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VABSTRACT
Communist Parties in the European Parliament:
The Quest for Legitimacy
(August, 1976)
John Foster Leich. B.A., Swarthmore College
M.A., Yale University. Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Gerard Braunthal
Communist parties have been present in the
European Parliament, the proto-legislature of the European
Community, since I969, despite the fact that traditional
communist and Soviet policy is antagonistic toward the
existence and further development of the Community. The
Italian Communist Party joined the Parliament in I969, and
¥ras followed by the Danish and French parties in 1973, and
the Dutch in 197^.
The presence of these parties in the Parliament
serves a two-fold legitimatizing function! it enhances the
representativeness of the Parliament and provides it with
an additional opposition voice, and it also adds to the
legitimati zation of the communist parties in their own
national subsystems. The parties participate in the Parlia
ment's work principally in the interest of domestic politic
al objectives. Any parallel policies among the parties
toward the construction of an integrated Europe are largely
accidental convergences.
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The Italian Communists have played the leading
role in the Communist and Allies Group in the Parliament.
They are committed to an increase in the Parliament's
authority within the Community and to direct elections for
the Parliament, with proportional representation. On these
two points the Italians are in conflict with the other
three Communist parties. The French Communist Party
strongly defends French national interests and independence
from Community control. The Danish and Dutch parties oppose
their countries' membership in the European Community, and
exercise their presence in order to prevent what they con-
sider further damage being done.
In agricultural questions, the communists seek to.
protect the small farmers and to exercise some control over
Community protectionist policies elsewhere in Europe. They
attempt to tackle the problem of control of multinational
corporations at the European level, and encourage communist
trade union participation in European decision-making. They
clearly distinguish between politico-economic integration
and intra-European military arrangements. They have accepted
the principle of multilateral trade negotiations by the EC,
on behalf of the member states, with third countries includ-
ing the Communist bloc.
The impact of the communist presence in the Parlia-
ment is difficult to determine for two reasons i awareness
of and interest in the work of the Parliament is slight as
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far as the general European public is concerned, while the
mode of operation of the Parliament with its drive for con-
sensus does not allow for the free play of measurable poli-
tical differences. Nevertheless the Communist and Allies
Group can be seen to serve in some respects as an opposition,
raising difficult and unpopular questions and airing a view-
point not otherwise heard in European institutions. Commu-
nist Parliament members have been particularly successful in
raising issues involving human rights, the problems of small
farmers, and trade union participation in EC actions.
In the Parliament the communists, unlike the other
five political groups, often find themselves in an isolated
position. However, v;hen an opportunity for collaboration
with the other groups is offered, the communists are quick
to take advantage in order to secure the passage of resolu-
tions in which they are interested. On the other hand, the
mere fact of participation in the Parliament hais not led to
closer relations or a harmonization of policy among the
parties in the Group.
The communist presence in the European Parliament
can be regarded as one of the significant turning points in
the development of eurocommunism, " or the determination of
some Western communist parties to develop a type of
socialism on a model which is quite distinct from that now
existing in Western Europe, the Soviet Union or China.
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INTRODUCTION
When the first comraanist party joined the
European Parliament in 1969. this move appeared to be so
completely out of character and in conflict with the
traditional communist attitude toward the Common Market
that it seemed to me obvious that an appropriate area of
political research would be the behavior of communist party
members in this forum. The official Soviet position has
been—and still is. for all practical purposes-that the
European Community is an organization for the protection
and benefit of West European and American monopoly capital-
ism, and is an inevitable adjunct in the exploitation of
the European workingman. By contrast the West European
communist parties, in particular the Italians, must have
held a different view of the Community and must have had a
different philosophy in mind when they decided to work
within and not outside the institutional structure of the
Common Market.
My research therefore has attempted (l) to deter-
mine, chiefly on the basis of a study of the parliamentary
sessions between I969 and I975 and other related material,
what objectives the communist parties are seeking through
their participation in one of the governing organs of the
European Community; (2) to assess the success or failure the
parties have experienced in reaching these objectives; and
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(3) to ascertain, if possible, whether or not there is now
evolving a common policy of two or more West European com-
rounist parties toward the problems of the nine member
states of the Community, such as might be described by the
today popular but imprecise term of "eurocomraunism,
"
It is a hypothesis of this paper that the presence
of the communist party in the Parliament is directly related
both to the legitimacy of the institutions of the European
Community and to the legitimacy of these same parties within
their own national subsystems. I have described this rela-
tionship as the legitimatizing role of the Communist and
Allies Group in the European Parliament. I have also pro-
ceeded on the assumption that at this point in the political
development of Western Europe democracy is an essential
element of legitimacy, and that in turn parliamentary control
over executive and bureaucratic action is one of the pre-
requisites of democracy. In this connection consideration
has been given to the extent to which the communist parties
function as an opposition in the European Parliament and with
respect to other European institutions.
The research has involved a study of the composi-
tion, organization, and behavior of the Communist and Allies
Parliamentary Groupi and it has entailed a perusal of the
record of the Parliament's debates for the six years in ques-
tion, personal observation of three separate Parliamentary
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sessions, interviews with Group members and their staff,
the consultation of all pertinent monographic and secondary
sources, and exchanges of views and ideas with the principal
American and foreign experts in this particular field.
The approach of the paper is both historical and
analytical, in the belief that through studying changes in
political positions over a six year period a basic continu-
ity of policy line can be deduced. Considerable attention
has been paid to the differences in the approaches of the
four communist parties concerned, since it is one of the
goals of this paper to determine if a "eurocommunistic"
approach to Europe does in fact exist. It is through the
dialectic of differences that a greater precision in policy
enunciation can be ascertained.
Tools for the measurement of the political impact
of the communist presence in the European parliament are of
necessity heterogeneous and approximative. Use has been
made of public opinion surveys, tabulations of parliament-
ary statistics, personal biographies, and the impressions
of those directly involved in the European Community's
political process. The dramatic events of 1976 which are
causing a reevaluation of West European communism have in-
evitably had their retroactive impact on the conclusions of
this study.
CHAPTER I
STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Historical Development
The European Parliament (EP) is one of the four
governing bodies of the European Community (EC). It shares
authority with the policy-making Council of Ministers, who
represent the nine member governments; with the EC execu-
tive organ, the European Commission, representing the Com-
munity as a whole; and with the European Court of Justice,
the final authority on Community law. As a parliament, the
EP is a unique institution. While it is not today a legis-
lature in the sense of being a rule-making body, nor is it
a parliament in the sense of being the core of responsible
government for the EC, the EP is nonetheless a transnational
organization with constantly but slowly increasing influence
on the development of European policy; far different from
the traditional international and European bodies such as
the United Nations General Assembly, the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe, or even the Assembly of
the West European Union.
The EP was born in 1952 as the Common Assembly of
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The Common
Assembly owed its origin to the fact that certain sovereign
functions with respect to the control of coal and steel in-
dustries had been transferred to the ECSC High Authority by
the six founding members of the Community! France, Italy,
2the German Federal Republic. Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg. Since these functions were no longer subject
to the control of the national parliaments of the six
founders, the Common Assembly was established to fill the
gap. However, chiefly at the insistence of France, the
Assembly was established as a consultative body, hardly able
to hamper the supranational activity of the High Authority.
When the other two communities, the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity (Euratom), were formed as a result of the Treaty of
Rome in 1957, tho Common Annembly was renamed the European
Parliamentary Assembly and continued as a single body to
perform the same function for the ESC and Euratom as it had
for the ECSC. In I967, when the three commission-type
organs of each community wore fused, the European Parliament
assumed its present name without any change in function.
The original parliament had a membership of 1^2»
36 each from France, Germany, and Italy; 1^ each from
Belgium and the Netherlands; and 6 from Luxembourg. In 1973t
when the EC was en^larged to nine member states, the SP was
increased to I98, Britain being allotted 36 members, and
Denmark and Ireland 10 each. After the British referendum
in June, 1975, the Labor Party occupied its seats in the
1. Gerda Zellentin, "Form and Function of the Opposition in
the European Communities," Government and Opposition ,
April-' uly. I967. p. ^H7.
Maison de I'SuroDe in Strasbourg, and the EP was complete.
EP members are designated by their national
parliaments according to procedures devised by each institu-
tion. Until now the EC has exercised no control over
parliamentary membership, other than to require that EP
members be members of their national parliament at the time
of their designation. Direct elections of EP members are
due to be instituted in 1978, as will be further described
below.
Organization of the EP
The EP meets once each month for a four or five
day session, except for the month of August. Parliamentary
committees meet more freauently. All but two of the plenary
sessions are held in Strasbourg, the remainder are held in
Luxembourg. The secretariat and administrative headauarters
of the Parliament are in Luxembourg.
The EP is the only Community institution whose
proceedings are conducted in public. Plenary sessions are
opent committee sessions are private. The sessions are
conducted in the six different languages of the EC, with
simultaneous translations. Documentation is also available
in the six languages.
The EP has twelve standing committees, covering
political matters, economics and finance, budget, agricul-
ture, social affairs (labor), public health, legal affairs.
transport and regional policy, cultural affairs, energy
research and technology, development and cooperation (with
associated states), and external economic relations (with
the rest of the world). The Parliament is run by a Bureau,
elected for one year, consisting of the President and twelve
vice presidents, and-.by courtesy-the chairman of the
political groups. As the Presidential Committee (or En-
larged Bureau), the Bureau, the group chairmen, and the
chairmen of the twelve standing com.mittees together set the
agenda, committee assignments, the disposal of questions,
and the like, for the Parliament. The Enlarged Bureau m.ay
invite 3C Commissioners or Council members to attend it-
meetings for the purpose of coordination and information.
The political groups are uniquely important to
the work of the E?.^ Unlike other international bodies,
ever since 1958 the members of the EP have grouped themselves
not by nationality but by political persuasion. In Stras-
bourg and Luxembourg they take their seats from right to
left as in a national parliament. Today there are six
political groups in the EP. from right to leftj Liberals
(25), European Progressive Democrats (17), Conservatives
(20). Christian Democrats (5I). Socialists (64). and Commu-
nists (15). The European Progressive Democrats consist of
2. John_ Fitzmaurice. The Party Groups in the European
Parliament (vVestmead; raTribo rough. RanTsT. England 1
Saxon House. D.C. Heath, Ltd.. 1975). p. 24.
twelve French Gaullists and five Irish Fianna Fa'il members.
The Conservatives include, in addition to the British mem-
bers, two Danes. In order to cope with delicate problems
of nomenclature and esoteric differentiation, the Liberals
and Communists each include the term "and allies- in their
title. There is also a small number of independents sitting
toward either end of the chamber, three to the right
(Italian neo-fascists) and three to the left (two Walloons
and one Irish independent member of the House of Lords).
Increasingly it has been through these groups that
decisions over appointments, agenda, and matters of parlia-
mentary policy have been taken.^ Group cohesiveness is high,
with a maximum deviation from unanimity in roll call votes
in 1963-66 of 17.6 percent in the case of the Liberal and
Allies Group, while the average for all groups was 9.7 per-
cent. In the case of the Communist and Allies Group, which
was not formed until 1973. the deviation is probably less
than one percent.^ Group cohesion is substantially higher
than cohesion on a national basis. In I963-66 the maximum
deviation by nationality, in the case of Germany, was
5, Ibid., p. ^1.
^, Zellentin. 0£. cit.
, p. 420.
5- This cohesiveness index may be deceptive. Roll call
votes are infrenuent in the EP, and CAG delegates are
often intentionally absent by national groups when a
vote is called. Those present generally vote "abstain."
26.5 percent, while the average for all nationalities was
15.5 percent.^
When the Parliament is seized of a particular
topic, either in the form of a request for an opinion by the
Council or on its own initiative, the matter is referred to
the appropriate standing committee. The committee appoints
a rapporteur, who drafts a report and presents the committee's
decision on the matter to the plenary. Usually the report
includes a motion for parliamentary action. After discus-
sion the motion is voted, often by a voice vote or show of
hands. Roll call and secret ballots are rare.^
Mode of Operation
The EP participates in the development of Community
policy by expressing its opinion on proposals of the Council
of Ministers, posing written and oral questions, and exercis-
ing a very limited financial control. In broad terms, within
the EC institutional structure it is the thirteen-man pro-
fessional Commission, appointed by the nine member govern-
ments, which is charged with taking the initiative in actions
designed to fulfill the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, for
6. Zellentin, loc. cit.
7. This fact makes it difficult to quantify EP decisions in
terras of f^roup cohesiveness, and to assess the impact of
individuals or groups on these decisions.
submission to the Council for approval. The Council, repre-
senting the nine governments, ig the rule-making body of the
EC. making decisions generally on the basis of unanimity,
although majority rule is provided in some cases. The rile
of the Parliament is one of consultation or concertatinn
Under the Treaty, the EP has the power to censure or to force
the Commission to resign as a group, a power which because of
its sledge-hammer-like nature has never been exercised.
In practice the EP is also consulted informally by
the Commission during the course of the drafting of its
initiatives. As a result a sort of alliance has developed
between Parliament and Commission whereby the EP has been
able in a small degree to convert the Commission into its
own spokesman vis-a-vis the Council. « A Commission member
is always present during the Parliament's discussion of
measures proposed by the Council. A similar procedure applies
to treaties, where the opinion of the EP is elicited by the
Council prior to the treaty's final ratification.
It should be noted that neither in the case of
Council resolutions nor treaties is the opinion of the EP
considered binding. Frequently the Commission supports the
Parliament's proposed amendments, but it is not obliged to
do so. Similarly the Council may also amend its own resolu-
tions or other action in accordance with the Parliament's
Fitzmaurice, 0£. cit.
. p. 53.
suggestions, but it also is not obliged by the Treaty to
accept the Parliament's conclusions.
A more effective means of influencing EC action is
through the institution of the parliamentary question, where,
by EP members, committees, or groups may interrogate members
of the Council or Commission, either orally or in writing,
on matters of Community interest. The fact that these qucs^
tions are usually debated in plenary EP sessions means that,
potentially at least, public attention may be attracted to
the Parliament's assiduousness in pursuing possible injustice
inequities, treaty violations, or other improprieties on
the part of either Council or Commission in their conduct of
the work of the EC. However, the fact that the EP sessions
appear to arouse public or press interest only under very
exceptional circumstances may serve to negate much of the
force which the questioning function of the Parliament would
otherwise command.
Power of the Purse
In one area alone, that of budgetary control, the
EP has after a long struggle developed a very small measure
of direct influence on the EC policy-making process. Since
1975 the overwhelming portion of the EC's budget has come not
from contributions from the nine members but from the Commun-
ity's own resourcesi customs levies, penalties on imports,
and a small share of the tax on value added (TVA) which is
now uniform throughout the EC. Also, since 1975 the EP has
been given full authority to reduce or to increase within
certain limits the EC's budget for so-called non-obligatory
expenditures. In the category of obligatory expenditures fall
those items which are required by the Treaty of Rome, such
as expenditures from the European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and the European Social Fund, in other
words nearly all the program expenditures of the EC. Non-
obligatory expenditures therefore concern chiefly the admin-
istrative portion or only about if percent of the EG budget,
although this represents a portion of considerable nuisance
value. As far as obligatory expenditures are concerned, the
Parliament's role remains that of being required to be con-
sulted by the Council and of being entitled to express its
opinion,^
The EP also plays a role, jointly with the Council,
in the audit of EC expenditures. An auditor's committee,
appointed by the Council, reports to both organs; and both
are. required to give discharge to the Commission on the
proper expenditure of budgeted funds. The implications of
this new function, which was provided for in the Luxembourg
Treaty of 1970 and h'u? only now come into effect, are still
unclear.
9. David Coombes. The Power of the Purse in the EuropeanCommunities ( LondonT CHaTKanTHousej PEF.~l972). p. 3o ff.
IQ, IMd.. p. 73.
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Proposals Tor the F..t.
—
The question of the powers of the EP is a matter
Of continuing concern, as more and more of the authority of
the member states is transferred to the institutions of the
Community. This process of transfer raises the ouestion of
the legitimacy of the EC institutions, particularly with
respect to their susceptibility to testing for democratic
characteristics in both form and methods of procedure.
Together with the increased budgetary powers
approved in the Luxembourg Treaty of 197O. the EC has been
considering a proposal to enlarge the legislative powers of
the Parliament, the so-called "Vedel Report. This report
proposes a system of co-decision between the Parliament and
the Council, whereby the Council would have to respond to
parliamentary opinions with alternative proposals in an on-
going process which would eventually result in a fully
agreed solution. The Vedel Report also proposes that co-
decision be applied to the selection of the President of the
Commission by the member governments, and that the other
Commissioners then be appointed by him. thus constituting a
sort of parliamentary investiture for the Commission as a
11. Commission of the European Communities. Report of the
y.prkin^ Partx £^2113 nin- th? Probl..m of thfEKlaT^e^t
21 the Pojrers of th^ turi-K-in VarUanent. "Kpport Vodil"(Brussels. Office for Official Publications of thi~European Communities, I972).
More realistic and viable counterpart to the Parliament's
power of dismissal.
While the Vedel Report sidesteps the question of
direct election of the EP members as not essential to the
implementation of the reforms it proposes, the direct elec
tions provide a third element, together with the budgetary
and legislative reforms, in the Parliament's continuing
effort to enhance its legitimatizing role in the European
Community.
12. For a discussion of the current direct elections
proposal, see pp, 30-36 and 62-6? below.
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CHAPTERII
THE LEGITIMATIZING ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Legitimacy and its Elements in a Democratic System
At the risk of proliferating neologisms in an
already overcrowded field. I have opted for the word
-legitimatization" as the term to describe, with Seymour
Lipset.
-the capacity of a political system to engender and
maintain the belief that the existing political institutions
are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society."^
Thus the European Parliament is exercising this capacity when
it performs a legitimatizing role on behalf of the European
Community as a whole. If we define legitimacy with Richard
M, Merelman as "the quality of 'oughtness* that is perceived
by the public to inhere in a political regime,"^ then
legitimacy is the outcome of the legitimatization process,
whereby the aforementioned belief is engendered, just as
democracy is the outcome of the process of democratization.
But legitimacy is more than the outcome in terms of individual
decisions. As Robert A. Dahl points out, legitimacy arises
from a belief not only in the Tightness of a decision, but
1, Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracyi
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American
Political Science Review
.
LIII (March, 1959), p. 8^7"^
2. Richard M. Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," American
Political Science Review
.
LX (Sept., 1966), p. 5^+B7
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also the Tightness of the process by which that decision has
been reached.3 Merelman's
"oughtness" and Dahl's brightness"
must therefore refer to both the outputs and the mode of
operation of the system in question.
Neither the EP nor the EC as a whole is today fully
invested with legitimacy in the sense of Lipsefs definition.
The representativeness of the Community institutions and
their responsiveness to popular control are open to question.
The entire conception and structure of the Community constitute
a radical departure in political behavior. Guglielrao
Ferrero has said that legitimacy "is never a natural, spon-
taneous, simple, and immediate condition."^ No government or
institution is born legitimate; a certain period of time is
required before this attribute can be ascribed to the
phenomenon in question. It is with this time lag that this
paper will be concerned.
As a political institution, the EP invokes both the
output and the mode of operation aspects of legitimacy. The
outputs produced by the Parliament are in the form of recom-
mendations to and criticisms of the actions of the other
organs of the Community. These recommendations and criticisms
are formulated by means of a procedure which involves
3, Robert A. Dahl. A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicagoi
University of Chicago Press. 1956), p. 46n.
4. Guglielmo Ferrero. The Principles of Power (New Yorki
^^.F. Putnam's Sons.n:942). pp. 138^3^
1^
confidential and public discussion, recourse to expert advice,
and the principle of majority decision by representatives of
all the significant European political parties. If this pro-
cedure whereby EP outputs are reached is recognized as
legitimate, then these formally non-binding opinions and
resolutions of the EP will gain in authority and persuasive-
ness. In other words, they will increasingly acquire the
attribute of legitimacy, and in so doing will legitimatize
the EC actions to which they refer.
In this discussion legitimacy will be considered
in its contemporary V/estern context, wherein, as Giovanni
Sartori has explained, an essential element thereof is
democracy.^ To f-lax V/eber's fourth category of legitimacy,
the belief in the legality of those outcomes which are correct
in form and have been made in the customary manner,^ will be
added a further embellishment, by positing a democratically
chosen authority which is behaving in accordance with gener-
ally accepted democratic norms as a further essential of
legitimacy. This is not the point at which to embark upon a
full discussion of the definition of democracy and democratic
procedure. This presentation will be confined to the state-
ment, along with Dahl, that the existence of an opposition is
5. Giovanni Sartori, "Democracy," Int^'rnati onal Encyclopedia
of the Social Sciences
.
I968 ed.
,
IV, 112.
6. Mix Weber, Economy and Society . Vol. 1 (New Yorkt
Bedminster Press, 19t>8)
, 37.
perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of democracy
itself, and that "the absence of an opposition is evidence
if not always conclusive proof, for the absence of democ-
racy. Furthermore, the term "opposition'* will be defined—
again with Dahl—as a group within a particular political
system which cannot definitively determine the conduct of
that system and which is opposed to the way in which the
government of the system is conducted by those who can make
such a determination.^ While it is possible to conceive of
an oppositionless political system which still operates in
accordance with democratic precepts, these same precepts pre-
suppose the admissibility of an opposition should one
materialize.
The obverse of the requirement of the existence of
an opposition as a constituent element of democracy is repre-
sentativeness, or the degree to which formal arrangements
exist whereby conflicting or divergent views within a system
may be and are in fact expressed during the decision-making
process. This is a somewhat more rigorous definition than
that of Sartori, who describes a political system as democrat
ic when it has as its kernel a collective body that is "free
7. Robert A. Dahl. Political Oppositions in Western Societie
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 19 o^) , p. xviii.
8. rfcid. cf. H.B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory
(New York: Oxford Univerijity Press, T^6o;, p. 1^19.
enough to express a diversity of views and interests.
Assuming that the decisions of the body established by these
formal arrangements are reached by a majority vote, which—
with limitations—is probably another key principle of derr.oc
racy.^^it follo-A-s that the minority will by definition be the
opposition, or that group within the system which is opposed
to but unable to control the policy of the institution in
question.
The role of any parliament as a means of popular
control over governmental action poses a much debated
question today. If we regard such control as another key
element of democracy in today's world, we find that it is
two-fold in nature. The parliament itself must be subject
to popular control in the form of periodic elections at
agreed intervals in which candidates representing conflicting
or divergent views may and do in fact participate. In turn
the "government- of the system, whether it emanates directly
9. Giovanni Sartori, "Representation* Representational
Systems,- International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, I968 ed.
,
Vol. XIII, 470,
IQ. H. B. Mayo, 0£. cit. , pp. 166-202.
11. Willard N. Hogan, Representative Government and European
Integration (Lincolnj University of Nebraska Press,
1967), pp. 20^-208. Cf; European Parliament, Directorate
General for Research and Documentation, Sympori urn on
European Intef^ratjon and the Future of PiTrlianients in
Europe. Surrmary r.eport. ?E 36 96? (Luxembourgi 197^77
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from the parliament or not. must be subject to what David
Coombes calls the parliament's managerial function. This
function concerns itself with the fairness, appropriateness,
and efficiency of governmental action, and is exercised by
some institutionalized means of control over the selection
or retention of the personnel of the government, means of
scrutiny and inquiry into their actions, and an ultimate
sanction in the form of the control of appropriations.
Within this broad framework, a great deal of
variety in terms of institutional forms and behavior may ob-
tain. Provided, however, that the above elements are present
in some form, a regime of parliamentary control may be said
to be in operation, which will serve to contribute to the
legitimatization of the regime in question.
The Problem of Democratic Control
in International and Supranational Crg.ini nations
The European Community is generally recognized as a
supranational, as distinguished from international, organiza-
tion. This means that the nine national states which are
members of the organization have transferred certain sovereign
rights to decide particular matters of policy to the supra-
national organization they have created for this purpose.
12. Eurooean Parliament, Symposium on Europran IntOiP^ratlon and
-the Future of Parliaments m iCuropeT, 1 1 tt'roduci or y xTiuor
tiKi 1 ^'^>_ oT IN-^t icn'il iTirTTar^t^nts , No t ( t-y
'
y vo i es; i;a
v
uavia Udombes. PH " V5"r "Vyy vTuxem do urg , 19?^) » p.
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Thus the right to fix tariffs on imports, to make trade agree-
ments with third countries, to regulate the production of coal,
steel and agricultural products, as well as many other rights.'
have been vested in the Community organs. The fact that the
Council of Ministers may operate on the principle of unanimity
in these matters does not militate against its supranational-
ity for the purposes of this discussion. In the first place,
many of the EC decisions, especiallyin matters of detail, are
made by the Commission, which is not responsible to the member
states' governments, but is subject to policy control by the
Council and to an as yet unused censure and dismissal author-
ity of the Parliament. Furthermore, having once taken the
steps required to pool their authority over specific matters
such as occurred with the creation of the European Coal and
Steel Community in 1952. it has now become virtually impossi-
ble for the member states to become disentangled functionally
from the joint decision-making process. This was clearly il-
lustrated by the French experience in trying to escape from
the commitments of the Common Agricultural Policy in 1965.'^^
13. In an effort to assert French control over EC decision-mak-
ing. General de Gaulle resorted to a boycott of the insti-
tutions of the EC. When the other EG members made it clear
that they proposed to continue the Community, and perhaps
even replace France with Britain, de Gaulle was forced to
abandon his boycott by powerful forces of French industry.
These interests, who had formerly supported the General,
had invested too much in the future of the Common Market
to be Ifft in an isolated position, and began publicly to
criticize the Pre:^idont's policy. In January. I966, French
delegates returned to their empty chairs having gained
little or no advantage for France from the boycott. Cft
W.-Hartlf?y Clnrkr. The Politics of the Common Ma rket
(liin^lewood Cliffs I Prentice-riall
,
I967). p. 136^
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The reauire^ent of democratic control poses particu-"
lar problems in supranational organizations. Simply stated
supranationality removes the decision-maKing process one stlp
further from the basic controls which the electorate and par-
liament exercise over the governments of the member states
Tariffs, trade agreements, and the regulation of industry and
agriculture are no longer subject to ratification or concur-
rence by the parliaments of the member states. At the same
time no alternative has yet been devised, not excepting the
European Parliament, which could exercise the control formerly
the province of the national parliaments while maintaining the
supranational character of the decision-making process. It
is toward an improvement of the parliamentary control process
by the European Parliament that much of the thought on in-
stitutional reorganization of the European Community is now
being directed. The question of direct elections for members
of the EP. its budgetary powers, and its role in the project-
ed political union of Europe are all matters which arise from
this deficiency in the element of popular control over
executive action, and the concomitant deficiency in legitimacy.
The problem is formidable. As James A. Caporaso
has pointed out, there is an almost total absence of demo-
cratic institutions at the Community level. Political
parties are not organized at the European level, but remain
Ik. Jaraen A Caporaso,. The Structure and Function of Euron»anInterrntion rPacihcT'aIisades,--CXr-aooWearT'OTiri^Tn*^
Co.7l9V5T7 pp. 68-69. - . "
national detachments with national goals. The EP-s only
serious power, that of dissolution of the Commission, is too
clumsy for practical implementation, let alone against what
has now become the EP's ally in a struggle to wrest authority
from the Council. The Parliament is often consulted too late
in the decision-making process to make even its advisory
function meaningful. Finally, the Co'oncil of Minister., th^,
ultimate decision maker, is responsible to no one at the
European level, and is scarcely amenable to control by the
national parliaments."^^
The Erosion of National Parliamentary Control
over Executive Action ~
The problem of what Karlheinz Neunreither calls a
-legitimacy deficiency ( Legitimationsdefizi
t
) affii^-ho not
only the EC, but the national governments as well, as
15 In recent years the control problem has been compoundedby the creation of the Council's Committee of Permanent
Representatives (COKEPSR). This body, selected at the
ambassadorial level, reviews and makes recommendations
on Commission initiatives. In areas outside the Com-
mission's competence, it is COREPER which is charged bythe Council with drafting projects for Community legis-lation. Com:nissioner Altiero Spinelli has called COREPER
a sort of Chamber of States in embryo.
. .2which7 takes •
oart m the legislative function of the Community."(Spmelli, The European Adventure /londoni Charles Knight
Co Ltd.. 1972/, pp. 170-172. Cfi Fitzmaurice, op^ cit.
.
pp. 7-8).
16. Karlheinz Neunreither, "Legitimationsprobleme in der
Europaischen Gemeinschaf t" (paper presented at the
Arbeitp-ruppe Int.-rn:itionale, Orr?ini satinn und Intr-^'rati onder Deutscnen VereinifTung fur Politischo Wissenschaft
meeting m Tubingen, June 20, 1975), p. 11,
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parliamentary control over executive action has progressively
become less effective. Legislative initiative more and more
has become concentrated in the cabinets of the European
national governments. Because of the existence of stable
parliamentary majorities in eight of the nine member states.
Italy being for the present the exception, little real opposi.
tion arises with respect to government proposed measures or
programs. Even when legislatures do take the initiative,
the final decision-making authority is in many instances
transferred to the cabinet, and thence-^because of the tech-
nical complexity of many of the necessary implementing
decisions—to the permanent bureaucracy which is one step
further removed from popular control.
^
Between elections, the opposition in a European
system of cabinet government is confined to the role of a
critic who can be visibly effective only within the parlia-
mentary arena, where he can directly confront the governing
majority. The efficacy of the opposition—by definition a
minority which is unable to exercise definitive control
over the policy of the government to which it is opposed—
is further weakened by the transfer of the decision-making
authority outside of the range in which the critic is still
effective. As the decision-making authority moves from
legislature to cabinet and then often on to the bureaucracy,
the opposition's leverage continues to diminish.
The legitimacy deficiency arising from the
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difficult to control the actions of these institutions through
the development of an informed public opinion, sufficiently
sophisticated to be able to criticize EC measures intelligent-
ly and effectively.
There is one school of thought, represented by
Willard Hogan. which deserves attention in this connection.
Hogan holds that the presumption that parliamentary control
is a prerequisite of representative government and democracy
is a fallacious one. and that to compare the European Parlia-
ment in this respect to a national parliament is an error.
National parliamentary control arose from the need to curb
excessive or arbitrary royal power and to ensure that public
policy would be responsive to popular needs and desires.
Because of the lack of similarity between the institutional
structure of the EC and this traditional national pattern,
the need for parliamentary control at the EC level has been
exaggerated. "The Commission is not a Louis XIV or Charles
I- and the Council, having no power of initiation, cannot
take matters into its own hands. It is a mistake to assume
that only elected officials have a representative character.
An independent, essentially professional and technical body
such as the Commission can be just as representative of
Europe's needs and desires in its field of competence as an
X8. Willard N. Hogan. 0£. cit
19. IMd .
. p. 207.
2k
elected body. Hogan argues that the separation of powers
inherent in the four-way division of the EC's institutions-
the Council, the Commission, the Parliament, and the Court-
is an adequate safeguard of the public interest, and that all
this talk about parliamentary control is merely a misapplica-
tion of a national model to a supranational institution.
Hogan's view would, however, still appear to be that of the
minority, and under the principle of majority rule, we must
cast it aside as not controlling.
The European Parliament and Legitimacy
RepreGentativenesa. It would be difficult to
describe the European Parliament as it is now constituted as
a fully representative organization. In the first place, the
breakdown by national units results in a very crude model of
representation, in which the smaller nations are heavily
over-represented in proportion to their populations. The
four largest countries (France, Germany, Italy and the UK)
each have thirty-six members. The next in size (Belgium and
the Netherlands), each of which has about 20 percent of the
population of the average of the largest countries, with
fourteen seats has almost 40 percent as many representatives
as the largest members. The next group (Denmark and Ireland),
each of which has a population of less than 10 percent of the
average of the largest countries, with ten seats has more
than 25 percent as many representatives? while the smallest
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country (Luxembourg), with a population less than 1 percent
of that Of the largest countries, has with six seats over
15 percent as many representatives.
Nor is the breakdown of the various national
delegations an accurate reflection of the popular votes in
the most recent electoral consultations. One reason for
this is of course the fact that the various national electoral
systems are not commensurate. Three of the nine member
nations (France. Ireland, and the UK) have single member
electoral districts, while the rest have some form of pro-
portional representation. The following tables show one
example from each system, and the lack of proportion which
is evident in each case.
TABLE 1-A.—France.
^ , Actual No.Share of popular No. of seats of seats
Partv ^^^3.^ """l-J held byi^^SL (first round) give in EP Party
7n
"I'R-KI 38. W. 14 16
PS and Allies 21.65 8 9
21.26 8 4
Centre
Deraocratique 12.^3 4
Others 6.16
2
2 4
20. See list of abbreviations following the Table of Contents
of this study.
TABLE 1-3.—Italy.
x^arxv
Share of
popular vote,
1972
No. of seats
this would
f?:ive in EP
Actual No.
seats hpl(i
Dartv
38. 8/. Ik 16
i'ui+In. Sin. 27.2 10 9
DCT
9.6 3
5.1 2 2
PU 3.9 1 1
PRI 2.9 1 1
MSI 8.7 3 3
of
by
The disparities in the French delegation may be
explained in part by the fact that the 1973 run-off election
showed a sharp drop in votes for the Centre De^'mocratinue
. a
slight decrease in the PCF vote, and a moderate increase in
the Socialist and UDR-RI vote. It is interesting to note
that in the case of both France and Italy the communist
parties appear to be under-represented, while the Socialists
are slightly over-represented in comparison with the most
recent evidence of their electoral strength. The Italian
Communist Party's (PCI) gains in the 1975 municipal and re-
gional elections (confirmed in the legislative elections of
1976) could be cited as well as evidence of a further and
continuing disparity in this regard. The two-seat discrep-
ancy in the representation of the Italian Christian Democrats
(DC) is explained by the fact that the South Tyrolean People*
Party (SVP), which votes with the DC, has been allotted one
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representative each from the Italian Senate and Chamber, a
representation the symbolic importance of which outweighs
the fact Of the smallness of its popular vote. In the case
of France, the system of a run-off election (scrutin
llmioi^disser^ I deu2C tours), when there is no majority in
the first round, tends to favor the larger parties, such as
the UDR. in tei-ms of the total members of the Assembl.<;
NatiorvOe elected. This advantage is in turn reflected in
the cor^position of the European Parliament delegation,
which was selected by the French legislature following the
March. 1973, elections.
The small size of the Danish and Dutch delega-
tions mnkes it difficult to reflect with any accuracy th^.
latef?t nlPc-oral results in the party composition of the
delegation. In the case of Denmark, the January 9. 1975,
election returns contrast with the present composition of the
Danish EP delectation as follows
t
TABLE 1-C .
--Denmark.
Share of No. of seats Actual No. of
Partv ^^S"^ Lo. ^^^^ "^^"^^ seats held byvote, 1975 give in EP party
Social Democrats 29,9?S 3
^
Radical Liberal 7.0 1
^
Conservative 5,5 3^ 0
Social! s-t-
People's'^ and
Communist 9,1
a^rPed^r?th?r%^''\P^''^'S^ "^^^ combined, since they had
pfrties to the Ip^^'"'' " """^ delc.gate for both
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TABLE l.C.
-Denmark - continued
Share of No. of seats Actual No of
S!l225 JiLTi.
-^tJ:^
Centre Democrats 2.1%
Christian
People's 5^5 1 0
3
1
Liberal 23.3 2
Progress 13,6 i
The present EP delegation thus appears not to
reflect the losses suffered by the Centre Democrats at the
last election, and to over-represent slightly the Liberal
Party. In general, however, the left-wing parties should not
have cause for complaint.
The Netherlands delegation is based on the elections
of 1972, the results of which offer little contrast in compar-
ison with the present composition of the EP delegation.
TABLE 1-D.—Netherlands
Party
Share of
popular
vote. 1972
No. of seats
this would
£:ive in EP
Actual No.
Sf?ats held
rarty
Liberals 2+ 3
Anti-
Revolutionary 8.8 1 1
Christian-
Historical 6.3 1 1
Catholic
•
s
People 17.7 2+ 3
Sociali sts 27.^ 5
Democrats * 66 ^.2 1- 0
Communists ^.5 1- 1
From this table it can be seen that the only dis-
proportion in the delegation arises from the fact that the
fractional seats have been assigned on the basis of the rule
of
-to him that has shall be given.- The three largest
parties, the Liberals. Catholic People's, and Socialists,
share between them most of the fractional seats, while the
Communists barely squeeze in under the minimum.
Having admitted these structural inequities in the
patterns of national and political party representations in
the European Parliament, we may now return to our criterion
of representativeness, namely: the degree to which all
significant conflicting or divergent views may be and are in
fact expressed during the decision-making process. Taking
as a model the four delegations in which communist party
members are present we see that there is a wide range of
opinion divergence expressed. At one end of the spectrum
stands the PCI, which has adopted a policy of working for
change within the existing framework which would lead to a
strengthening of the Parliament's role in the EC. More or
less in the middle stands the French Communif^t Party (PCF),
which is much less committed to the success of the EC in
principle and is wary of any increase in the authority of EC
institutions. At the opposite end we find the Danish Social-
ist People's Party (SFP). whose representative continuously
reiterates his party's opposition to Denmark's membership in
the EC, and the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN).
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whose representative—at least through the June, I975.
session-had not even taken the opportunity of making his
party's views known on this or any subject during the course
of the parliamentary sessions he attended. Similar spectra
of opinion differences are to be found in the other EP
political groups, particularly those such as the Socialists,
Liberals, and Christian Democrats, in which more than two
nationalities are represented.
From the time that the British Labor Party agreed
to take up its seats in Strasbourg in the July Session of
1975. no significant political trend (i.e.j with the exception
of extremist and fringe groups) has been boycotting or absent
from the EC institutions for reasons of principle.
Proposed Direct Elections for EP Members
. In Decem-
ber, 1975. the summit of the heads of government of the Nine
(the so-called European Council) agreed to hold direct
elections for the members of the European Parliament in May
or June, 1978. Provision was made whereby those countries
"who for technical reasons might not be ready for such elec-
tions," as Britain and Denmark had indicated might be the
case, could continue to appoint their delegations.^ This
decision was taken pursuant to Article I38 of the Rome Treaty
which called upon the Assembly (European Parliament) to "draw
up proposals for election by direct universal suffrage in
accordance with a uniform procedure in all member states."
ZZ, New York Times, December 3, 1975.
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At its January 1975 session, the Parliament adopted
a second Draft Convention on Elections to the European Parlia.
ment by Direct Universal Suffrage. An earlier convention on
the same subject, adopted in i960, had- been ignored by the
Council of Ministers, and was now out of date, as a result of
the enlargement of the EC to nine members. The I975 draft,
the so-called Patijn Report, named for the Dutch Socialist
deputy who was rapporteur for this subject, calls for an in-
crease in the membership of the EP from I98 to 355 members,
to be elected simultaneously on the same day for a five year
term under the electoral rules of each nation, pending the
drafting of a proposal—no later than I98O—for a uniform
electoral system. Members of national parliaments would not
be disqualified from candidacy for the European Parliament.
Article VIII of the draft states that the provisions govern-
ing the admission of political parties to elections in each
member state shall apply to elections to the European Parlia-
ment. Apparently the proposed uniform electoral system would
stop short of deciding which parties could present candidates
in each national area.
According to the Patijn report, the national break-
down of the 355 parliamentary members would bei
Germany 71
United Kingdom 67
Italy 66
France 65
Netherlands 27
Belgium 23
Denmark 17
32
Ireland 1^
Luxembourg 6
This distribution was reached as the result of a
formula which can be applied to new members or to important
demographic changes over the years. The formula is a follows,
cei.ll sL%^a?s''''°" °' ^^^^ —
2\ ""^^^ a population between one million and2.5 million are given a further six seats.
3., Up to a population of five million each state re-
iSIbftantsf^''^^"''
^^^^ ^^^"^ additional 500. OoS
4 For a population of between five million and tenmillion each state receives one further seat for eachadditional 750,000 inhabitants.
5. For a population of between ten million and fifty
"ii-i?^ ^^^^ state receives one further seat for eachadditional one million inhabitants or part thereof.
6. For a population exceeding fifty million each
state receives one further seat for each additional
1.5 million inhabitants or part thereof.
On July 12, IQ 76, the sumrr.it meeting of the European
Council in Brussels approved a slightly different distribution,
largely in response to French objections to the smaller number
of seats allotted to that nation (65 in contrast with Germany's
71). The new distribution calls for 81 seats for each of the
four largest countries (Germany, the UK, Italy and France),
25 for the Netherlands. 24 for Belgium, 16 for Denmark, 15 to
Ireland, and 6 to Luxembourg, for a total Parliament of 410
members. The press reports of the Council meeting do not in-
dicate what formula was used to reach these new figures, except
to point out that the distribution would facilitate a solution
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Of Britain's problems with her minority nationalities. Eighty-
one seats, for example, would enable both Catholics and
Protestants from Northern Irelanri -f-/^ -k^ v, ^ .uiiex land to be represented in the UK
delegation. ^3
Under the present system for the selection of
European Parliament members, the Communist and Allies Group
(CAG) in the Parliament consists of fifteen parliamentarians
(nine Italians, four French, one Danish, and one Dutch), or
7.65 percent of the total membership of I96. This is less
than the percentage of the total communist vote in the most
recent legislative elections in the nine European member
countries. In these elections the communist share of the re-
sult has beent
TABLE 2.—Communist Vote.^'^
92mli::L Percentage Date of Elertinn
Belgium
-j 2
Denmark (DKP only)^^ Zf,2
France
Germany
^3 ^^^2
Great Britain 197k
Ireland (no CP candidates) — I973
23. New York Times
,
July I3. 1976.
2^*. L'Esprosso
. December 12. 1975.
197^
1975
21.3 1973
he Danish member of the CAG belongs to the SFP. but claims
hi^'^PrSM^S^ I'h" ^''^ an well If ^VP votes were added ton s ligure. the percentage of course would be higher.
25. T
t
t
"
"""''"
'^ Percentage Date of ElPnt.Inn
Italy P„27.2 1972
Luxembourg 10^^
^^^^
Netherlands
3 ^^^^
These statistics would indicate that if direct
elections for a European Parliament are held in each of the
Nine in 1978, with the electoral system now being used to
elect national parliaments, the communist representation in
the new parliament will increase from 7.6 percent to at
least 9.9 percent. It is therefore not surprising that the
PCI has consistently pressed for direct elections to the
European Parliament. This has been with an eye to the
future as well. When and if Portugal and Greece join the
Community, communist representation should further increase
to 10.2 percent, based on the 1975 and 197^ elections in
these two countries respectively. The addition of Spain,
where no free elections have as yet been held in recent
years, may even raise this figure a percentage point or two
more.
What is surprising is the fact that the PCF and the
Danish SFP have both consistently opposed direct elections
to the Parliament. The reason for the PCF's opposition, as
we shall see later in detail, is the party's insistence that
French sovereignty not be impaired by supranational
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institutional arrangements.^^hile the SFP is following the
reservations expressed by two successive Danish governments
since Denmark's accession to the EC, as well as reenforcing
the party's own opposition to Denmark's continued member-
ship. 2^
The PCI has also demanded a further qualification
in the direct election proposal, to wit, that the election
be by proportional representation in all countries. Such a
requirement would in all likelihood permit communist partic-
ipation in the Luxembourg delegation, increase the PCF
participation, and possibly result in the election of a
Belgian CP representative. The Luxembourg CP at present has
6 seats in the country's 56 seat legislature, while the
Belgian CP has 5 out of 212.
Interest in direct elections with proportional
representation is not confined to the CAG. In Britain, both
the Liberal Party and the Welsh and Scottish Nationalist
Parties are strong backers of the proposal. The Liberals
see EP elections with proportional representation as a first
step to a PR system for the Parliament at Westminster, which
would substantially increase the Liberal's representation;
while the Nationalists see it as an important step toward
26. Gerard Eordu. Official Journal of the European Communi-
ties. Debates of the European Parliament
. l4 January,
19/5. pp. 64-65 (hereinafter cited as "Debates " )
.
27. Jens Maigaard, Debates
. 29 April, 1975. p. 45.
Welsh and Scottish autonomy and eventual independence.^Q
The Opposition's Role Within the 3:^stem, According
to Gerda Zellentin. the communist parties were originally
deliberately excluded from the Common Assembly of the ECSC.
predecessor of the European Parliament, by the six founding
governments in order to further the development of consensus
in the Assembly and the other organs of the Community.^^
Since 1969. however, when communist party representation in
the EP began, somewhat to the surprise of outside observers
the communist parties have appeared to behave like tradi-
tional opposition parties, criticizing and attempting to pre-
vent the passage of measures with which they are in disa^ree-
raent. They have played the rules of the parliamentary game,
made use of such acceptable techniques as oral and written
questions, attempted filibusters and the destruction of
credibility through the citing of new evidence and the
impugning of the motives of other EP members and of repre-
sentatives of the Commission.
The communist parties are not alone in performing
an opposition function in the EP. In the first place, the
28. Interview with U. W. Kitzinger, editor of Journal of
Common Market Studies, Oxford. June 1, 1976.
29. Zellentin. 0£. cit.
, p. 423. Cfi Enrico Vinci. II
Parlamento riuropeo (Milam G. Giuffre. I968), pp. 53-54.
3Q. Fitzmaurice, o^, cit.. pp. 58-59.
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role Of the opposition in the EP is quite different from that
which it plays in a national legislature. The EP has no
elective role with respect to the executive of the community,
and its majority does not necessarily support the program
submitted to the Parliament by the policy initiating and
making organizations of the EG, the Council of Ministers and
the Commission. There is thus no continuing focus of cohe-
sion for those groups in the EP who oppose particular aspects
of Community policy, no dialogue between government and
opposition such as one finds in most European national
parliaments. Furthermore, the communist parties are merely
one of several opposition groups, along with the Socialists,
Christian Democrats. Liberals, etc., depending on the issue
at hand. However, the communist parties may be said still
to have the character of a "major structural opposition," in
the words of R. A. Dahl,^ in that their goal is still
ultimately to change the economic structure in which the EC
operates, and to adjust the political structure and institu-
tions of the EC in order to achieve this economical goal.
At the same time, the communist parties have chosen
to perform this structural opposition function within and not
outside the institutional framework of the EC; and in this
fashion, they do in fact contribute to the legitimatization
of the Community structure. A consensus thus exists within
-31. Dahl, Political Oppositions , p. 3^2.
the Parliament, not on the future economic structure of
Europe, nor on the nature of the political institutions
Which are to determine this structure, but upon the existence
Of the EC as an inevitable stage in reaching any economic
goal whatever, given the present power relationships in
Europe. and the rest of the world.
0£Eositionls Sub^szstem The degree to
which the communist parties' presence in the European Parlia-
ment contributes to its legitimacy bears a direct relation-
ship to the role of the communist parties in each of the
European national subsystems. In none of the present members
of the community is the communist party illegal. In five of
the Nine, communist parties shared in coalition rule in the
immediate post-World War II period. 3^ Communist representa-
tives sit in six of the nine national parliaments. " In
Italy, a "historic compromise" has been offered by the PCI.
consisting of a Communist-Christian Democratic coalition. Is .
an alternative to the present governing majority. In France
the Proeiramme Commun of Communists, Socialists, and left-wing
Radicals presents itself as an alternative to the Gaullist
majority. In Denmark, the passive support of the SFP. which
represents Denmark's communists in the European Parliament,
may be necessary for the success of some of the government's
32, France, Italy. Belgium. Luxembourg, and Denmark.
3.a All but the UK. Ireland, and Germany.
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programs, in view of the slimness of its majority in the
llolketing. As long as there was no foreseeable possibility
of the communists' peacefully coming to power, either as a
majority in themselves or in a coalition with other left-wing
parties, their presence or absence from the parliament of
the national subsystem did not. as in the case of Germany
before the legalization of the (West) German Communist Party,
significantly affect the legitimacy of the Federal Republic.
These circumstances have, however, now changed dramatically,
and to exclude the communist parties from the political life
of any of the nine EC member states is evidently no longer
acceptable to the majority of each electorate concerned.
However, as Neunreither has pointed out. the shift
of functions from the subsystem parliaments to the bureauc-
racy of the SC has seriously weakened the role of the
national opposition and has made discussion or agreement on
European problems at the subsystem level notably more
difficult. At the same time, because of the notoriety of the
PCX's delegation to the EP and its intelligent exploitation
of its position at Strasbourg, both internally and externally
(with which this paper will later deal), the Italian party
for one has been, able to enhance its own legitimacy at the
sub-system level, assisted in no small measure by the legiti-
macy deficit of the governing majority.^'*
3^. Neunreither, o^. cit.
, p. 12.
In the case of France, the relative imacceptabiuty
of the EC to the subsystem as a whole, and to the PCF for
specific reasons, means that the party's role at Strasbourg
can only with difficulty-and largely through negative
actions-be exploited in order to increase its legitimacy in
the sub-system. Not only does the PCF often find itself in
agreement with its UDR countrymen at Strasbourg, it must also
continue to reject the EC to the extent that it perceives
the supranational organization as representing both a threat
to French sovereignty and an instrumentality of the European
capitalists as a class, led by German and American monopo-
lists.
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CHAPTER III
THE DEVEIX)PMENT OF COMMUNIST PARTY PARTICIPATION
IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Background
The Treaty of Rome, signed on March 25, 1957,
established the European Economic Community and the European
Atomic Energy Community. When the treaty came up for ratifi-
cation in the national parliaments of the six member nations,
communist parliamentarians wherever present voted unanimously
against ratification. In an apparent effort to frustrate or
delay ratification of the Rome Treaty, the PCI and PCF held
a five day meeting in Rome in December. 1958. At this, and
at a subsequent meeting of the communist parties of the Six
in April. 1959, the participants agreed to fight against the
implementation of the Common Market as a tool of monopoly
capitalism which reenforces imperialism and the exploitation
of the European working class, and v^ich. as the economic
basis of NATO and support for German militarism, constitutes
a threat to world peace. ^ In essence, this viewpoint
reflected the Soviet attitude which had been elaborated in
the Moscow Institute for World Economy and International
1. "Declaration Commune des Dele'gations etc.," Cahiers du
Communic^me
.
XXXV. 1-2 (January-February. 1959). pp, JJ^-i^u; iJeciaration Commune des Representants etc ,"
C|hi!li:s da Corniunij^. XXXV. 4 (April. 1959) pp.* 4o4.
Relations. Theses on the UjEerialist Integration of Western
Europe .
^
These theses held that the Common Market was an
alliance of the monopolies and states of Western Europe, sub-
Oect to American control, which had the additional tasks of
constituting an aggressive wedge against the socialist
countries, of exercising a type of indirect collective
colonialism over the developing countries, and of making
possible a common front against the demands of their own
working class.
^
The general stand of the Soviet Union had not
always been so categorically opposed to European integration.
Indeed, before 1914 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had taken a posi-
tive stance toward a United States of Europe, and his posi-
tion changed only gradually during the course of World War
I. After 1917, with the failure of the revolutionary spark
to take hold in Central Europe and the revival of the
capitalist economies there, Lenin became completely opposed
to European union. Thus it is not difficult for communist
theoreticians to invoke Leninist principles in favor of
international integration when they so desire, backed up
2, Mirovaia Ekonomika i Fvlezhdunarodnve Otnosheniia
. I/1957,
pp. 83-96; World Marxist Review
.
V, 11 (November. I962)!
3. Summarized in Heinz Timmermann, "Westeuropas Kommunisten
und die Europaische Gemeinschaf t. " Boitra'.qe zur
Konfliktforschung II
. 3 (I972). 5-3B
'3
with Karl Marx-s vigorous internationalism.'^
In the late 1950's, however, both the PCI and the
PCF were essentially in agreement with the Soviet line. The
PCI warned of
important part of'ou; populSLn;
while the PCF held that the EC would "organize a comnon
misery and unemployment for the population."^
Since 1957. the overall position of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on the EC has changed very
little. Shortly before the Moscow Conference on Contemporary
Capitalism, in the summer of I962. the Institute for World
Economy and International Relations published a revised
version of the Theses on European Integration, which no
longer stressed the complete subordination of the European
economy to United States monopoly capital, but recognized
that European economic integration was weakening American
leadership. The Common Market was not simply a plot of the
4. Gerda Zellentin, Die Kommunisten und die FAr>^ cr^n^
^^^oy^s (Frankfurt/Main: AthenauiTVeHIg. i96'4)7 p. kg,
^* 1^1 prr^n^° ''u'^iJ?^ europeo." Comunicato della Direzionedel PCI. March 2^. 1957. in Documenti politici ediret.tive
, pp kh^kQ, quoted in Donald BlackmerT Unityin DiverF^i ty (Cambridge. MAi MIT Press. I968)
. p, 153.
6. Henri Jourdain essay. Economie et Poiitjr-ue lOO/lOl(November. I962).
.9. auoted in !Tmrnermann, 00. cit .
.
p. 11. —^ '
imperialists but a "new phenomenon in the development of the
capitalist economy," which because of its ver^ existence had
contributed to the obvious growth of prosperity i„ Western
Europe,
This slight concession to the realities of life in
Western Europe was reechoed in 1972 by Leonid Brezhnev in
his March 20 speech to the Soviet Trade Union Congress. On
this occasion the Soviet leader called "absurd" the thought
that the proposal to hold a European Security Conference'was
designed to torpedo the Common Market, and that the Soviet
Uni on
.
. .
was far from unaware of the develoDine- sit.ia+io«in Western Europe including the existence^olCommon Market. /The U3SR is_7 attentively obs;r;in^the activities of the Common Market and its evoJutifn.^
In the same year. 1972. a new edition of the Great
^Q^^Q"^ Encyclopedia described the EC asi
kAAnl fl^l^rj^^.r^^^^i'' organization... a new phenomenonarising rom the circumstances of the contemDorary stateof the general crises of capitalism.
. .And? reflecting
^^Lf^r'^^^^i^?^" objective tendency of the monopolilticstage of capitalism to internationalize economic rela-tions and capital, to liauidate narrow boundaries, as
iLi?.^^^''^ explained. He stressed that capitalism
" } countries in the world in a single econom-ic whole." and that...'-a capitalist enterprise inevitably
7. gravda, August 2. I962. Cfi M.M. Maksimova,
Ekonomicheskie Gruppirovki v Zapadno^ Evrore (Moscow*Izdatel'stvo Nauka, I969). pp. 36-43. which purports toDe a monograph on economic groupings in Western Europe,
the ^EC?
^""^^ mention the EP as one of the organs of
8. Pravda . March 21, 1972.
^5
Tlli;\lTstlTer'^^^ -Sion. and
According to the Sncyclot^^dl ^ . the EC is directed
against the world communist movement, the socialist countries,
and the strugn^ies for national liberation of the colonial and
dependent peoples. Supported originally by the USA as an
economic base for NATO, the SG has now become an economic
competitor to the U3. and "the hopes of strengthening have not
been justified," However, the EC has not been able to ensure
a crisis-free equal development nor to moderate the class
contradictions of the member states. In a bow. perhaps, to
the West European communist parties, the Sncyclopedia says:
The working masses of the six countries oponly pro-test against the anti
-democrati c character of the" EC;
and they demand that it be given a new and profound
economic and social content, distinct from its present
one. which would correspond to the interests of the
wide masses of the people.
9
The position of the PCI had meanwhile changed
sharply from that which it had held in 1958. By i960, at the
8l-Party Congress in Moscow, the Italians were already argu-
ing that Western Europe was becoming increasingly prosperous
and more and more independent of the United States. This
circumstance implied that there was a role for the West
European communist parties to play in encouraging the contra-
dictions between Europe and America, and that this role could
be played by the communist parties in the European
9. T^ol * rhi.il ^oy.-'t 'kn i :i ^nt::ki ] op '^ci \ ii . Trct'o Ir.dr.nic
'mvTrr^vTTJT, ^
—
organizations themselves*
be facilitated by the orlsenL^? +h f ^^hf. workers can
sentatives of the working c?aL fn 5h»^!^''""^^" '•fP^'lO"vii oxass i t ese organizations.
The first concrete steps to establish relations
with the EC were taken by the PCI
-controlled trade ur>ion. the
Confedera.ione Generale Italiana di Lavorn (CGIL). whose
strong socialist minority membership forced the communist
majority to a more independent and flexible behavior, before
the party itself was ready to do so." The CCIL proposed at
the communist-controlled I962 World Free Trade Union (WFTU)
Congress in Leipzig the foundation of a WFTU liaison office
with the EC in Bru<^«5Plc; c'^r>r^« -i-u ^.vusse s, bmce the other communist trade
unions were cool to this proposal, the CGIL proceeded alone,
and opened such an office in March. 1963. Then, in 1965 the
CGIL was joined by the PCF-controlled Confederation G^ne^rale
du Travail (CGT) in the liaison office in Brussels. The
Italian trade unions have continuously remained in the fore-
front in pushing for greater collaboration with the EC. The
CGIL has now been joined in a federation with the Social
Democratic Unione Italiana di Lavoro (UIL) and the Christian
lll'^'^tT/^^
della delegazione italiana alia commissionepreparatoria." Interventi della dele^azione del Partitokpmunista Italiano alia Conferenza dep:li 81 Partitigomunisti ed oppraiTR^me: A cura d^lH Sizione centrale
?i ^r^"^?? ® propaganda della Direzione del PCI. January
pp.' 175-176^^* ' ""^^^"^ Blackrrer. op. cit. .
11. Timmermann. 0£. cit. , p. 12.
^7
Democratic gpnfQderazi o n. I.ta liana dei Sindacatl Liberi
(CISL), and they together have Joined the Confederation of
European Trade Unions (CETU). the esentially non-co.munist
roof organization of- all the trade unions in the EC countries.
As of the summer of 1975. the application of the French CGT
for admission into the CETU was still being considered in
Brussels. The CGT is the only large national trade union
organization not a member of the CETU. Opposition to the
admission of the CGIL and the CGT into the CETU has come
chiefly from the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB). a non-
partisan but strongly anti-communist grouping, and from the
French Socialist Force Ouvrii^re (FO) trade unions, who also
opposed the admission of the British Trades Union Congress
(TUC) on the same anti-communist ideological grounds. "'•^
Renewal of the Italian E? Delectation . 1969
The first opportunity for the PCI to participate
in the European Parliament arose in I968, when the Italian
delegation to that body was finally renewed. Although in
1958 both the P3I and the PCI had asked to be included in
the first Italian delegation to the EP. they were excluded
by a majority vote of the Italian Parliament, both parties
being at that time firmly in the opposition camp. The PCF
12. I Cn^mu^.\ nti al Parl'^monto Enroppo
,
BoT Inttino
dMnforT-izione
.i. cura der"Sef^retaria to del C^runnn.
197V1. FP. -i^-?3"; '
^8
was similarly excluded from the original French delegation
to the EP.^^
The Italian delegation selected in 1958 (by an out-
going Parliament) reflected the composition of the governing
majority of that year, plus the extreme right, whose votes
were needed in order to designate the delegation by an
absolute majority. The partisan breakdown of the 1958
Italian delegation was as followst
Governing majorityt
DC 28
PSDI . 2
PLI 2
PRI 1
Right wing opposition!
MSI 2
PNM-PMP (Monarchists) 1
Fate, both personal and political, was not kind to
this first Italian delegation to the EP. Between 1958 and
1963, two members of the delegation died and were not re-
placed. The national elections of I963 effected a consider-
able change in the composition of the Italian Parliament,
13. "Cassio" (N, Dell 'Omodarme) , "La Delegazione Italiana al
P,E./' Comuni d'ZiwovH, XVI, 3, r.larch. 1963, p. 5, The
exclusion of the opposition from the delegation in 1958
followed a pattern established in 19^9, when the Italian
delegation to the Consultritive Assembly of the Council
of Europe was selected, and repealed in 1952, when dele-
gates to the ECSC Common Assembly were chosen.
14. The French delegation appointed in 1958 under similar
rules included I6 UNR-UJT (governing majority), 7 SFIO,
2 MRP, and 11 independents,^
1*9
Not only did five
.e.bers of the EP delegation lose their
national seats, but also, in part as a result of this elec-
tion's outcome, the P3I beca.e a part of the governing ooali-
t.on. This Shift Of the PSI fro. opposition to governing
majority
.as an element in the a^ertura a sinistra (opening
to the left), which was to set the pattern for n.ost Italian
governments since that date.
Italian constitutional lawyers have interpreted
the rules concerning representation in the EP to r»ean that a
delegate must be a member of the national parliament at the
moment of his designation, but not necessarily during the
entire period of his European mandate. ^5 T>,e legisllture
elected in I963 made no effort to replace those delegates who
had lost their seats in that election, and these therefore
continued as 2P members, despite the objections of other
national delegations. Between 1963 and I968. four addi-
tional delegation members passed away without replacement,
and one. Eduardo Martino. had to resign as a member of the
EP. because he had been appointed to the EC Commission. Six
others had been appointed to the ministerial functions in
Italy. Traditionally in the case of other national delegations.
EP members who were appointed to ministerial positions gave
15. Cfi Monaco. "Caratteri Istituzionali della Comupita
economics europea." Rivista di diritto internazional
e
.ALI. 1 (195S), p. 30. cited in Vinci. o£. cit.
, 5in.
16. "Cassio." o£. cTt.
. p. 7.
up their EP mandate, out of respect for the institutional
equilibrium within the EC between the EP. representing the
national parliaments, and the Council of Ministers, which
represents the national governments. Two further EP
members had other full time jobs. In practice, only 13 of
the original 36 members of the first Italian delegation
turned up regularly in Strasbourg to participate in the
Parliament's work."^^
This deficiency in the Italian representation was
not only damaging to Italy's interests, it also meant a
greater burden for the other members of the HP. who had to
assume the Italian's share of committee work. What made the
natter even more pressing was the fact that it was now
Italy's turn to have the presidency of the Parliament, in
the person of that country's former Prime Minister. Mario
Scelba. According to an informed parliamentary staff member,
the other European parliamentarians made the acceptance of
Scelba' s candidacy contingent upon a renewal of the Italian
representation in the Parliament. EC Chairman Jean Rey
described as "shocking and abnormal- the fact that Italy had
not renewed her representation in the European Parliament in -'
17. Ibid .
18. Ibid
. . p. 6.
19. Author's confidential interview, Strasbourg, July 2.
cfj John Foster Leich. "The Italian Communists
studies. IX, 4 (June, 1971), 2o-^/-^.
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es re-
for several years, while the other five member countri^
newed their representations on the basis of each new general
election. Rey further maintained that he could not understand
why the communist party members who had seats in the Belgian.
French and Italian parliaments should be excluded from the
Strasbourg assembly.
Meanwhile the situation within Italy had changed
considerably. As noted, the P3I from I963 onward has sup-
ported the governing majority in the Center-Left coalition?
and its chairman. Pietro Nenni. was serving as Vice Prime
Minister or Foreign Minister in successive Center-Left
governments. Giuseppe Saragat. head of the PSDI and at the
time Foreign Minister, in a TV appearance on November 5. 1964.
called for the inclusion of the PCI in the Italian EP repre-
21
sentation. The Italian general elections of May I9, 1968.
resulted in a further increase in the communist vote, a trend
which has been continuous since the end of World War II. In
addition, a new break-away socialist party, the Partito
Socialista Italiano d*Unita Proletaria (PSIUP). gained 4.5
percent of the total vote and 23 seats in the Chamber of
Deputies. Those who joined PSIUP disapproved of the PSI
cooperation with the center parties and participation in the
Center-Left governments. In the Chamber of Deputies, PSIUP
20. Ubid. It is unclear why Rey omitted Luxembourg, with a
10 percent communist vote.
21. 59^4^ "Cassio," Ibid . . 7n. Cfi L'Unita . November 6.
members generally voted with the PCI Th. ,h, ,.e roi. e share of the right
wing parties In the I968 national vote PU mst .
,
, rial, MSI, and PDIUM(United Monarchists), declined from fl^ i 13.8 percent to 11.6 per-
cent.
A new Italian delegation was therefore appointed
at the end of 1968 whose
.embers took their seats at the be-
ginning Of the next EP session, in March. 1969, and Mario
Scelba was duly elected president of the EP on that date
The partisan breakdown of the new 36-member delegation was
as followsj
Center-Left majority:
DC
SYP
PSI-PSDI
PRI
Opposition*
Right Wing*
PLI
PDIUM
MSI
Left Wing*
PCI
P3IUP
Independent
15
1 (seated with DC)
6
1 (seated with Socialists)
1 (seated with PLI)
1 (seated with PLI)
1 (seated with PCI)
1 (seated with PCI)
This delegation was unbalanced in two respects.
Inevitably, undue weight was given to the very small parties
(PDIUM and SVP) in order for them to be represented at all.
The delegation also was weighted in favor of the DC. who
polled only 39.1 percent of the popular vote, and would have
therefore been entitled to Ik and not 15 seats, not including
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the extra seat for the SVP Th. t ,- . The socialist group also had onemore seat than their sharp nf *v,
would indicate, andthe communists were one or two short depending on whetheryou count the one Independent or not Th. ppt
.
PCI was quick tocan attention to this discrepancy when thei. delegation
arrived in Strasbourg.
Following the 1972 general elections, the Italian
delegation was reapportioned as is sho.. on Tahle 1-B (page
26) above.
££i Partlcipatir... in the EP, 1262-1223
In 1969 the Italian left-wing opposition EP members
-ven PSI. one PSIUP. and one independent, did not co.orise
the necessary fourteen delegates required in order to for™ a
parliamentary group. Instead, they were listed-together
with one French independent, a communist sympathizer-as non-
inscrits or "non-aligned." Such a designation seemed to be
both lacking in logic, and in fact to place the communists
under certain parliamentary disadvantages which they were
quick to point out. and which have been discussed on pp.
3-6, above,
Giorgio Amendola. the leader of the PCI (non-
inscrit) "group", set forth the party's position with respect
to institutional arrangements in his maiden speech on March
22. Amendola. D£bats, 12 Mars, I969. p 38 (PrP I07iFrenyh-only ecHTlon of officiai' jSur^ai cited o^^^. 27
12. 1969. He began by pointing out that while a "discrimina-
tion Which had lasted for years" was now eliminated, the PCI
Still did not have its full ^han^ ^-pi'S i ±i s re of representatives. Had
the EP been elected by universal suffrage with proportional
representation, the number of communist members then present
would have been greater. Amendola claimed that if the votes
Of the PCI. the PSIUP. and those who had voted for the old
Partito dU^ Of Senator Ferr.ccio Parri (the independent
.ember of the "group") were counted together, then every third
Italian elector could have been shown to have voted for this
trend. "If you want... to establish a link with European?
public opinion." Amendola told his EP colleagues, "you must
count on the forces which we represent in our countries and
in Europe."
Amendola then attempted to dispose of the "pretext-
that the communists had voted against the Treaty of Rome and
therefore were excluded from the EP. He saidi
+h.-K°''''
opposition /to the Treaty of Rome/ did not mean
DOlitrca?'con.V"';^"^'' necessity ^ economic anS
Soi^! collaboration among the European countrie-:. andregions. Nor, on the other hand, has our opposition
Hv'^wM^f the real,ity which was developing, the reality of a process of
rr^Jow'' '""^^^f r^"" ^^^^ process has been con-c etely controlled by important American and European
monopolistic forces, ^
The communists did oppose the creation of the EEC
because it constituted a new divisive factor, owing to the
nature of its origin, in the center of Europe.
The EEC arose from the climate of the cold war, inthe framework of a policy directed toward the
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maintenance and reenfr>r»r%om«*»-».
political and miular? b!ocs! °PP°^i"g econonie.
Now that "for the first tlmp- n- v•li i; xi e it had been recognized
that there was a crisis in the construction of the EC.
An,endola explained that the communists wanted to contribute
to a solution of this crisis, first of all by pointing out
its origin in the relationships which existed between the EC
and the United State.. The EC had not been able to meet the
American challenge at the technological level or at the level
of monopolistic economic control. This in turn was due in
part to the fact that the working class in Western Europe
was divided both nationally and internationally. If a uni-
fication of Europe was to be accomplished, this would have
to be accompanied by an "overcoming" ( superamento ) and
liquidation of the opposing military blocs, and by progress
in the unity of the Left in all European countries, in the
fight for peace and for socialist democracy.
Amendola made clear also that the PCI. while it was
alone among the European communist parties in the HP, be-
lieved that it represented ideally the communists of the
other countries as well, or at least
current of ideas and forces which is an
essential element of European and worldwide reality
ignorer^^^^
can be fought against, but it cannot be
23. Ibid., p. 38 ff.
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Despite the fact that the PCI „e™.er3 did not con-
stitute an ornciax parliamentary group, certain
"facilities"
were accorded to them by the EP pct r.
• members were appointed
to committees on the ha-i«a r^r «b ois Of one per committee. In plenary
.ess.ons they were allotted the same speaking opportunities
as other groups, and speakers on behalf of all the PCI members
and their associates were given priority over individual
speakers. Eventually the "group" „as allotted two staff
members. Nevertheless, without official group status, the
communists continued to suffer some serious disabilities in
comparison with the other parties. None of their members
were eligible for the presidency or one of the several vice-
presidencies Of the EP. nor could they sit in the bureaus as
committee officers, nor be rapporteurs. Neither could
communists sit in the Enlarged Bureau of the EP. the organ-
ization which sets the EP agenda and determines policy and
administrative matters, including the EP-s own budget.
During the four years that the PCI delegates were
the only communists in the European Parliament, some of the
basic lines and problems of Italian communist policy became
clear, and in many cases these have continued unchanged down
to the present day. The first problem is an institutional
onei the extent to which the PCI's desire to "reform" the
institutional structure of the EP is in conflict with the
^^^??Q ^' — •• P- 275. Cf, Fitzraaurioe. oe.. cit
.
.
P» -'•^9 • """"""
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party's persistent insistence on « f ^
,
,
x . a freedom of action forItaly in matters o-r r?^r.«^4.Of direct concern to the PCI. 3 constitu-
-cxes. The dichotomy was stated by Anendola in hi.
of the Treaty of Rome which would
among ?hl"E^:p?°;;'^^,°:„^-,\-°nomic cooperation
autonomy and policy of eaci; ll^^^t respecting thetional parliaLnt??5 ^ country and of each na-
The question of the international competence of
the EC was from the beginning linked by the PCI to the pro-
blem Of direct elections, with their usual qualification of
"by the method of proportional representation." It was the
PCI-s position that as long as there were no Europe-wide
elections for the European Parliament, the PCI would regard
the EC merely as an economic union of limited objectives,
not competent to take political decisions. ^6 The PCI alio
proposed that the unanimity principle continue to be re-
spected in the voting by the Council of Ministers, despite
the Treaty of Rome requirement for the eventual introduction
of a qualified majority vote, in the interest of protecting
the weaker member states. At the November. 1971. round-
table discussion on the Italian communists and Europe in
Rome, it was also suggested that the members of the
Commission no longer merely be appointed by the several
25. Amendola. loc. cit
.
26. Author's interview with Leonilde lotti. August 10, I969.
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governments but that thev be Pi«.n-^oH v -uvliney elected by the national parlia-
ments with a qualified majority on thp r^nr.^ ^^v^iAi^y, xne nomination of the
governments, and with the agreement nf +>> -o the i:,uropean Parliament
This would give the Commission members tno , o whom sovereignty
was de being transferred, a greater degree of representa-
tiveness and a closer relationship to the basic organs of
national sovereignty, the parlia„ents. ^7 A portion of this
rather complicated suggested procedure was incorporated into
the Vedel Report on the enlargement of powers of the EP in281972.
In practical terms, however, the PCI repre-
sentative did not hesitate to press for immediate greater
parliamentary control over those matters for which the
national parliaments had already turned the right of decision
over to the Council and the Commission. Thus we see
Leonilde Iotti29 and Silvio Leonardi30
^^^^^ Francescopaolo
D'Angelosante in 1970,31 p^zio Fabbrini in 1971^^ and Franco
27. Leonilde lotti. "Sovranita nazionale e Istituzioni-comunitarie," I Comanisti Italian! e I'Euro^a Q.adp.n^
dicembre'?07!) ^^^^f^^^' . ^^PPlf-nto ^nTrf-Cnov^mbre'a 1971; della rivista bimestrale del CESPS. p. 81.
28. See pp. 10-11 above.
29. lotti, D^MM. 7 octobre 1969, pp. 48-50. Signoralotti is widow of long-time PCI leader, Palmiro Togliatti.
30. Leonardi. Debats
. 10 dicembre, I969. pp. 75~?6,
197of''ppf''g9!§o^^^^' "'^^"^ ^970, pp. 59-61, 13 mai,
32. Fabbrini, D^b>.ts, 16 novembre, 197I, pp. /|7-/|8.
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Boiardi in 1972.33 all advocating a greater EP control over
the EC's own resources on the grounds that the national
parliaments had been deprived of their control function in
this respect, and that the EP „as the only suitable organ
remaining that represented,
"even if in an indirect way "
the sovereignty of the people3'^ which could logically be
consulted.
The judgment of the PCI. upon entering the EP.
concerning the Communitys industrial integration was
generally negative. The results were regarded as bad for
Italy, bad for the Italian working man. and perhaps bad for
Europe as a whole. 35 ^his unfavorable judgment as to the
results of economic integration was bolstered by a PCI be-
lief that the piecemeal, functional approach of the EC to
economic problems, without an overall plan, made it possible
for forces external to the Community to step in and take
control over the European economy. 3^ Had there been adequate
democratic control over EC action, these opportunities for
33. SQiardj
,.
Collogue Parlementai Suropeen . l^etat de
1 unification europeene et le role des ParlementsTstras-bourg: i::uropean ParliameHt
.~972T7 iJT 4o-46?
^^^^^
3^. lotti. "Sovranita nazionale." p. 81.
35. Leonard!, "II Processo di integrazione nella Cee "
i. Oomunisti I taliani e I'Suropa
. pp. 19-5^.
36. Ibid Cf: Nicola Cipolla e Luigi Conte. "La crisi della
?°EiJoDl ^^''^''?^!7fi^^ - ^""^^^^^-^'^ I taliani e
s.r
.sra
intervention on the part of the multinational corporations
might not have arisen. The multinationals, in the PCI'
opinion, were the true beneficiaries, together with thei
supporter, the United States. This position of negativi:
toward the EC integration and its impact on Italian industry
was reechoed in the strongly protectionist stand the PCI
adopted toward the effects of integration on Italian
agriculture.
In the 1969-73 period the PCI came strongly to the
defense of small Italian farmers, wine-growers, and horti-
culturalists. For example, the PCI strongly protested
against the rather miserly provisions for the retraining of
Italian tobacco growers who were to be forced out of jobs as
a result of the introduction of a free internal European
tobacco market. It was bad enough that the proposed regula-
tion of the tobacco industry placed the Italian small farmers
at the mercy of the German and Dutch tobacco cartels. The
plan also seemed to be lacking in any adequate concern for
the fate of the displaced farmers. Similarly, the PCI made
vigorous efforts to protect the Italian citrus fruit growers
on the grounds that EC association agreements with Morocco
and Tunisia, by lowering the tariffs on North African citrus
products, perpetuated a colonial relationship.-^''
37. Leich, 0£. cit.
, pp. 278-279.
61
French Communists Enter the EP^ 1222
The originally antagonistic position toward the EC
ta.en by the PCI. PCK. and other West European communist
parties had been largely a PCF construction, and bore the
.ark Of the generally more conservative and dogmatic stance
Of the French party, which was attempting to enlist the
support of the CP3U in its own struggle for supremacy among
the West European communist parties. 38 Ten years later,
the situation was quite changed. Already in I969. Jacques
Denis and Jean Kanapa. of the International Section of the
PCI Central Committee, in their booklet on the subject.
Pour ou Centre VEurope
.
demanded that the PCF be admitted
into the EP. despite all the deficiencies and impotence of
this organization. 39 The PCF should be present, they said,
in order to defend the claims of the working masses, when
matters of European security and policy were under discussion.
The Common Market now existed, and had established a network
Of relations within the French economy which could not be
broken without serious damage. What was needed was a joint
effort of all the progressive and left-wing forces in Europe
to carry out a common action against the monopolistic aspects
of the Common Market, in favor of democratization of its
38. Timmermann, 0£. cit.
, pp. 10-11.
39.
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institutions, and in the intpre«=5t nf Fm^«teres o European security. This
should take place on several fronts at nnnoi onii o ce, such as a united
European trade union effort, but under no circumstances by
increasing the supranational authority of the EC institutions ."^^
Thus from the beginning, the PCF has made the
principle of French sovereign independence the cornerstone of
its policy toward the EC, has opposed any extension of the
Parlia.,ent.s powers at the expense of the member states, and
has strongly opposed the institution of direct elections for
EP members. ^"^
On June 2?, 1972. the French Communist and
Socialist Parties agreed to a Programme Commun de Souverne .
inent, which contained an entire chapter devoted to France and
the EC. This program represented a considerable step toward
a more positive appreciation of the EC by the PCF. Apparent-
ly at the urging of their partners, the French socialists. ^2
the PCF agreed that they would
;^A.,; ^^^^ development of the EC's institu-tions and policies, with the desire to liberate the
ra?'^TH/r"'.-!j%?""^^^^'^"^ ^^Vital. to SLoc-tize its institutions, to support the demands of theworkers, and to direct ( ori enter ) .the Community's
actions m the workers' interest. ^3 ^
^0. Ibid
. . pp. 220-221.
41. Ibid., pp. 212-213.
42. Timmermann. o^. cit
.
. p. Ik
43. Prop;ramme Comnun de Gouvornement du Parti Conmuniste
Exan^riis Rt. du Part i '^ocinl i l:o
. preface de Geor^os
Marchais (i-arisi i::.ditions iiociales. 19?2). p. 177.
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At the same time, the PCF and PS agreed that they would
or-actL^rL^rt^i^^ri2xI5lt?rn:pS^^--!iL.^r^^°"'
economic, and social program.
political.
The program went on to say that since the European
Parliament was called upon to approve the EC budget in any
case, it should be allowed to control its execution. Direct
election of EP members was not mentioned in the program.
The French parliamentary elections of March. 1973,
resulted in the PGF's winning 73. or about one-seventh of the
seats in the National Assembly, whereas PCF candidates
polled over one-fifth of the popular vote in the first round
of the elections. The French electoral system gives a
parliamentary advantage to the party having a relative
majority, in this case the UDR. Following the elections,
three PCF members were appointed to the French delegation in
Strasbourg, and a fourth was added during the course of the
year. The arrival of the French delegates, together with the
Italian and Danish delegate already on hand, meant that the
necessary figure of fourteen like-minded members of the EP
were now present; and the Communist and Allies Group could be
formally constituted.
^4. Ibid.
C H A P T E R IV
ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST AND ALLIES GROUP TO JUNE, I975
Characteri^t^rc, pf gAG Memborr.hin
One has the distinct impression that the members
of the CAG are generally of greater political weight and
perhaps better qualified professionally and technically than
are those of other EP groups. ^ A resume of the backgrounds
of the CAG members would tend to confirm this impression.
However, standards of comparison are difficult to establish
because-unlike the members of other EP groups-- neither the
PCI nor the PCF has had the opportunity of occupying national
leadership posts in the government of their respective
countries since the immediate aftermath of World War II. In
other respects, however, a comparison of the eight PCI mem-
bers with the fourteen Italian DC members shows the following
factsi
1. The two groups are the same average age (c. 55),
2. The PCI members have a slightly longer average
experience in both the EP and in the Italian
Parliament.
3. Proportionately, a greater number of PCI mem-bers come from the innermost circle (direzionp)
of the party (Amendola. lotti) than the DC members
( Andreotti
,
Scelba)
.
^. With respect to specialization at the national
level, the PCI delegation is weighted in favor of
1. Fitzmaurice, 02. cit. . p. I31.
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?hl^nr^^''r^'.?^^^^^* finance problems whilethe DC delegation is more diversified.
Comparable data for the four PCF and the ten UDR
delegates show thatj
a longer experience in both the EP and theNational Assembly.
3. Proportionately, a greater number of PCF mem-bers come from the inner circle (Comite PoUtiaae)
of tne party (Ansart) than in theT^ofnEhFUDR(Kaspereit). Two of the four PCF members are
memb;irs of their party's Comit^f Centralc while
only three of the ten UDR members are of theComite Centrale level.
^. Data with respect to specialization is not
available.
The numbers involved in the Danish and Dutch dele-
gations, both communist and non-communist, are too small to
permit a meaningful comparison.
Policy and Objectives in the EP
.Pol-cy Rationale. CAG overall policy and objective
in the EP, as distinct from the individual policies of the
four parties which compose the group, are based primarily on
domestic considerations and only secondarily on consideration
touching upon the solidarity of the working class, the future
of the communist movement as a whole, or the state of develop-
ment of capitalism in Western Europe today.
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These domestic considerations vary considerably
a^on. the four countries, and overlap only slightly in
-ters 0. substance. There is. however, so.e parallelism
the tactical response o. each, which „i,ht he described asa co..on ™eans of meeting dissimilar problems. Por example.
each of the component parties sep=!P x es its presence in the CAG as
nstrumental to the improvements of its electoral position atho»e in fore.eeable future consultations. Hach party maKes
use of its presence at Strasbourg-as a component of the
group-in order to increase its exposure abroad in a manner
Which will be reflected favorably in the domestic press. All
the group members, regardless of whether they condone their
own country's presence in the EC. support the principle of
communist representation in the European Parliament and its
expansion to include all those eligible communist parties who
may not yet be members. All of the parties agree that a
qualitative change has taken place in the transnational devel-
opment of capitalism in Western Europe, and that this change
requires action at some international level in order to
bring it under control.^
When dealing with substantive matters, however, it
cannot be said that the CAG has a group policy. As will be
explained in Chapter IV. great differences exist between the
2. Cf. Hainer Klaus. Die Grunr-o f«r iis vcr^ndc-^;^ '•,rh-nt-„
6eip;nn;-?r.-.!1i. v uKou;.li;.rv^u-jcfer^I-ri~acrT:»trJT.r^lv"—
Ijniversity of Berlin. 197'*). pp. lok-15k.
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PCI and the PCF and between the two big parties and the two
small ones. These differences
„,ean that there is no group
policy toward institutional change in the EC-including the
questions of direct elections and the EP budgetary powers-no
group policy toward the control of multinational corporations,
nor even toward matters involving dgtente and the overcoming
'
Of military blocs.
This dialectical interplay of domestic concerns and
the international institutional expression thereof may be
illustrated by looking at several specific issues and seeing
how the CAG and/or the individual party's policy is reflected
in each.
Institutional Questions
. The basis for an overall
CAG policy toward the institution of the European Community
and its component parts—if such a group policy could be said
to exist—may be found in the Political Declaration of the
Co:r.r,u.dst Parties of Capitalist Europe, signed in Brussels on
January 28. 197^, This declaration recognizes the lack of
consensus among communist parties in their attitudes toward
the EC I
Des situations diverses se presentent aujourd'hui
pour les pays d'Europe occidentale. Dnns certiins payspour lesnuels lour appartf^nince h la GEE depuis quinze
ans a tisse des liens ^conomiques ^troits, les Partis
Communistes luttent centre son orientation monopoliste
et ses cons^ouences. ainsi que pour sa d^mocratisation.
Dans d'Qutres pays dont I'adhesion au Marche Commun est
toute recente, les partis communistes agissent par
centre pour le rotrait total de la CEE. Dans los pays
ouesteuropf^ens non membres ou ansoci6s. les partis
communistes luttent contre los t^ntatives d'Tncluro lour
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payyans la sphere d'influence des monopoles qui dominant
Diversity of objective is thus openly admitted. However,
there is still unity as welli
Walgre cette variete de situations, les oartiscommunistes des pays capitalistes d' Europe r^ffirmentnu'uno reponse commune a la politique d'int;Vati^
^conominue est possible et n^cessaire.
. /Tl faut?
fnt4^S?^^r'r^' Vt- solutions confir^e^ fuxmt^rets de tous /les peuples d •Europe/.^
Thus the PCI and the PCF fight against the "mono-
polistic orientation" of the EC and strive for the "democrati-
zation" of the Community, while the Dutch and Danish parties
express their opposition to their countries* membership, and
avoid any act which would increase their countries' commit-
ment to the EC. its goals, and its supranational authority.
3. Les Communistes It? liens
. Bulletin pour I'Etranger publie
Ear ie janvier-fevrier. 197^. pp. lOTI^^hlo^ '
L'Uniti. January 31. 1974. No official English transla-
tion of this resolution exists. It reads as follov.-:
"The countries of V/estern Europe are faced with differ-
ing situations. In some countries, whose fifteen years
membership in the EEC woven close economic tics, the Com-
munist Parties are fighting against the monopolistic
orientation of the Community and its consequences, as
well as for a democratization of the EC. In other
countries, which have only recently joined the Common
Market, the Communist Parties are. on the other hand,
working for a total withdrawal from the EEC. In the West
European countries which are not members or associates,
the Communists are fighting against attempts to include
their countries in the sphere of influence of the monop-
olies which dominate the EEC Despite this variety
of situations, the Communist Parties of the capitalist
countries of Europe reaffirm that a common response to
the policy of economic integration is possible and
necessary solutions which are in accord with the in-
terer.ts of all the peoples of Europe must be made to
prevail.
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Unity of objectives is at best a .
i
^^^^
^ one of an acte depresenr^ P of thp PAr . " ^e C G as a unit at Strasbourg.
Furthermore, in Drar+^««
.
.
p ctice this agreement to disagreehas meant that there ha=
sav in . .
' '''' °' ^^^^^^y' toy consistency, in the approach of inri^.-n , nPPi-oa n O individual CAG spokes-
^.rferent nationalities
..t aiso in statements made
-o,
-<^xvid.al group members of the same nationality. Also, a
speaker of one nationality
„ho identifies himself as a .roup
spokesman may
.e followed
.y another, also spea.ing in the
name of the Group, „ho ta.es ,uite a different point of view.
1. Powers of the EP,
For example, vis-a-vis the distribution of power
a^ong the organs of the EC, there are important differences
Of opinion as to what the share of the Parliament should be
in the Council's decidon-making process. While in general
the CAS seems to regard the unanimity rule in the Council
as a guarantee that the input of the individual national
parliaments into their own governmental decisions will be
respected, some PCI members are inclined to such sweeping
statements in the opposite sense as that made in December.
197'*. by Fazio Fabbrinii
and wish1o'?:pe2t1odav' l^^ll.^K^^t^-'^'^ "^"^
trano-r^v, + 4 Pf- xod y, any act which is desip-ned to
Fabbrini, Debates. 10 December. 197k, p. 67.
G.3tave Ansart. head of the PCF delegation, on the
-nts In the Co.noiX with its unanimity rule which prevented
the rise of a bad, new Europe.
fui i.posing'lh^L'wiuJ"' °f tf^- P-er-
The above is a good example of differences between
the PCF and the FCI on basic institutional matters, a differ-
ence which is perhaps even more clearly illustrated in their
opposing viewpoints on the question of direct elections for
EP members. The Italian position seems to waver between that
originally formulated in I969, to wit. that no transfer of
effective power to the Parliament should take place until
direct elections had been agreed upon, and a more general
immediate down-grading of the Council's authority in favor of
the Parliament.
The PCI journal Rinascita summed up this dilemma
as follows:
Comminf?^ competence from the national to the
P0wer2 withfrih ^P^^^^^Pjni?^ by a redistribution of
?een?orcemen? of f^T^^'^^.^'^^t^^^ translated into a
Dossibn o/h ^ CjF^^l and a reduction of the
munii^ leveizf^''"^"'^^''" ""'^'"^^
The French, on the other hand, standing as they do
in opposition to direct elections for the EP. see the sole
5. Ansart. Dcbatp;^
. 11 December, 19?/^. p. 155,
^'
ll^^M.^'li^' ' Rinancita. October 12.
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^eans of preservation of the French
.or^ing^an's rights in the
maintenance of the unanimity rule of the Council.
At that same December. 1974, session, F. P.
D'Angelosante even recommended that the unanimity rule be
waived, for the first time, in connection with a regulation
on the maintenance of competition, on which the EP had given
a favorable opinion, but which the Italian representative on
the Council was vetoing.
^ Again, it is interesting to see
how an essentially domestic problem has determined the CAG
attitude toward an EC institutional arrangement. Had
D'Angelosante achieved his goal of in effect overriding the
Italian veto in the Council in this case, this would have
been a good example of a transfer of the opposition function
from the national parliament to the EP.
However, at the October. 197^. session of the
Parliament. Amendola had already made it quite clear that
the PCI was utterly opposed to giving greater powers to the
Council of Ministers, a body "...which is not the expression
of a Parliament and a democratic comT.unity. Fabbrini took
the matter one step further, warning against the Parliament's
wooing of the Co.;r:ciI, in the hope of thereby "...managing to
wrest a little more from it." Instead the EP should come
into conflict with the Council, if it is ever to fulfill its
7. D'Angelosante. Debates
. 12 December. 197^+. p. 223.
8. Amendola, Debater;
. I6 October, 1974, p. 1^15.
function and gain greater estee. and legitimacy among the
general public of the EC nations.
^
2. Budgetary powers
Between 1970 and 1975. a procedure was developed
according to the so-called
"Luxembourg Agreements." for the
budgeting and appropriation of funds from the ECs own re-
sources, such as proceeds from the Common External Tariff and
a percentage of the community-wide Tax on Value Added, as
distinct from funds which have been contributed by the mem-
ber states in proportion to their size. GNP, and other
measurement factors. This procedure permits a far wider
parliamentary participation in the decision-making process
in this field. The details of this participation are not of
direct concern to this study.l° Suffice to say, the EP-s
powers with respect to the budget are confined to expenditures
for administrative matters (non-obligatory expenditures), its
role with respect to the approval of other (obligatory)
expenditures, which represent the overwhelming bulk of the
EC budget, remains an advisory one. The I975 treaty on
budgetary powers, signed on July 22, also established a Court
of Auditors to review all EC expenditures and to report
thereon to the Parliament, Commission, and Council. On the
9. Fabbrini, Debates, 12 November, I97I1, pp. 50-5I.
10. Coombes. 0£. cit. gives a detailed analysis of the develop-
ment of parliamentary budgetary powers.
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basis or tMs report, the HP and the Council jointz. ,i.e
^ischarge to the Co^.ission with respect to the i.pXe^enta-
tion of the bude-Bt tv,„D dge . Thus It can be seen that the EP's
"power Of the purse" is still largely ex ^ost facto.
Over the years, the debates on the EP-s budgetary
powers have provided occasions for the statement of CAG
policy and illustrations of the differences which exist
among the colonist parties in the Parliament. As early as
1969 the PCI strongly favored a proposed requirement that
the Co^nunity budget be submitted in its entirety to the
Parliament for approval or rejection, and not merely for
suggested changes. This stand was based on the principle
that since the funds involved
.
. .
have been taken out from undpr na + ior,oi
mentary control, they reouire a^on^r^n? !i Parlia-
in S:f^2t:5^?o^m-^^-"- -P--"-^^ ^v^^ °?
The PCI spokeswoman further went on to say that the party
was
.
. .
favorable to any initiative designed to extend
^?nnr::?^S^ ^^'^^''^^ °^ Parliament over the ac-tions of the Community.
In fact, the PCI in February. I970. made the requirement for
EP approval of "own resources" expenditures a prerequisite of
the PCI vote in favor of the draft agreement, and the party's
11.
me
g-
12. lotti, Dchats
. ? octo)>re, I969. p. ^9.
e^tr^?q7rTQ?<^'n^' liH:?^?-^? Parliament Working Docu-nmnts, 197^-1975. Document 50T/V4, Pebruar\rTB7^Q7^
—
ives text of treaty amendments.
Ultimate support for the treaty a.end.ents incorporating the
Luxembourg agreements, when they finally came before the
Italian Parliament for ratification. ^3
In December. 1972, the Parliament considered a
-tion for censure against the Commission for having been
dilatory in preparing the necessary le-islatinn^^a.L g o to cover the
increase in 2P budgetary powors whirh hr.A v.& y e n c had been authorized by
the Luxembourg agreements. The PCI members made clear the^r
disappointment when this notion was withdrawn by its origina-
tor, the French socialist Ceorees Snon»i« r v, •g bpe ale (who in I975 became
President of the Parliament)
,
The debate on budgetary powers provided another
opporfunity to illustrate the PCl-PCF differences in approach
to the institutional question. While Fazio Fabbrini in
October, 1973, insisted that a good part of the powers
attributed to the Council be transferred to the EP and that
place!i§
economic and social policy have tfken
the PCI appeared to be prepared to go along with the proposed
budgetary consultation procedure ( concertation) being estab-
lished between Council and Parliament, provided that on the
13. Leonardi, Debats
. 3 feVier, I970, p. 82.
14. Fabbrini. Debats
. 12 decembre. I972. pp. 58-59,
15. Fabbrini. Debates, li- October. I973. p. 36.
son
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material covered the EP have "the last word."l6
The PCF. on the other hand, disagreed with thi.
position Sharply, as was indicated hy Ansarfs interventi
in which the French Politburo member said
pend^^c^^^^ri^ ti'i2tit,fii frtoliy^r,"^*--^
French policy. Ansart said, would be decided In France and
"nov/here else."^
3. Hatifinati nn
In one other functional area, the PCI was quick to
seize upon an apparent legal lacuna to insist on increased FP
powers. D.Angelosante in June. 1969. demanded that the
association agreements with Tunisia and Morocco be ratified
by the EP, since they had been negotiated and signed by the
Community as an international personality, with no provision
for ratification by the separate national parliaments. EP
ratification was required in order to avoid a situation of
"absolute illegitimacy. on another occasion PCI sympathiz.
er. Tullia Carettoni-Romagnoli. pointed out that in the area
of trade agreements, negotiated by the Commission and signed
by the Council, the national parliaments-at least those
which have a ratification provision for such agreements in
16. Ibid ., p. 37.
17. Ansart, Debates
.
I* July, 1973. p. 111.
18. D'Angelosante, Debats
. J juin, I969. p. 38.
their consti tutionQ ay.«xons-are once more deprived of sovereign
rights. Since there is no procedure Tor the ratification oftrade agreements on the part of the EP as an alternative ^9
The Danish position on budgetary powers follows the
-legation's position on the „hole question of the roie of
the HP, and indeed of the legitimacy of the EC itself The
successive Danish delegates have ^ade it abundantly clear
that their suspicions of the entire EC establishment can be
allayed only if-.and possibly not even then-the power of
decision remains firmly in the Council of Ministers, where
the Danish F^^;^ Has a much greater leverage than it
does through its ten members in the European Parliament. 2°
In fact, on February 1. 1973, the Danish government approved
an order spelling out ministerial responsibility for actions
taken by Danish representatives in the Council of Ministers,
thereby increasing the influence of the Folketin. over their
actions.
19. Carettoni-Romagnoli. Debates, I3 February. I973. pp.
21
75-
20. Per Dich, Debates, k October. I973, pp.
2^^^ referring here to the
struct^th^Dan^;h^'"^^^''!V^ the Folketing which in^x ucto e Da ish representative of the Council and towhich he must report. A similar scrutiny committee hasnow been established in the British House 0? Commons
ven^inf" '"^"^^^ ^'^'^^ indefinitely by prLting instructions from reaching the UK delegates on
June S'"J976^''^''"' interview with David Coombes'
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^. Direct Elections? of EP Members
.
It is in the field of direct elections of EP members
that the division among the CAG members are most clearly
illustrated and the primacy of domestic considerations most
clearly shown. On January Ik. 1975. a general debate was
held on the Parliament's latest resolution on direct elec
tions, based on the so-called Patijn report.
The CAG speakers were all critical of the Patijn
report, and all abstained in the final vote on the resolu-
tion, with the exception of the Danish member of the group.
Jens Maiganrd. who voted against it. The criticism, however,
sprang from quite different sources. Essentially, the PCI
held that the resolution did not go far enough (no propor-
tional representation), while the PCF found that it already
had gone too far. r^Iaigaard's vote was motivated by the
opposition of the present Danish government, an opposition
which Maigaard's party supports, to direct elections for EP
members in any form, and not by a substantive criticism of
the resolution and report.
The PCI position, as stated by D» Angelosante, was
that direct elections are an important step in the democrati-
zation of the European Community, and that these elections
22. Maigaard told the author on June I6, 1976, that he (and
the Danish government) opposed not only direct elec-
tions, but also any strengthening of the powers of the
EP. since this would undermine the Folketin^ influence
through the Council of I'iinisters.
Should be on the
.asis of proportional representation.
el-^^ent was
.issin. fro™ the Patijn report. Furthennore the
resolution did not provide for the uniform electoral pro-
cedure reouired by the Treaty of Ro^e. On the contrary, the
resolution leaves to each national state the electoral syste.
to be used and therefore the decision as to which of the
national parties may participate in the elections in each
state. ^3
According to the FCF spokesman. Ge'rard Bordu, the
proposed direct elections are a smokescreen for "the handful
of giants...^ho7 are deciding the fate of 250 million
x-uropeans." Furthermore, the sham of direct elections is
an attempt to "abolish inalienable characteristics." As long
as Europe is the lackey of big business, who can predict
what the policy of a directly elected Parliament will be?
As though with the rising cadences of the Marseinai.P
. Bordu
exclaimed I
;«'^n;^+f.
cannot accept that a European parliamentary
majority... should take France's decision for herl^y
The PCI's complete disagreement with the French
viewpoint was expressed by lotti as followsi
23. D'Angelosante. Debates
. 14 January, I975, pp. 53-55.
24. Bordu. Debates. Ik January, 1975, pp. 64-65.
25. Bordu. loc. cit. The implication that direct elections
would constitute a sham legi timatization was reechoed inthe author's conf id-^-ntial conversations in Strasbourg.
June. 1975.
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we-h;vra!Syi'?ert'"?h'^r/fi:i^,%'"°r °?''-K-^^<^ i" that
a process which wouia enaW» 1^,^.^^^^^'°"^ initiate
number of obstaoles.26 Europe to overcome a large
It« position of the various elements in the CAG on
the ouestion of direct elections reflects a realistic assess-
ment Of the electoral possibilities of each. In the case of
the PCI. its popular vote has increased steadily over the past
decades in every general election since ma. This trend has
been confirmed as recently as the legislative elections of
June. 1976. Because of the lowering of the electoral age to
eighteen for nearly all purposes, a tendency of more than
one half of the new voters entering the electorate to vote
for the communist or socialist parties, and the traditional
immobilism of the Italian electorate, it is quite likely
that an irreversible trend has been set in motion. As older
traditionally conservative voting cohorts die off. a continu-
ously increasing communist vote in Italy would appear inevit-
able, barring unforeseen external factors, 27
The PCI thus has nothing to lose from a commitment
to direct elections in terms of the future composition of the
Italian delegation to the EP. Moreover, the PCI gains in
credibility at home through its vigorous espousal of
26. lotti. Debates. 19 February. I975, p. 176.
27.
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denooratization and parllamentarianism which its direct
elections stance represents, and thereby becomes an ever more
respectable partner for an eventual com,romesso storico with
the DC.^° •
At the present time, the PCF could benefit from
direct elections to the EP only if proportional representation
were Introduced into the French electoral system at the same
time. Any such change to a scrutin de liste system, in the
absence of a general constitutional upheaval, seems most un-
likely. If. however, the PCF still regards as viable their
ETOSramme commun with the PS and the left-wing Radicals, then
this means that the communists could come to a power-sharing
position through the front's winning the presidency rather
than a majority in the National Assembly. The margin of the
Giscard victory in the presidential elections of 1974 „as so
close (50.66-49.33) that this road may still seem to be the
most fruitful. Given the general philosophy and atmosphere
of the Vth Republic's constitution, with its strong presi-
dential leadership, the PCF may therefore in the long run not
be interested in a more powerful EP which might be able to
frustrate the policy of their elected presidential candidate.
The Danish position is even more negative, since in
view of the Danish government's own unfavorable attitude
28. Cfi Gianfranoo Pasauino. "Pesi internazionali e
contr.ipposi nazionali," in n r:aro TtnUnno. "d by
Fabio Luca Cavazza and 3tephen~iT7"Graubard (Milam
Garzanti, 197'*), Vol. I, p. 166.
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toward direct elections, the SFP whir^v, i •
.
on ^ri-. ich claims to represent
an those Danes who voted against joining the EC in the I972
referenda,
.ust reject out of hand any proposal for such an
innovation.
^
A recent SurobaromeHrP poll (October. 1975) shows
sentiment toward direct elections in the countries concerned
which tends to substantiate the conclusion that the attitudes
of the elements of the CAG are fended chiefly on internal
considerations. Respondents of all parties in Italy favored
direct elections by 78 percent, the highest percentage in
any of the nine member states. This represented an increase
of fourteen percentage points over the response in I973. In
France a favorable response came from 69 percent of those
polled, an increase of 18 percentage points, while in Den-
mark the favorable response showed a decline of four points
to 32 percent. For all nine countries the response was 6k
percent in favor completely favor" responses plus "favor
on the whole"), an increase of ten percentage points since
September, 1973.^^
The hypothesis that the PCF's opposition to direct
elections is not based on consideration of the sentiment of
its own vot-rs on this question, but rather on questions of
29. ps politik eftpr don andrn oktober. Resolution of theParty 3oard. October 28/29. 1972.
30. Commission of the lairopoan Communitic;;, F n^oh-rn '-i-'tr^'
it. '^ec. 1975 C-Vorking '3ocumcnt of the r.^minTiUion
of the :iuropean Communities),
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internal political strategy, is supported by the Institut
Srancais l^Opinion P^^blioue's findings for 1972. These
Showed that 54 percent of the PCF voters polled favored direct
elections to the EP. a higher percentage than for any other
political grouping. 31 m 1973, however, this sentiment had
decreased to kS percent. 3^ m an index of supranationality
based on the 1972 responses to this question and a series of
other substantive auestions the PCF was shown to be only
percent partisan of supranationality, as contrasted with 56
percent for the Socialists, 5^ percent for the Centre
De*mocratiqae. and 46 percent for the UDR.
Furthermore, it would seem that in all nine
countries general attitudes toward European unification have
hardly any influence on electoral behavior and party prefer-
ence. This was the conclusion of the Directorate General of
Press and Information of the EC Commission in 1972, after
extensive surveys of attitudes toward integration and party
preferences. 33 At election time other considerations are
31. The 54 percent support for direct elections may reflect
a temporary salience of the SP as an issue among PCFidentifiers at the time the poll was taken (May, 1969).
32. 1973 European Communities Study raw data, Inter-
Uniyersity Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor.
Michigan.
33. Commission of the European Communities. Directorate
General. Press and Information, Europeans and Kuropoan
Unification; tho Renults of a Survey Study Conduct.-d
in Fpbpnry-r^!ar-h 1*^70 etc.
.
Brussels, June, 1972. p.
171, Vf'imeograpaeci;
.
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more important than European unification
-kv,P 11 or the powers of the
European Parlaiment.
^Hbstantive Questions. In dealing with substantive
questions before the Parliament the CAG has been guided
Chiefly by domestic considerations of concern to each
.e.bor
party. Matters of overall European concern are largely second
ary factors in the evolution of CAG policy. For example, the
PCI has in recent years made gains among the traditionally
conservative Italian farmers, and the party hopes that this
trend will continue. The thrust of PCI policy in agricultur-
al matters is therefore highly nationalistic and. as will be
seen, selectively protectionist while rejecting the much of
the EC's general agricultural policy. The French communists
are far less aggressive on thin point, despite their overall
more nationalistic stance, since the EC agricultural policy
has until now been largely beneficial to the French farmer.
As a further example of this phenomenon in social
matters, the CAG has called for a greater role for the trade
unions, since in both Italy and France the communist parties
play a dominant role in the principal trade union organiza-
tions. Migrant workers, for example, are a concern to the
PCI because Italians living abroad are still voters and
often become PCI supporters once they have left their
traditionally conservative home communities. Since many
3'*. See Appendix I.
fewer Frenchmen work abroad, and migrant workers in France do
not vote unless they become naturalized, the PGF's concern
for their fate is more altruistic and correspondingly less
intense,
1. Asericulture
.
The CAG's policy toward EC efforts to rationalize
Community agriculture seems to be essentially protectionist
and to be strongly favorable to the interests of the smaller
agricultural producers. The FCI fights a continuous and
apparently rearguard action in defense of Italian fruit,
vegetable, and tobacco growers, attempting to preserve their
competitive position and to protect them from politically
more influential middlemen. A particular point of attack has
been the PCX's offensive against an asserted preferential
treatment on the part of the Community for North European
products such as butter and cheese, and a discrimination
against Southern products such as olive oil. Also, the CAG
speakers have attacked the general EC tendency to support
high prices for agricultural products, even if this means
the destruction of surpluses. They attribute the high prices
in part to the chaotic nature of agricultural regulation in
the community, which reflects a balance of power among
agricultural producers, united in a roof-organization called
COPA ( Confe'doVation d *Org:anisations Professionelles A^ricole^)
.
rather than a rational well thought-out plan.
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In the fruit an. vegetable line. CAG
.r,.s that the
assxst the s.aXX producers an. a.oia favoHn, the
.iaa,..
r-
''''
one o. the reasons
.ortne Norwegian
"no" votP in +^^4.
" country's 1972 referenda.^ onE »e.hership.35
,
^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^^^
s successful efforts to improve the EC retraining progra™
for Italian tobacco growers who were rendered redundant by
the EC's program of free trade in tobacco. ^6
It is in asserting that discrimination prevails in
EC agricultural doIIpv +ha+ crjJ. p xicy .hat PCI speakers have been most
prominent in their criticism. They claim that ZC policy
favors the Dutch and other north European producers of butter
while discriminating against Italian olive oil producers.
The EC protectionist policy for butter has led to the develop.
™ent of a massive surplus of this product, the so-called
"butter mountain." while the free import of vegetable oils is
ruinous for the unprotected Sicilian olive growers. This
debate was led by the PCI expert on agriculture. Senator
Nicola Cipolla, and the fact that his principal adversary.
35. This is doubtful. A
36. Leich, og. cit.
, pp. 277-278.
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EC Agricultural Commissioner P. J.
^ ^^^^^
Bute. Minister of Agriculture a..e. a certain pi.uancy'to
the debate, even if it .i. not contribute ™uch to the clari-
fication Of the issues. Nor has EC policy been much
influenced by the PCI-s argements, the "butter mountain-
continues to be a ma.or EC agricultural surplus problem to
date, and olive oil remains unprotected. 37
The PCI position on EC agricultural policy was sot
forth most comprehensively in the report by Cipolla and Lui^i
Conte to the meeting on the Italian communists and Europe,
"
held in Rome in November, l97k.J^ The main points of this
article have since then been reiterated by PCI spokesmen in
EC agricultural policy discussions in the EP. According to
Cipolla and Conte, the EC's agricultural policy is chaoUc,
mieconomic and discriminatory,
"...a disorderly and casual
mosaic of regulations. "39 The result of this policy has been
high prices for everyone-many times higher than on the
international market-which has been a particularly severe
blow for the Italian peasant. Neither he nor the crops he
produces has benefitted from the EC protectionist policy.
37. Cipolla, Debate?, 18 January, 1973, PP. m-lSV i6
38. N. Cipolla and L. Conte, "La Crisi della politica
agricola del MEC" (fn. 36. p. 59).
P^-i-ii^ica
39. Ibid ., p. 56.
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and his income has not Kept up „lth that of the industrial
workers. The continuing exodus of fa™ workers to the cities
is proof Of their dissatisfaction and difficult economic po^i-
t.on. Furthermore, the foreign agricultural policy of the EC
especially the practice of dumping Community protected pro-
ducts, has disturbed the world market and unfavorably affected
the Third World.
Community agricultural policy, the PCI maintains,
tends to harm those branches of agricultural production which
employ more workers. On the other hand it favors the bigger
and more developed agricultural enterprises, resulting in
vast surpluses like the "butter mountain" which must be
dumped abroad. At the same time, the association agreements
the EC has signed with Third World countries facilitate the
import of agricultural products such as olives and citrus
fruits which compete with those produced by the poorest EC
EC farmers. All this has resulted in an overall boost for
Dutch and French agriculture and a negative balance for the
Italian producers. Italy's unfavorable position in this
respect is the result of
.
. .
political and technical weaknesses of the Italiangovernment aggravated by the prolonged sectarian re-lUoal to allow the participation of the...PSI and PCI
...in Community institutions.
As a solution to this problem the PCI proposes to
shift the European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund
^0. Ibid., pp. 60-61.
to give greater emphasis to its role as a guide in preference
to its role as a guarantor, byi
and dairy Pro%'L1s?\SrJ:dx>:^i?::/;,!l^"^-S-- b-ts.
would otherwise ?o to J "§-^^ that
Of surpluses in th^e arSa^tnl^^'^i?^ P"^<=*»ase
and large scale deve1opj;:ntar;'ro1ecisr""' '"'''^^'"'-'^
Which d^irec\-iri^p-:nhrine"::r;f%";;-3^Sir?i-^
will b^™or"irii^:''sftrs%[^™ ^^^^ ^^^^y
structural reforms; and
Pnoe., tnrougn
who are better placed to judge the value and emclencv '
i^ IrussflsVSJ'
"'V'-"^
'^^'-'^^ of^lheIaLf
Since the French farmer, at least until the begin-
ning of the fuel crisis in the fall of 1973. has been in a
much more favorable position vis-a-vis the EC than has the
Italian, the PCF has been much less concerned with EC agri-
cultural policy than has the PCI. Traditionally, the PCF
has been far more a movement of the French urban proletariat,
with few roots in the countryside, in sharp contrast to the
present composition of the PCI, about a third of whose mem-
bership is of rural origin.
The agricultural price crisis which developed in
the fall of 1974, with demonstrations in France and Italy and
shortages, especially of sugar, in many parts of the Nine led
the French Communist Party to support the PCI's demand for
41. Ibid
.
. pp. 69-71.
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a redefinition and revision of +h= rO . the Community's agricultural
policy. However, the PCF insisted that any such redefini-
tion Should give a wide freedom of application to each of the
member states, since the farmers were even now asking for "a
Closure of the frontiers. "'^^ Ansart saw the Icey to the
solution in an initiative on the part of the CAG to call for
a special session of the EP. This session was convened on
September 16. Before this time the PCF had shown little
interest in agricultural problems, but at this session the
PCF supported "solidarity between workers in town and country."
At the same time there was
.
. .
no need to do away with national independence andsovereignty m order to organize cooperation Eurom>ansecurity, and defend the vital interL^s of the workers.
The CAG is also well aware of the usefulness of the
EC relationship for politicking at the local level. The de-
pressed mountain areas of Northern Italy have shown an
increasing trend toward PCI voting preferences.^^ In I973.
a PCI spokesman called for a "vast assistance program" from
the European Social Fund for this area, presumably as a reward
for the support of the share-croppers and poor farmers of the
Red Belt in northern Italy. Traditionally, most ESF funds have
42. Ansart, Debates
. I6 September. 1974, p. 39.
Ibid.
. p. 40.
44. giorgi9 ^^^i and Alfonso Prandi. Patternn of PoHticalParticipation in Ital^r. (New HavenJ—TinF-UHTversi tyPrecs, 1970). pp. 33^-339.
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been spent in the South.^^ As- of June. 1975, EC assistance
for Red Belt farmers had not yet materialized.
2. gconomic Or^^anization of the Community ,
The CAG's view of the overall economy of the EC is
a complex one. The PCX regards the EC as "an incomplete
customs union, with certain elements which are characteristic
of an economic union. The Community, they say. is guided
by the ideology of free exchange, and tends to favor the
existing private forms of economic organization, specifically
the multinational corporations. Further there are growing
gaps (difformita)
.
first between the EC and the USA. and
secondly within the Community itself between the developed and
underdeveloped sectors. Italy belongs in the latter. These
gaps have been widened by the investment policies of the
largely American multinational corporations. To the extent
that economic integration is achieved, external control is
weakened. An increase in European productivity will be
incompatible with hegemonic control from outside the EC.
Therefore, it is up to the CAC- to work for greater integration
in order to overcome the unevenness of contemporary economic
development.
Until now, the PCI m.aintains the reasons for the
failure of the European economic union have been the lack of
^5.
46.
Luigi Marras. Deb.itvs
. 10 May. 1973, p. 220.
Leonardi, "II ProccGso di Integrazione," p. 73
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a democratic consensus and the lack of a capacity for
autonomy vis-a-vis external forces.^^ However, the PCJ.s
remedy in the past for this failure has hp^n o-laxiu n bee a more active
intervention of the worker- "ae +v,« ^ .^ '^^e o as the most dynamic and progress-
ive Of the productive forces/'^^ The PCF. on the other hand
tends rather to attribute European economic problems to a
general crisis of the capitalist ^vtcn,x i syotem. iVUnor institutional
reforms will not suffice. The multinationals must be checked
and the EC democratized "in all fields and in all its organs."
These two approaches were illustrated in the contributions of
Leonardi (PCI) and Marcel Lemoine (PCF) during the EP debate
on inflation in October, 1973. Leonardi opposed the proposed
community anti-inflationary measures both on substantive
grounds and on the more theoretical ground that the measures
gave greater power to the "non-democratic" institutions of
the Community.. At the same time appeared to favor a return
to protectionism, in which the weaker economies will suffer
the most.^O Lemoine. on the other hand, held that inflation
is the result of the strengthening of capitalistic monopolies.
;a;i;J^%r^^°?^'^.^'*?^^ °^ hyperaccumulatlon ofc p tal, the endemic disease—one could most say the
^7. I gomunisti |1 Parlamento Europeq
. 197V3. resume' ofNovemoer, I974. session, p. 3.
^8. Leonardi. "II Process© di Integrazione. " p. 54.
^9. I Comunisti al Parlamento europco
. loc. cit
.
50. Leonardi. Debaters. 16 October. 1973. p. 38.
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leukemia-of the capitalist economy. 51
Victory in the fight against inflation is to be found not in
further supranationalis., but in the restoration of national
sovereignty, peaceful coexistence anH ^.cA fate , d international coopera-
tion.
3. Social Policy and Labor Policy
.
Under the heading of social policy, the CAG has
taken up the questions of working conditions throughout the
EC, unemployment, inflation, the status of migrant workers in
the Community countries, and the role of the trade unions in
the development of the Community policy. It is this last item
that often seems to be the major social concern of the CAG.
insofar as what is disclosed through emphasis in public
debates. Even before I969 the communist parties were pushing
for greater participation by trade unions in Community policy
development. As the economic situation grew worse in I972
and 1973, this demand was intensified.
The position was first spelled out in the EP in
lotti's speech in June. I970. in which she said that the trade
unions must play a direct role in Community life, establishing
. . .
a dialectical relationship which, without detracting-from the political organs, will give European democracy
an ever less delegated /character/, ^
and that furthermore "a greater participation of the popular
51, Lemoine, Ibid
. . p. hh.
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masses in the construction of Community social policy re-
quired.
As a CAG initiative, and after some hesitations on
the part of the participants, a tri-partite meeting on the
unemployment crisis was held at the end of 197k in Brussels,
among ministers of labor and/or social affairs of the Nine,
the EC Commission, and representatives of the national trade
union federations, including the French pro-communist CGT and
the newly organized Italian combined communist-social
democratic-Christian democratic trade union association. It
is interesting to note that there was very little difference
between these two groups as far as the future role and demands
of the European trade unions were concerned.
At this Brussels meeting, the trade unions called
for -precise reconversion plans, elaborated with the partici-
pation and supervision (contrgle) of the trade unions," and
a new investment policy for the European Social Fund, to be
developed in concordance with the trade union organizations.
The trade union memorandum asked that these proposals be ac-
cepted as a "serious basis for negotiation." In general the
trade unions have been continuously critical of the small
amounts allotted to the E3F (less than one billion units of
account /T97I dollars/ over a three year period), as well as
the lack of consultation in its allocation and expenditures.
52. lotti, I^cbato . 16 juin. 1970. p. 72.
This critical stance has been reflected in CAG parliamentary
interventions. 53 tri-partite meeting was considered a
sufficiently useful forum for social aotinn vt uci i c o to be reconvened
late in 1975.
The CAG has had to continue to press for the Z|0.
hour week, with no overtime and earlier retirement, through-
out the Community, despite their wry admission that the 40-
hour week has been a trade union goal ever since the beginning
of this century. 3y 197/1. the 40-hour week was EC policy,
on paper, at least, for which the CAG has claimed the credit
because of its efforts in the EP and elsewhere.
The migrant workers in EC countries have received
considerable attention for many reasons. One is the large
number of these workers, especially in Germany and the low
countries, who are Italian, and return to Italy to vote at
every important election, mostly at public expense. Another
reason is that France is host to migrant workers from
several Mediterranean countries. As to the Communist parties'
position on this problem, the PCI and the PCF hardly differ.
The CAG therefore called for giving the migrant worker the
same social, cultural, and political rights as each country's
own nationals, regardless of whether he plans to stay abroad
53. "Per una Politica Socials
I. Comimigti p.l P.ir Inn onto
5^. Luigi marras. Debates
. 10
Kuropea (Documentazione)
"
Europ^>o
. I97V3. pp. 17-26.
December, 1973, p. 27
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u stressed the vulnerability of the migrant
worker to any declinp in ^y e xn the economy, since he. as the worke,
with the least organized defense, will be the first to be
laid off. mtiMately. however, the CAG maintains that it is
the multinational corporations who are to blame for the
migrant worker's plight, since it is they who have created
his employment.^
Multinational Corporations
It is not surprising that the multinational corpo-
rations appear as a major source of distress in the CAG
European scenario. They are blamed for polluting the envi-
ronment. 5^ for stifling competition. 58 for contributing too
little to the EC-s treasury. 59
^^^.^^^^
balances in Europe. 6° and for causing unemployment and i.-
flation. In approaching the question of the investment by
55. ^fijoine. Debates. 12 February, 197^, pp. 59-60:D'Angelosante. Debates
. 12 June, 197^. pp 1061108.
Marras Debates, 12 March, 1973. (not reproduced in
taken ^r^rJh^'^r??''^* ^ photocopy of Marras' speech,f om the Italian version of the record is repro-duced on page 86 of I Comunisti al parlamento
. inter-
• M.'W^^l^ ~ ^^^^ "^'"^
57. D'Angelosante, Debates
. 3 July. 1973, p. 72.
58. Leonardi, Debates
. 15 January, I974. pp. 35-37.
59. Fabbrini and Lemoine, Debates
. 14 March. 1974 nn 121-
122, 124-125.
60. Marie-Therese Goutmann (PCF). Debates, 9 December. 1074
PP. 38-39. '
^1. See Above.
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American multinationals in the EC. the CAG appears to follow
the now standard neo-Leninist analysis, to wit, that surplus
capital fro. a highly industrialized state seeks an outlet in
a less developed area, albeit in the case of Europe an area
which has already been industrialized. This investment has
both stimulated the competitiveness of the European economies
among themselves and improved the competitive position of
the American enterprises. The EC reaction has therefore been
ambiguous, an effort to save the advantages of Ameri
investment while protecting the European economy from Ame
domination. Meanwhile the technological gap continues to
grow to the advantage of the American multinationals, and
control at the national or EG level becomes more and more
difficult.
The PCI position on multinationals is that they are
not 2er se either good or bad. After all. there are multi-
national economic enterprises even in the socialist countries,
and there are mixed forms of multinational undertakings be-
tween private companies and socialist countries, such as the
Fiat works in Togliattigrad, USSR. The multinationals
. . .
correspond to an objective need for the inter-
nationalization of productive activities through special-ization at the level of production, and not only at thelevel of trade in finished products according to the
62. Giovanni Duchini e Carlo Ruggeri. "La CES e gli Stati
euronei di fronte alle •corporations' USA," Rinascita.
1 febbraio 197^, pp. 21-22.
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traditional principles of international trade/3
The basic task is to adapt EC institutions to cope with the
problem of control and to create a capacity for political de-
cision making at the international level.
The PCF position starts from the same theoretical
premises, but comes to somewhat different and ultimately
illogical conclusions. Multinational enterprises represent
•
^^^^^^swer of the largo capitalist groupings tothe objective need for exchange of informltion work!and goods among nations. 6^ utn.,
However, apparently simply because of their size, the multi-
nationals are potentially, if not actually evil. The turnove
of General Motors is greater than the Swiss or Belgian GNP.
while multinationals shamefacedly exploited the workers in
Portugal and Chile before the revolutions in these countries
forced them to treble the workers' wages. The interpenetra-
tion of big business and government in the EC nations
renders nugatory any attempt at national control of the multi-
nationals. Therefore, the PCF sees nationalization of these
corporations as the only solution. During the debate in
which this problem was raised in December, 19?^, EC Commis-
sioner Altiero Spinelli was quick to point out that Bordu's
proposal for nationalization was not at all responsive to
his theoretical premise that the contemporary economy is
63. Leonardi, Debate'? . 1? December, 19?^^. p. 221. Cf.
Klaus. OS crt.
. pp. 97-II5.
64. Bordu, Debat t-s. 12 December, 197^, p. 210.
98
breaking out of national frontiers, regardless of whether it
follows the capitalist or socialist mode of production/^
The EC's attempt to cope with the multinational
corporation problem through the establishment of a European
Company Statute met with a mixed reaction from the GAG. The
Statute, proposed by the Commission to the Council of Minis-
ters on May 13. 1975.^° attempts both to facilitate the form-
ation of corporations operating simultaneously in two legal
systems and to provide a means for their control. In addition
to the granting of an international charter, the Statute also
provides for a Supervi.-ory Board, with worker participation,
and a European Works Council for each enterprise. The CAG
was placed in a rather difficult position when debate on the
Commission's proposal began in July, 1974.
While the CAG was strongly opposed to the philosophy
behind the European Company Statute which was in part designed
to facilitate the establishment of multinational corporations
in Europe, they felt they must strongly support the provisions
for workers* representation in the Supervisory Council and in
the European Works' Council. The CAG therefore pressed for
greater authority for these bodies, a more simplified and
direct form of election, especially for workers' representa-
tives, but at the same time a restriction on any right of the
65.
66.
Spinelli. Debates
. 12 December, 197^. p. 225.
Bullf*tln of the Kurop-.-an Communi ties
. Supplement 4/75.
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European Wor.s- Council to bargain coXlectively on
.ehaxr of
any national trade union group. This last was in the inter-
est Of maintaining the principle of "class autonomy. "6?
The CAG has also maintained that the existence of
the European Company Statute did not preclude the individual
countries fro™ continuing their efforts to control the multi-
national corporations through legislation or court action
Thus, even though the European Company Statute „iu probaMy
become a part of the legal system of the Nine, its existence
will not represent a relinquishment of sovereignty to the
Commission and the European Court in this connection. It
Should be noted that this position may be in conflict with
the CAG-s general stand on sovereignty, first formulated bv
lotti in 1971. which has upheld the supremacy of community
over national law. as far as the establishment of the common
market in various products was concerned. ^8 The subsequent
reservation of the right to exercise national control over
multinational organizations should therefore be regarded as
yet another example of the privacy of domestic over Community
considerations, at least as far as the PCI is concerned.
Qo*"fn^°^^f^' •^"^y- l^?'^. pp. 149-53. 1<?8-99, 206| Marras. Ibid., p. 197.
68, lotti, "Sovranita Nazionale," p. 82,
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5. Attitude toward NATO
.
The PCI position with respect to NATO has become
increasingly clear, especially
.ince I969. and since the
development of the compromen.,o storico and the very real
possibility of the PCI's at least sharing power in a future
Italian government. As was discussed above. ^9 the PCI had
originally opposed the creation of the EEC. because it was
a product of the cold war and the offspring of NATO, By 1969.
however, all that was changed, and Amendola could declarei
And now the Community has finished with bcin^^ in-Vvolved m the crisis of NATO and the Atlantic policy.
In other words, the original sin had been overcome, even
though it is not clear exactly how or why. In place of Luigi
Longo's slogan at the Xllth PCI Congress in February. 1969.
of "Italy out of NATO and NATO out of Italy!- Amendola sub-
stituted the concept of the S'jperamento dei blocchi (tran-
scending military blocs), to which he referred in his maiden
speech to the SP on March 12. I969. Such a transcending
would be
. . .
pursued by means of reciprocal agreements provid-
ing for the liquidation /of the blocs/ by successive
states, passing from the creation of atom-free or de-
militarized zones to the creation of vast neutral
regions. <^
69. Page 5^.
70. Amendola. Debate, 12 mars. I969. p. 38. ( Cosi la
Conuni tA ha finito c.nry 1 * r-nsero coi nvolta n^lla orisi
_della po'lTTica aTf-intica della NATO).' ^—
^
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However, by 19 7'.. the PCI „as no longer insisting
on a dissolution of the military hloos as a prerequisite of
ditente. Berlinguer. in his report to the Central Committee,
held that such a dissolution would not be one of the
Ani consequences, ^and presumably not an earlv
P>n !a?rfn"-e$uri^rnri;uL\-/thd\l-i^of
'
thf^?x"u\rS^1a^ii:.^"^^-^"^ ^-^^ frorrtL^of
By the time the XlVth PCI Congress had arrived,
Berlinguer had reached a position of even opposing Italy's
withdrawal from the North Atlantic pact. In his report to
the Congress of March 18, 1975, he said:
V/e are not raising the question of Italy's with-drawal from the Atlantic Pact, since npith'-r- this
eventuality nor any other unilateral withdrawal f-or.ieiLherbloc is feasible, and would indeed ^nd up byhindering q,^ even reversing the process of internationalQ e uen t
e
. # ,
Berlinguer clearly regarded a potential withdrawal from NATO
as a destabilizing factor on the international scene, and
therefore a threat to a further development of detente
.
Finally, while the matter of Italy's membership in NATO was
not discussed on the floor of the EP in recent years, the
attitude of the PCI delegation can be seen clearly from a re-
cent interview of Amendola by Der Spiegel
, in which the CAG
Chairman said, in response to a question whether a PCI
71. Enrico Berlinguer, Ia Proposta Comunista (Torinot
Einaudi, 1975), pp. "33-39.
72. L'Unita . March 2k, I975, p. 8.
government would declare Italy no longer a member.
The position of the PCF on this matter is of course
quite different, taking as a point of departure present French
policy tov/ard NATO. Since General de Gaulle in I966 withdrew
French forces from NATO command, the PCF has seen the problem
more in terms of France's re-entry into the organizational
structure of NATO than in terms of her withdrawal from the
Alliance. While Denis and Kanapa complained in I969 of the
continued existence of any French ties to NATO,?^ more recent
73. g|r^r ie-el. August 4. 1975. p. 76. In the June 15 issue
?ntfe^— Berlinguer said in a pre-eLc^ion
t.r
feel that r^ince Italy does not beIon<; to the
iiarga./ ract. from this viewpoint there is anl^ti^lute
certain ;,y that we can proceed along the Italian way
2 fJ'^^friiS^ without any interference 2on the partof the Uo:iR/.
.
,
^ ^
In reply to a question whether the North Atlantic Treaty
were not a shield for the construction of socialism infreedom. Berlinguer said:
I want Italy not to leave NATO also for this
reason, and not only because our exit would upset
the international equilibrium. I feel safer on
this side...
Thf>se words, which ultimately arose from a comparison
between the situation in Czechoslovakia in I968 and in
Italy today, may mark a turning point in the develop-
ment of "eurocomrnunism- as a third type of Marxism-
Leninism, alongside those of the Soviets and the Chinese.
7^. Denis et Kanapa. o£. crt.
, pp. IO3-120.
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commentaries have expressed a PCF f^ar +urur le that the post-de
Gaulle leadership wishes to re-involve France with NATO as
an alternative to the continuation of the force de frafioe ^5
The Communist.Socialist Pro»^ Co^un calls quite clearly
for the immediate and simultaneous dissolution of the
Warsaw and the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations, as well
as a renunciation of the French independent nuclear
deterrent and France's adherence to the Test Ban and the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaties. ^6 In the EP itself, the
PCF has had little to say about NATO as a European phenomenon.
other than to decry the idpa tha+ -^,1^^^^ • i-j.un lae t ^urope might constitute a
third force. Such a third force, in the eye of the PCF.
could only be a sub-bloc of European capitalists in a system
of blocs which the PCF hopes to help Europe to transcend. ^7
6. Sner^ Policy
.
In the field of energy policy, the CAG has followed
a line which could be interpreted as pro-Arab. but which seems
largely dictated again by domestic considerations. The CAG
opposes special concessions to oil producting companies which
are exploring supplies of crude oil in Europe and its offshore
waters, and opposes the general concept of "independence" in
75. Jean Kanapa, Coexistences Pacjfinue et Lutte Classe en1^ (Pans: Parti Communiste Fran^ais. 19751. pp. 397"
76. Pro^rapme Com-^un
. pp. I71, 17/^.
77. Ansart. Debates , lb January, 1974, p. 123.
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energy matters as a pretext for cutting down purchases of Mid-
Eastern oil for political motives. ^8 However, the CAG
maintains that it is the price of fuel that is the critical
matter, and that all means possible should be used to expand
its production, in order to prevent a further price rise.
At the same time, the CAG is critical of EC policy
in channelling some of the efforts of Euratom into non-nuclear
research. Such research, it maintains, is merely a backstop
to what the petroleum industry should be doing anyway, and
is thus an indirect subsidy to the already rich oil multi-
nationals. ^9 The PCF favors the return of supervision of
nuclear research to the national
-ovcrnrr:f.nt-, no th^t Europe
will not be dependent on American imports of nuclear
technology in the future. The pro.^ram cnmmm calls for the
nationalization of the French nuclear industry? and this
according to the PCF. would be the safest means of dealing
with the problem, both economically and physically.
Coal mine safety is also an important preoccupation
of the PCF, which has a high concentration of voters in the
mining country in Northeastern France. Accidents in coal mines
seem--to the PCF—to increase together with the profits of the
mine owners, rather than the reverse.
78. Bordu. Debates
.
10 April. 1975, pp. I68-I70.
79. Leonardi. Ibid
. . pp. 14-15.
80. Lemoine, Debates
. 15 May, 1975. pp. 137-138.
81. Ansart, Ibid
. . pp. 17-13,
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7. Tax on Value Added
.
The CAG position on the Tax on Value Added (TVA)
one percent of which is supposed to flow directly to the FC
for incorporation into its own resources fund, reflects an
appreciation of the unpopularity of this new type of tax
particularly in Italy, where it is believed that the appiioa-
tion of TVA has contributed sharply to the inflation problem. 82
During the course of the dehato nr, v,, •uuu xe on harmonization of TVA
schedules in March lQ7it +-k« pftmn. I9 t, the GAG's generally negative posi-
tion was illustrated, again with minor PCI-PCF variations.
The PCI held that EC efforts to dictate TVA policy to the"mem.
bers were bound to fail, since TVA was a part of the entire
taxation picture of each member state, and therefore should
remain the responsibility of the Nine governments, who could
administer TVA with due regard for the overall taxation policy
of each country.^-'
The PCF position was more blunt. TVA is unjust in
principle, since it is regressive and its burden falls chief-
ly on the working classes, while giving advantages to the
monopolies. The final consumer is penalized while the capital-
ist processor benefits by being able to pass on the cost to
82. Cft CE3PE. 02. cit.. pp. 113-121. for a prediction thatthis would happen. Both wholesale and retail prices ro^oin Italy by about 15 percent at the beginning- of loyk in
anticipation of the introduction of TVA during that year
*his was an attempt to offset the fiscal penalization
which TVA entails.
83. Fabbrini, Debates
. lU March. 1974. pp. 120-122.
the working man. TVA is thus a system "h^, h
tinctions ••8'* Th. C .
°"
j Xar,e European multinational industrial ana financial
.^oups as a means
.or satisrying its neea Tor more
-own
resources" funds.
8. EC Relations with the Third World.
'^-^ attitude towara Community relations withthe Third World can be illustrated by reoallin. t.°y c g he positionOf the EC communist parties on the original association pro-
visions contained in the Treaty of Rome, then on the two
Yaounde conventions (see below) and finally on th» I975
Ion.e Agreement, which sets up a cooperation pattern between
the EC and the forty-six African Caribbean and Pacific
countries. One of the reasons for the originally negative
attitude Of the West European communist parties toward the
Treaty of Rome may well have been the fact that incorporated
into the treaty at that time was an association agreement with
the French and Belgian colonies in Africa which were in the
process of achieving their independence. This "colonial
appendix" to the Treaty was seen as prolonging in practice the
colonial relationship of the area with the European "mother-
„o5lands.
8^. Lemoine, Ibid
. . pp. 124-125.
'R?na°cUa'1xx?f T^'fi^^i "L'Europa cerca ossigeno,"pmaselta
,
XXXII, No. 8 (February 21, 1975), pp. 19:20.
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later agreement. v-Ith the now independent African
countr.es. signed at Yaounde' in 1963 and 1969, were stiil
subjected to heavy criticise as neo-coXonialist. especiaiiy
because they provided for continued preferential treatment
for ...C products, and gave the African countries little in-
fluence over EC decisions on development aid to their
economies. ^ The GAG did concede thnf +va at there were some im-
proven.ents in Yaound^ II. in ter^s of generalised preferences
export subsidies for the associates, and the reduction of
the "reverse preferences" for EC exports to Africa.^?
The attitude of the GAG toward the I.,^^ Convention
of 1975 was now basically positive, the only cavil being over
the insufficient leverage given to the associated states in
determining the amount of European Development Fund grants
to be given for particular purposes. attributes
the "improvement" in the Lome' Convention to the success of
the African liberation movements in the ex-Portuguese colonies
and elsewhere, the participation of trade unions in the
negotiations, and the development of a consciousness of the
fact and significance of independence in the ex-colonial
areas, symbolized by the development of OPEC, and African and
Caribbean relations with Cuba. Thus a return to the old
86. D'Angelosante, Debats
. 9 d^cembre. I969, p. 29.
87. lotti, "Sovranita Nazionale," p. 90.
88. Sandri, Debates
. 10 December, I974, pp. 97-98.
colonial or neocolonial relaf
^
tionship seems to the CAG an
unlikely outcome. Indeed R.v,o+ c
,
.
2^"dri has described thelome Convention as a "historic event - . ^ w
,^
has claimed thatits ™.ltiXate.al nat.re is the pKnoipal guarantee against a
••relapse into /I^er-icanZ neo-colonialis™. "90 The victory of
.ultiXateraXis. in the I.™/ A^.ee^ent represents a
.efeat ofthe Unite. States- a.Mtion to prevent Europe Tro. actin, on
Its own.
9. The EC and Fast-Wegt trsde.
The CAC; position on multilateralism in trade wUh
the Third
.orld may be the .ey to an important evolution in
the CAG-s attitude toward EC trade relations with socialist
or "state-trading" countries, as the communist states are
Officially designated by the Community. From i960 to 1971,
the PCI position was that the bourgeois parties- objection!
to bilateral agreements between EC members and individual
socialist countries were lacking in validity, and that in
particular the claim that such trade should be Community
controlled simply because the Soviet Union did not officially
recognize the existence of the EC was in effect a red herr-
ing. The Community had different sorts of relationships with
different parts of the world. Exceptions had been made for
89. Sandri, "L'Suropa ceroa ossigeno," p. 20,
90. Sandri. Debates
. 30 April, 1975, p. 90.
ean
trade with the United States in the Kennedy Hound.^l
,or th
Third World with the association agreements, why not then
exemption in favor of bilateralism for the socialist countrio
Comnunity control over trade all too easily could spill over
into control over political contacts, to the detriment of
such helpful developments as the Brandt Ost^olitik. 92
In 1972, this position was still being maintained,
but with a slight modification. The Paris EC suir.mit of
November of that year had proposed a coordination (concerta-
tion) of trade policy by the EC powers in anticipation of
the European Security Conference. The PCI spokesman at that
time did not oppose concertation, in principle, provided the
EC had made concrete progress toward democratization and was
not slipping back into the position of creating a new trading
bloc. 93 In the autumn of 1973, in view of an approach by the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)^^ for multi-
lateral negotiations between Comecon and the SC. the CAG
spokesman held out the possibility that such negotiations
might very well lead to an exclusion of bilateral agreements.
91. The Kennedy Round provides for consultation between the
Zu A establishment or modification ofthe Common External Tariff. These consultations
usually result in important preferences for U3 exports
to the EC, ^
92. D'Angelosante. Debats
. 25 novembre. 1969, p. U6 Cfi C^"^
pp. 20i^-212. 7
i
93. Leonardi, Debats
. 15 novembre. 1972. p. li^3.
9^. Comecon may be considered a counterpart to the EC in that
it is an organization of the countries of the Soviet bloc,
designed to integrate their economies.
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but that the latter should not he excluded a
case, bUateral agreements could not be seriously considered
an obstacle to European political union.95
In February. 1974, the Commission proposed to the
Council that cooperation agreements by EC members with non-
member countries, including specifically the state-trading
countries, be brought under Community control. During thi
debate on this proposal, the CA^I reversed its previous stand,
its spokesman strongly endorsed the principle of Community
control, as a means of "enabl^n,:? Europe to resist American
pressure and so defend its own identity."?^ He cited the
Soviet-V;est German agreement of May. I973, as proof of the
The CAG voted for the proposal, which was ultimately adopted
by the Co.jncil of Ministers as EC policy. In February. 1975,
however, the CAG had another opportunity to reaffirm its
defense of bilateral agreements, as important contributions
to detente
,
in discussing the Parliament's resolution on ex-
panding trade with Coraecon. This time the CAG supported the
resolution in principle, but abstained in the final vote,
apparently because of the resolution's warning that bilateral
95. D'Angelosante, Debat-s
. 18 October, 1973, p. 181.
96. Sandri, n^-bito^
. 11 ?ebru:;ry, 107;!, pp. 19.20,
>vm
agreements represented a
-danger to be avoided. "97
This rather dramatic shift from an exclusive support
for bilateralism to backing for Community control of trade
with communist countries is difficult to explain. All one
can do is take at face value the CAG assertion that the EC
can, through the asaumption of such control, "defend its o,
identity," and relate this decision either to the very slow
defrosting trend in Soviet policy toward the EC (noted
earlier), 98 or to the growing divergences between West
European CPs and the CPSU. Even the most optimistic view
of possible change in the Community's political complexion
as a result of the eventual admission of left-wing Mediter-
ranean governments cannot be projected ex £cst facto to
justify such a shift in support for EC institutions. The
matter must be left for further investigation.
97. Sandri, Pebates
,
18 February, 1975. Dp. 106-107. Cf,Goutmann's elaboration of the PCF's position is asfollows: Trade between the EEC and Comecon should
not result in national independence and sovereigntybeing called into question." This may very well re-flect a fear that France might be hampered by EC controlher efforts to liberalize trade with the US3R. Ibid
p. 108, —
*
98. Cfi Wolfgang Berner and Heinz Timmermann, Srfahrun^s-
fcerlcht uber den Besuch einer Gruppe fuhrender
Vgrtfeter der I talieninchpn Kommunisti schen Partei in
iind mn am 15-lo Ivl^rz 1973 IK^ln: Bund^HTTiti tl^tfur ostwissenschaftliche und intornationale Studien
1973)
. p. 1^.
'
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Indications of the CAG-s policy toward EC relations
with China were revealed in two instances during the EP
sessions between March, 1969. and June. 1975. In February
1973. Sandri raised the question of future Community rela-
tions with China, and expressed the hope that the rumors were
untrue that the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) was now pro-
posing to enter into relations with a Europe which China
would find united "both economically and militarily." To
give credence to such a Chinese hope could involve the EC in
a new cold war situation, which should be avoided at all
99costs. In the June session of 1975, when the question of
EC-CPR relations was again debated, the entire GAG was
absent from the hall during the entire course of Co.niissionor
Sir Christopher Soames' report on his negotiations with the
Chinese, and during the period of debate which followed.
The diplomatic diffidence expressed in both cases may reflect
the strict neutrality of the PCI in the Sino-Soviet conflict,
which the PCF has not found cause to overstep. In the fall
of 1975 the EC and the CPR reached an agreement establishing
diplomatic and commercial relations between them comparable
to the EC's formal relations with the U3. No other communist
country has official relations with the EC.
99. Sandri, Debates
. 13 February. I973. p. 59.
100. Author's personal observation, June 18, 1975.
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ins Iffiical Function. There is one area of CAG
action which has to do with neither institutional no
substantive questions ger so which can be described
"lyrical." and is a function shared by the EP with oth
parliaments and popular assemblies. This is the propensity
of such institutions to engage in what are in fact obiter
dicta on a rather grand scale, and to turn the European
Parliament, for example, into a forum for the expression of
European opinion about the dramatic political issues of the
day. even when their solution-or discussion-may not fall
within the purview or powers of the EF.
The GAG'S participation in this "lyrical" role has
been well illustrated by its espousing of particular causes,
such as the Berufsverbot issue in Germany, whereby persons
with left-wing associations are being denied the possibility
of employment in government careers. Other good examples
are Community policy toward the Mediterranean countries
(Portugal. Spain, and Greece), the problem of continued
prosecution for war crimes, the execution of political crimi
nals in Spain, and—perhaps the most lyrical of all—the
question of whether to celebrate the end of V/orld War II (to
be discussed below).
Cf« Kenneth H. F. Dyson, "Anti-Communism in the Federal
Republic of Germany: the Case of the _Berufsverhot
.
ParliarnentarY AfTaira, XXVII, No. 1. (Winter, i9?V75).
pp. 51-6? pas.-^im .
nil
The right of the European Parliament to concern
itself with questions of violations of human rights is said
to flow from the consideration of safeguarding peace and
liberty, expressed in the preambles of the treaties which
established the European Communities. It was with this
justification that the EP passed resolutions criticizing the
couD d»itat in Chile (October 17. 1973). the arrest and expuL
sion from the USSR of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (February 14.
197^), the Spanish government's execution of the Basque
separatist leader, Puig Antich (March 14. 1974). and the
failure of Bolivia to extradite the Nazi war criminal. Klaus
Barbie (October 15, 1974),
It was the CAG which sponsored a resolution on
July 11. 1974, deploring the granting of any amnesty to war
10 3
criminals. ^ With the full support of the Socialist Group,
this resolution was passed without opposition on February 17,
1975 1 even though some EP members were bothered by the fact
that the resolution was communist-sponsored. The resolution
on the execution of Puig Antich was also greeted with some
misgivings, because the CAG president was one of the resolu-
tion's co-sponsors. One has the impression from the record
of the debate that some of the EP members were attracted by
102. Franco Concas (P3I), rapporteur, Debates
. 17 February,
1975. p. 24.
103. European Parliament. Workin?^ Documents 1974-197S
. Docu-
ment 200/74.
the Puig Antich resolution sinop. ce it seemed to balance the
resolution on the expulsion of Sni.h^y b 01 bolzhenitsyn which had been
adopted during the previous month. In fact Rn. .-^n . Bordu of the
had to go some lengths just to dispel the impression of
this type Of trade.off. m bis contribution to the March 1.
debate he stressed that:
We have never approved of the exilp n-r +v^•Z^olzhenlt3yn7. In fact, it was not -'^
'''''^^^
pass an opinion on the matter ^^r-nL business to
viewed historically the Solvit u^'^ -^^ consider thatin some respects, ^ow^ver the f ^^o^^^^raout certain ta-v- whtoh hof, *' . ^'"^^ had to carry
cratic development. 5o§ ^^^^ ^'^P^^^^ its normal demo-
Indeed, the lyrical function can carry an E? member a long
way! The record does not show how the GAG members voted L
this resolution.
The CAG-sponsored resolution which chastized the
President of the French Republic for abolishing VE-Day was
far less successful. This was defeated in a voice vote,
despite a considerable amount of unexpressed sympathy for the
CAG position on the part of the French (Gaullist) EPD.^^^
Those who spoke against the resolution stressed that this was
an internal French matter, regardless of Bordu' s assertions
that President Giscard d'Estaing had consulted President Ford
10k. Jan 3. Broeksz (Dutch Socialist). Debates
. Ik March,ly/^, p. loj.
105. Bordu, Debates
. l4 March. 197k, p. 191.
106. Author's intorview v/ith Jean Feidt. Ch^f du Bureaud'Information du PS. Paris, June 6. 1975,
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before issuing his proclamation. ^^'^
WH^ten and Oral Qu^^ The GAG'
s
participation in the work of the Parliament may be judged in
part by its share in the written and oral questions raised
during parliamentary sessions. Here the GAG's share has been
roughly proportional to its representation in the EP (8
percent), during the twelve-month period which ended with
the June. 1975. session. Thirteen of the l6l questions
raised with either the Council or Commission were CAG initia-
tives. This rough proportionality raises some question as to
the efficacy of the GAG's role as a legitimatizing opposition
in the SP. In a study made in I966. Gerda Zellentin found
that the then "opposition" in the EP. the Socialist Group,
tended to initiate a lion's share (over 55 percent) of the
parliamentary questions. If at the present time we con-
sider the Conservative and Christian-Democratic Groups to
constitute an opposition as far as bourgeois political parties
are concerned, and the Socialist and Liberal Groups to be the
majority. -^^^ then we find that the same tendency discovered
by Zellentin prevails in the year ending with the June, 1975.
session, namely: 66 opposition questions to majority
107. Bordu, Debates
. I3 May, 1975. p. 30.
108.. Zellentin. "Form and Function of the Opposition." p. ^33.
109. This majority-opposition dichotomy is, to my mind
hi^'lhly conjectural and based on as yet insufficient
data. Cfj Fit7.maarice, o^. cit
. . pp. 193-203, pa::r:im .
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questions. If the 21 questions raised by the European Pro-
^ressive Democrats are included in the opposition tally the
preponderance of opposition questions is even more notable.
This may be explained, however, by other variables, such
the greater familiarity of the British Conservatives and th.
Irish P:pd members with the question procedure, owing to their
experience with the V/estminster practice of a special time
for oral questions from the floor. This practice was adopted
hy the EP after the enlarsement of the Community in I972.
Two of the CAG questions raised during this period
dealt with an initiative which has been an example of
successful CAG intervention in EC activities. On December 12.
1973, the CAG roouested that the EC convoke a tripartite
conference of trade unions, employers* representatives, and
ministers of Labor to draw up a European statute of workers*
rights, including those of migrant workers. The statute
should cover working hours, retirement age. salaries, social
benefits, and non-discrimination against women and younger
workers. The continuing energy crisis in the fall of 197^
again prompted the CAG to raise the question of the proposed
tripartite conference. Such a conference was in fact held
at the end of the year.~^^ A second CAG question in April,
1975. strongly urged that the Council carry out the recom-
mendation of the December, 197^, meeting to the effect that
the conference be re-convened in.-1975. This was done on
110. i £crr^' al Pnrlamento Europeo . 197V3, p. 28.
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November 18, 1975,^^^
Of the remaining eleven questions, three dealt with
general problems, the energy crisis, the control of poverty
and the price and supply of sugar. Three appealed to identi-
fiable constituencies, women, workers in the auto industries,
and residents of Brussels near the EC headquarters, and one
concerned a specifically Italian problem. The other four can
be classified as fulfilling the "lyrical" function of the SP,
questions concerning topics of great symbolic importance,
the raising of which adds to the prestige of the CAG or of
its associates internationally. Guch "lyrical" queL-tions
dealt with the restrictions on employment for left-wingers
in Germany, the location of a vocational training center in
West Berlin, the Council's congratulations to the Chilean
Junta on the anniversary of its seizure of power (I), and the
fate of Archbishop fv'akarios of Cyprus.
Within -GrouD Differences and Differentiations
.
While the differences among the four parties which compose the
CAG should not be exaggerated, it is useful to examine these
differences in detail for the light they shed on the policies
of each party and on the possibility of the evolution of a
common "eurocommunist" policy toward 2urope.
111. Pul 1 ptin of thp '^uropo^n Communi ti p s , No, 11, 1^75.
pp. 11-1^.
I
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1. PCF-PCI Differfinopc
The most important differences within the CAG arise
between the PCF and the PCI BrnaHi.r . ^ •^-L. iiroadly speaking, these differ-
ences might be said to reflect the stereotypes, over the
years, of Italian and Frenoh polioy respectively toward
European integration. The overall Italian policy, there-
with the policy of the PCI. can be seen as an effort to
maximize the not inconsiderable advantages which Italy can
receive from membership in the SC. while the overall French
and PCF policy seeks to maximize France's freedom of action
within the Community framework.
The PCF's strong emphasis on French freedom of
action has only become clear during the course of the pres-
ence of its delegation in Strasbourg, i.e. since July,
1973. The 1972 Prog;ramme commun du gouvernement . to which
the PCF continuously refers as the basis for its policy.
does not deal with the subject of sovereignty in detail.
Instead it issues two broad injunctions with respect to
France's role in the EC. The Programme enjoins the dem.ocrati-
zation of the Community's institutions and the preservation
of France's liberty of action. V\rhat this latter term
means in practice has only recently been clarified.
112. 3y contrast with the French P3 delegates, who never men-
tion it (Author's interview with Jean Feidt. June 6.
1975).
113. Pro '^rg Time commun, p. 177.
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In 1973, the PCF approached the question of sover-
eignty in a low .ey. In his maiden address. Gustave Ansart
said:
sover-
and we v/ill
The following year, with the growing economic crisis,
the tone became more strident, e.g.t
The concept of thp nation i <=: -p^ ,
expression. 11^
. s not for us an outmoded
Later in the same year, after the election victory of Yallry
Giscard d'Estaing and the resulting French rapprochement to
Europe. Ansart became even more specific. He said:
^
We have always said in this House that we would not
-n any circoms .ances suffer any breach of our indepen-dence, our national sovereignty, even on the Dretext of
^uropean cooperation... In any case, French policv mustbe decided in Pans, and not in any other European orworld capital, and least of all in Washington. llo
This extreme position was reechoed in February, 1975,
when Ansart insisted that "decisions concerning France will
be taken independently in Paris and nowhere else."-'"^'' This
statement was made in connection v/ith an attack on the pro-
posal for direct election of EP members, which Ansart described
114. Ansart, Debates
.
115. Ansart, Debates
.
116. Ansart, Debates
.
117. Ansart, Dobates
.
4 July, 1973. p. 111.
13 March. 197^, p. 55.
13 November, 197^, p. 127.
19 February, 1975, p. 173.
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as "more a gimmick (aliii) than a sign of real democratization
of the Community."
The PCI position, on the other hand, has from the
beginning accepted the principle of the limitation of national
sovereignty as an inevitable feature of today's world. As
Leonilde lotti put it in 1971t
There has arisen a necessity for development in theworld economy which necessarily exceeds the narn.i^e^s ofnational boundaries and leads.
.. toward sunranatlona'
agreements and forms of integration which* are car)ablo ofresponding to the economic problems of the modern world. 118
It is therefore the PCI's duty to promote this on-going pro-
cess, and to democratize the Community through a revision of
the Treaty of Rome,
... to work within the contradictions /of European
integration/, and to modify their character (r)er
modificarne i 1 sep:no ) . 119
In a word, the PCI is committed to working from within, while
the PCF still feels that it must stand on the defensive.
A good example of the interplay which arises between
these attitudes within the CAG was furnished by the debate in
November, 197^, over the proposed three billion dollar Commu-
nity loan to be raised throughout the world, including the
OPEC nations, for the purpose of re-lending the proceeds to
EC members experiencing economic difficulties. The PCF
118. lotti, "Sovranita Nazionale," p. 81.
119. Ibid . 3cr.no here refers to the mathematical characters
and -.
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speaker stressed the growing divergences In the economies of
the Nine, arising from the "increasingly fierce competition
of big business." The remedy for these divergences is the
creation of "large national services, which cannot be subjects
or indulge in speculations." The spokesman for the PCF said.
The PCI spokesman, on the other hand, declared his
party to bet
.
. .
basically in favor /of the Coir^'jni->-v lonn7 +v,^ +It offers the very sli^ht^but nev^^t^S 33 lx^4r'
'
possibility of control... /5nd should be/ seen as thecreation cf a new instrument whoso airn is to l^mit theanarcnical and speculative nature of internal capital
movements. ^'^^ ^
Other examples of Franco-Italian policy differences
with respect to direct elections of EP delegates and the
Community's policy toward multinationals have already been
122dealt with. These differences all flow from the two
parties* varying approaches to the question of sovereignty,
and constitute as well a reflection of differing electoral
objectives. Further factors also enter into the CAG's self-
appreciation of its own internal differences. Giorgio
120. 3ordu, Dnbatog
. 13 November, 19?^, p. 135.
121. Leonardi, Debates
. I3 xN'ovember, 197^, p. I35.
122. See pp. 77'Q} and 95-99 above.
An,en.oXa attributes a part of the proUe™ to the fact that
France (an. BHtain) are teth older nations than are Italy
(or Germany), and that therefore tho or« v. •ierei e emphasis of the former
two tends to be ™ore nationally than Co^.unity oriented As
he put it. "the French are
..ch less open that we are. ••"3
They do not manifest the variety of opinions which the PCI
expresses. Italian co^unists are already Europeanized be-
cause Of the magnitude of the emigrant workers problem, a
problem not shared by the French party in the
.ame form.
One topic on which there seems to have been less
PCF-PCI friction within the E? than outside its walls was the
problem of the behavior of the Portuguese Communist Party i„
the spring and early summer of 1975. While press reports
stressed the tensions between the PCF and the PCI over
Portugal's road to socialism and the role of the PCP there
m. in the EP itself Ansart, speaking on behalf of the CAG
as a whole, merely supported heartily the proposed EC aid to
Portugal, and asked that the debate be limited to this one
aspect of the Portuguese situation. ^^5 Earlier Bordu had
spoken of "the pluralism which is being created in politics
in Portugal. "^26 a theme which already had been sounded by
123. Author's interview with G. Amendola. June 10. I975.
124. K S. Karol. "L'Obsession Portugaise," Le NouvpIObservatour, June 2, I975, pp. 3I-33.
125. Ansart, Debates
. 18 June, 1975, p. I2k,
126. Bordu, DoMt£2, 11 April, 1975, p. I97.
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Berlinguer at the PCI XlVth Congress in Milan on March 18.
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1975. Subsequent developments in Portugal, the November
1975 Marchais-Berlinguer meeting with its stress on plural-
ism, and the general tone of the February I976 XXIInd Con-
gress of the PCF also might suggest that the basic PCF-PCI
understanding over Portugal was a good deal wider th^n press
reports indicated at the time.
In style and general behavior there are also
important differences between the PCI and PCF members of the
EP. The PCF's tendency toward hyperbole, especially when it
comes to sovereignty questions, already has been noted. Like
the PCI in I969, the PCF came to the EP with something of a
chip on its shoulder. During the first year of participation,
PCF speakers tended to spend more time on heavily charged
ideological and human rights issues,—such as the role of
the multinationals, the perils of American hegemony, or the
specter of the revival of German chauvinism,—rather than on
matters of substantive concern. This behavior recapitulated
the Italian experience. As Amendola pointed out, the PCI
had come to Strasbourg, after a long period of exclusion,
expecting to encounter a hostile attitude; hence their
early sensitivity on questions such as representation and
the formation of a parliamentary group. When little hostility
127. L'Unita . March 24, 1975. PP. 3. ^.
128. Amendola interview, June 10, 1975.
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was encountered, the feeling of defensiveness disappeared.
Today, with the exception of the rather exuberant Sicilian.
Senator Nicola Cipolla. one no longer finds any of the sort
of good-natured face-to-face parliamentary antagonism on the
part of PCI members which used to enliven past Strasbourg
debates. Similarly. FCF delegates have tended, especially
in the last year or two. to speak much more to the issues
and to appeal less to the emotions of potential listeners at
home or elsewhere.
2. Danish Distinctions
.
The position taken by the Danish delegate in the
CAG flows from two overriding considerations. In the first
place, he is not a communist per se . but an "ally" from the
Danish Socialist People's Party (3FP). a group which split
from the Danish Communist Party (DKP) in 1959. under the
leadership of the former DKP leader, Aksel Larsen. Secondly,
both the SFP and the DKP voted against Denmark's joining the
Community in the referendeum of October. 1972. Since 1973,
the SFP delegate has officially represented both parties in
the EP. The SFP continues to oppose Denmark's membership in
the Community and is on record as seeking an opportunity to
secure Denmark's withdrawal from the EC. At the meeting of
the SFP Party Board on June 15, 1975t it was resolved that
the party would fight plans to develop the EC into a European
union, would oppose any surrender of sovereignty and maintain
Denmark's veto through the Council of Ministers, would oppose
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direct elections of the EP "and all of their consequences,"
would oppose the "strengthening of capitalism by means of
wide-ranging harmonising of legislation," and would promote
publicity about the work of the EC "so that it may be brought
under control." This program toward Europe should be com-
plemented by greater efforts toward cooperation on a purely
Nordic basis. -^^^
The Danish delegate has therefore tried consistently
to adhere to the narrowest possible interpretation of the
fact of Denmark's membership in the EC, In the SFP's
opinion, t^(:• D-r:>-h referendum which approved the co'xntry's
membership in effect froze the political situation as of the
date of the referendum (October 2. 1972). Therefore any
further development of European integration, such as steps
toward economic and monetary union, which had not already
been agreed to by the Danish parliament prior to the
referendum, were subject to renegotiation. Denmark's approval
or concurrence should not be assum^^d in advance. "^-^^
As a further .qualification of his position, each
successive Danish delegate has been careful to point out that
he is one of the "Allied" factors in the CAG, and not a member
129. Xodst-ind'^n imod ET^'s Ensretningr ma i2^fres
. Resolution II
of the ^? Farty Joard, June 15, 1975, kindness of the
Danish '^A^ r^ecret'i.ry
.
130. Dlch, >_I:it2n, 3 -uly. 1973. p. 3-; ^^aigaard, Debate^; .
9^^uly7T9?r7 p. 93.
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of a communist party. ^31 occasion Per Dich made it
clear that he did not associate himself with a resolution of
the CAG which, in his opinion, downgraded the persecution of
intellectuals in the USSR.-'-^^
3. Dutch Particularities
.
The Dutch Communist Party (CPN) shares the SFP's
opposition to its country's membership in the EC. Since
October, 197^^ a CPN delegate has been a member of the CAG.
As of the end of the June 1975 session, this delegate had
not yet taken the floor. Thus the CPN's position must be
deduced from other sources. ' The CAG Information Bulletin
(I Comunisti al Parlamento Europeo ) for September-October,
197^, quotes an interview by the Dutch newspaper Koog aan
zaan with Wessel Hartog, the CPN delegate. When asked why,
since his party opposed the EC, he had accepted his seat at
Strasbourg, Mr. Hartog replied:
Because you cannot turn the clock back sixteen years.
It's a fact that the Community exists. Now that we have
the opyqrtunity to exercise our influence in the EP, we
do so.-'--^-^
The CPN's position has obviously not yet been fully
clarified. One author, Neil Mclnnes, has thrown an interest-
ing, albeit somewhat esoteric sidelight on Dutch CAG
131. Dich, Debp.to? . 18 September, 1973. p. H; Maigaard,
Debates
, 16 January. 197^, pp. 133-13^.
132. Dich. Ibid .
133. i Com^ni^ti al Parlaj.or.to I"L:rcpoo . 197V2, p. 12.
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membership. While it is the CPN's policy to work for the
withdrawal of the Netherlands from both the EC and NATO, "in
order to contribute to her security by means of an independent
policy." it would be "dogmatism"
-according to the CPN-
to walk out now. while at the same time it would be
-revisionism" to seek to infiltrate the European institutions
in order to "democratize" them."^^^
Institjt.iona1i7Ad Inter-oartv CooTPeration in the
CAG. Structural inter-party cooperation within the GAG is
simple and straightforward, based on the size of each
delegation. In 1975. an Italian. Arnendola. was Chairman of
the Group; a Frenchman. Ansart, was Vice Chairman, and the
only Dane. Maigaard. was Treasurer. The Dutch delegate, being
a recent arrival, as of June 1975 held no office. The
secretariat was led by an Italian. Bruno Ferrero, as Secre-
tary General, ^ with a Frenchman, Daniel Debatisse. as
Assistant Secretary General (adjoint). There were several
additional Italian and French personnel, and one Danish
Secretary, Niels Larsen.
In June, 197^, the CAG established four study
groups, charged with determining priority objectives on which
13^. Poll tiek en Cultuur
. No. 3. 1973, p. li^2.
135.. Neil .'v'cTnnes, "The Communist parties of Western Europe
and the i'ZG," The .Vcrld Today
.
February, 197^. p. 82.
136. In 1976. Ferrero was succeeded by Roberto Viezzi.
to base parliamentary initiatives. The study group, ar. to
-avail themselves of the united contribution of the entirety
of democratic forces (si avvarr^ del contrib.to unitaHo
dell-insieme delle Torze democrati ..137
The study groups are composed as follows.
N^tio'r/^nd^perdenc^^-and'?" T^'^^^^' ^^''^^Sl^-
D'Angelosante^'leona^difMaigaird) . "'^^P-''^-"- < Bordu.
D:AngeJosinte^"L??.?='T^^^?" in Europe (Carettoni.i faSiosa , iotti, Lemome, Leonardi).
lottirsandri)?"' developing nations. (Gout.ann.
Neither the GAG Chairman nor the Vice Chairman has
been assigned to any of the study groups. Of the remaining
members, about one-half are members of more than one group.
Is the CAG in fact a Political Grouo ? The answer
to this question would depend upon the respondent. A French
staff member of the CAG told the author that the FCF regards
the Group as primarily an administrative arrangement. Any
convergences in political line are agreed on a party-to-
party basis, not as a group undertaking. "^^^ The Danish
delegate said that he was a member of the group chiefly be-
cause of the facilities it offers. The EP is a good place to
137. I Cor^unif^ti al Parla:::CMto Europoo
. 197^1. p. 17.
138. Author's interview with Sylvain Dreyfus, Strasbourg.June 15 • 1976, ^ • t.»
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find out what is going on in European politics and to keep in
touch with the European left. He felt there was no CAG
European policy as such, even though there was some within-
group discussion and a resulting paralellism in voting. -"-^^ A
rumor persists in Strasbourg that the Dutch CPN may withdraw
from the EP and be replaced by another Dutch left-wing group.
All this would indicate a very low degree of cohesiveness in-
deed. It even opens up the possibility--albeit remote—that
a general reorganization of the left-wing parties in the EP
may occur, with a new group to be formed with the PCI and the
British Labor Party as its nucleus. This new group would
replace both the CAG and the somewhat uncomfortable associa-
tion the Labor Party shares today with the more conservative
continental Social Democratic parties in the SP.-'"^-^
139, Author's interview with
June 16, 19?5.
1^0. Autlior's interview with
June 15. 1976.
Author's interview with
June 8. 1^76.
Jens Maigaard, Strasbourg,
Schelto Patijn, Strasbourg,
John Fitzmaurice, Brussels,
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CHAPTER V
CONSEQUENCES OF GAG PARTIGIPATION IN THE EP
Impact on EC Policy
It is difficult to assess the extent of the CAG's
impact on EC policy. In the first place, while the Commission
and the Council may pay attention to what the EP says, the
public in general is largely ignorant of what the E? has
done, and is even only dimly aware of its existence.
Secondly, the EP's procedure does not lend itself to quan-
titive measurement. Votes are recorded as simply the
approval or defeat of a resolution, motion, or amendment,
with no indication as to how the groups or individual members
voted
,
The Problem of Impact Determination
. The low
salience of European problems in the public mind of the nine
member states, and among CP sympathizers in each, is well
illustrated by the raw data gathered by Ronald Inglehart and
Jacques-Ren^ Rabier in their 1973 European Communities Study.
For example, 78 percent of the French and 72 percent of the
Italian respondents to a survey conducted in 1973 indicated
that they had only a little interest, or no interest at all,
1, R. In/^l^'hrart anr] J. -R. Rabier, principal investigators,
10 ^"3 "!''urop9an Cor.m'jni ties S uryoy (Ann Arbor: Intf,^r-
I'rii vor<-« Ity ConL-^ortlum for Political Research, 197^).
Ori^^inal fractional percentages have been rounded off.
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in the problems of the EC. Six percent of the Italians and
2 percent of the French respondents did not even know whether
or not they were interested at all! Within this sea of dis-
interest, respondents who felt "closest to" the two large
V/est European cor.munist parties show sharp and predictable
differences. PGF sympathizers registered the least interest
of any French political party in the problems of the EC (8^^
percent, a substantially greater percentage of disinterest
than the national average); and the nm^ber of PGF respondents
who indicated a high degree of interest {ik percent) was well
below the national average. Disinterest here, of course, may
also indicate a degree of antipathy toward the EC, which was
demonstrated in responses to other questions in the survey.^
PCI adherents, on the other hand, showed a lesser degree of
disinterest than either Italian DC or TvISI voters, or 2^.52
percent, as compared to a national average of 29 percent.
Sixty-five percent of PCI sympathizers indicated only a little
or no interest at all in EC problems, somev/hat less than the
national average of 73 percent. PCI respondents were general-
ly substantially more interested in EC problems than their
French PGF colleagues.
Danish SFP adherents indicating no interest at all
in EC problems coincided with the national average of about
2. See discussion on following pages, and Appendix I.
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19 percent, the highest rate of disinterest for any EC
.e.ber 3
Seventy percent of all Danish respondents said they had only
a little or no interest at all in EC problems. The Dutch CPN
respondents showed the least interest of any Dutch partisan
or non-partisan grouping (46 percent of CPN respondents answer-
ed "not at all ^interested") as opposed to a national average
of 27 percent Seventy-fnur percent of all Dutch respondents
had only a little or no intcrot^t in ZC problems.
The degree of information about EC problems readily
available to the average national of an EC state is also in-
adequate in the respondents' opinion. Eighty-three percent
of the Italinns. 71 percent of the Dutchmen, 67 percent of
the Frenchmen, and 6I percent of the Danes interviewed either
believed themselves insufficiently infomed about the EG or
did not know whether or not they were in fact sufficiently or
insufficiently informed. Within this sea of self-confessed
ignorance. PCI respondents felt themselves somewhat better
informed than the average Italian, while SFP respondents felt
themselves much worse informed than did their fellow Danes.
PCF and CPN respondents were close to their national averages.
3. Danish C? (DKF) responses are not listed separately in theSurvey.
4. The Dutch responses must be treated with a certain reserve,
since the CPN responses were gathered from only thirteen
respondents, or 0.85 percent of the total sample.
13^
Even among those who are interested in and informed
about the EC. the degree of attachment to the Community is
low by both subjective and pragmatic criteria. When asked
how they would feel if the EC were to be abolished tomorrow.
58 percent of the Italians, 57 percent of the Frenchmen. 48
percent of the Dutchmen, and 4l percent of the Danes inter-
viewed either did not know or stated that they would greet
such an event with indifference. In line with Danish
ambivalence about the EC. 29 percent of the Danish respondents
said that they would be relieved by such an abolition, while
only a very few of those of other national! tj os felt that
way. Among CP sympathizers, k2 percent of the Italians said
that they would be "very sorry," while 75 percent of the Danes
said they would be "relieved" at the news of such a develop-
ment. There is also an interesting variation in the responses
to this question between respondents under and over twenty-
five years of age. In the case of France and Italy those
under twenty-five tend to be less indifferent, and more pro-
EC, by up to six p'^rcentage points, while younger Danish and
Dutch respondents are more indifferent to, disinterested in,
and less sympathetic toward the EC,
When it comes to paying "a little more" in taxes to
bring about the unification of Europe, a general unwillingness
is to be noted among all nationalities, with the CP's le'iding
the other political groups in all four countries. Younger
respondents v/ere somewhat moro willing to make a financial
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sacrifice, in every case. Overall, Frenchmen were the least
willing to pay more taxes, followed closely by the Danes,
and the Italians were the most willing.
Within this context of ignorance and general apathy
with respect to the EC. knowledge of the role of the European
Parliament is certainly not widespread. The only question in
the 1973 survey which mentioned any parliament at all had to
do with direct elections for "a E.ropo.n Parliament." The
question was phrased in such a way th.t the respondent could
have replied intelligently without indicating whether or not
he knew that an indirectly elected parliament was already in
existence and functioning. Even so. the percentage of people
who did not know how to respond to this Question, and there-
fore were presamably unaware of the existence of the
Parliament at the present time was notably high, in comparison
with other problems of comparable technical complexity.
Responding "don't know" to this question were 30.^9 percent
of the Frenchmen, 24.35 percent of the Italians. 21.52 percent
of the Dutchmen, and 20.02 percent of the Danes.
^^^^ct Impact of CA2 Participation in the EP. The
direct impact of CP participation in the EP is difficult to
measure for throe reasons. In the first place, it was not
until after the CAG was formed late in 1973 that it was
possible for communists to be assigned rapporteurships
. It
is true, of course, that the rapportaur must present the view-
point of tJie majority of his committee. Nevertheless, the
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rapporteur plays a key role in developing the SP's opinion on
Council actions, and his own political opinions can weigh
heavily in the drafting thereof.^ The first such an assign-
ment of a CAG rapporteurship was made on February 18, 197^.
The Committee on Energy, Research, and Technology assigned
Silvio Leonardi the report on the investigation of the supply
of energy available to the EC. and how it relates to collabo-
ration with interested third countries.
Secondly, few roll-call votes are held in EP plenary
sessions, which prevents any clear indication of solidarity
on the part of other ^? groups with the CAG. or even their
response to CAG initiatives. Finally, the parliamentary
committee sessions are secret, and their records, which might
be the best indication of the persuasive power of CAG input,
are closed to public scrutiny. As in many parliaments, by
the time an initiative reaches the EP floor for general debate,
the lines pro and con have already been drawn; and few votes
are ever switched as a result of arguments presented from the
floor. This is particularly noticeable in the EP, where
party loyalty and group cohesiveness are probably higher than
in a national parliament.^
5. Cfj Fitzmaurice. o^. cit
. . pp. 55-56.
6. Gerda_ Zellentin, ^orm^i^n dor V/i llensbi 1 i ';rj^ in d^.n
e ur0 na i s f:h en Q rg;an I sa t i 0 n ( ;
n
(Frankfor t/i^'aim Athenaeum
Verlag, I965)
. p. 87.
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Until the end of I973. because of the disqualifica-
tion of the non-inscrit EP members from rapporteurships. the
communist delegates represented only themselves in public de-
bates. However, between March 197^1 and March 1975. the first
parliamentary year in which rapporteurships were available
to the CAG, CAG members performed this function on seven
occasions, dealing with energy, relations with developing
countrien, laV.or and social affairs, and agricultural mat-
7ters.
In the absence of hard data on CAG impact on SP
decision-making, a few subjective impressions may bo useful.
U. W. Kitzinger noted in an interview that there had been an
almost total absence of partisan conflict in the HP 'ontil
the arrival of the Italian CP members in I969. Since then
there has been greater questioning of initiatives which be-
cause of their European style and content might earlier have
been accepted without question, regardless of their merits.
John Fitzmaurice believes that the CAG has raised questions
on social issues which would not have been raised by other
groups. L. Peressich, chef dc cabinet of Commissioner
gSpinelli, feels that the communist EP members have not taken
7. Parlanonto Europeo, Gruppo Comunisti e Apparentati
,
At ti vi t^i del Grupr^o . dal I.u'Tlio 197^ ill Conniio 1976
TTiiKomliour^i Documentazione a cura del Segre tariato
,
19?6), p. 31-33.
8. Author's interview in Brussels, June 8, 1976.
fall advantage of their position in connection with the new
budgetary procedure. The CAG's direct impact on this aspect
of the Parliament's work has been less than that of other
political groups. On the other hand, some CAQ initiatives
have been remarkably successful. Peressich particularly re-
called the resolution freezing relations with Spain in
November 1975, because of political repression there shortly
before Franco's death. The CAG, with the assistance of the
Socialists were able to muster a majority for the resolution,
taking advantage of the fact that there were many absentees
among the more conservative HP members at the time the vote
was taken.
Other CAG initiatives which have been successfully
adopted by the Parliament have been the war crimes resolu-
tion (July, 197^); the resolution on the extradition of a
convicted v/ar criminal, Klaus Barbie; and the calling of the
Tripartite Conferences on matters of concern to the trade
unions (197^ and 1975).
The CAG's efforts, also previously discussed, on
behalf of the Italian tobacco farmers, as well as the calling
of the special E? session on the agricultural crisis in 197^,
mark important instances of successful CAG impact on EC
action.
Impact of CAG Extra -Pari! r^n^'ntary Act: nns . Under
this heading will be considered three exemplary cases of
extra-parliamentary action. No exhaustive treatment cf this
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aspect of GAG work will be attempted. The first example is
that of the press conference in Strasbourg. This type of
effort is usually not very rewarding. Public interest in the
activities of the EP is very low indeed, and press coverage
of EP sessions is at best spotty and confined to events such
as the belated arrival of the Labour Party delegates in July
1975, or one-time occasions such as the arrest of Danish
delegates for disturbing the peace in a Strasbourg nightclub.^
Resolutions and opinions of the Parliament, the debates,
questions, and censurings have little or no echo in the
European or v/orld press.
The writer witnessed two press conferences held the
same day in Strasbourg by the PCF delegation on the question
"the Berufsverbot. the measures taken in West Germany to
prevent the hiring of left-wingers as teachers and government
employees. The first conference was held at noon in the
liaison de I'T^urope
.
attended by some twenty-five journalists,
interested delegates, and visitors. The second was sponsored
by the 3as-Rhin Federation of the PCF, and was held in the
Mai son des Syndicats with a somewhat smaller attendance.
Discernible press coverage of the event was confined to a
short article in the next morning's L'Humanito
. The local
9. ''Letter from Straubour^:, " The Now Yorker
.
September 15
I975, p. 102.
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press in Strasbourg did not cover either event.
At the press conferences PCF and PCI delegates
introduced SPD and DKP^° members of the German Initiative
••We£ mit den Berufsverboten . " whom they had also presented
or were about to present to the President of the EP and a
representative of the Commission. An oral Question \ms also
tabled for the EP session for the following day, o'une 18,
which was accompanied by a brief discussion on the floor of
the Parliament. Sir Christopher Soames, the Commissioner
who was answering questions that day, handled the matter by
pointing out that he was sure that the CAG spokesman,
M. Ansart, would not want him to pursue a line of reasoning
which v/ould lead to the conclusion that the item at issue
was entirely a West German internal matter.
An example of extra-Parliamentary activity on the
part of CAG members, not related to a particular EP session,
is offered by the meeting organized on November 23-25, 1971.
in Rome by the Centro di 3 1 ud i di Poli tica Economica (CE3PE)
of the PCI, under the title of "The Italian Communist and
Europe," This meeting was the fourth of a series on the
development of Italian capitalism within the framework of
the world economy. While the principal participants in the
meeting were CAG members (Amendola, lotti, Leonardi, Cipolla,
10. Deutsche Komnimi sti sche Partel . the vVest German
Communist Party.
11. Soames. Debates . 13 June, 1975. P. 117.
D»An,elosante. Fabbrini. and 3andri). other leading PCI mem-
bers also took part (Segr^e and Pajetta). as well as non-PCI
Italian political leaders (Scarascia-Mugnozza. Scalia.
Terracini. Corona), and a number of foreigners of various
political persuasions: Jacnues Kahn (PCF). Hendrikus
Vredclin." (Dutch Socialist), and representatives of the
Soviet, East
-.erman. Bulgarian, Jugoslav. Spanish. Belgian.
British. Rumanian, and Greek communist parties.
The Treating provided the PCI its first opportunity,
since .joining the EP in I969. to give a public exposition of
its objectives in the EC, and to adduce and publicize a large
amount c-f informational m-^terial supporting its positions.
The puhlic sessions were well-attended, and the meeting re-
ceived wide coverage in the official and unofficial Italian
communlpt press, and moderate coverage in some non-conmunist
papers. A complete record of the meeting has been published
.
An entirely different type of expository action is
exemplified by the meeting held in 3onn and KOln on March 13-
16. 1973, by the Bundesinsti tut fl!ir ostwissensch-^ftliche and
intern.-! ticn-ile Studjj^, which provided the PCI with a dis-
tinguished international forum from which to explain its
viewpoint. The meeting was chiefly concerned with the PCI's
political conception of the European Community. From the EP
12. Q .ladcTni 2I. i^o 1 i ti c \ od '^^")r.^:^.i n. J, Supplomonto al N.6,
novGrnbre-diccmbre dolla rivist-i bimestrale del CE'KPE.
1^2
Group came Amendola and Leonardi, plus Ferrero, until I976
Secretary General of the GAG, and Professor Hrnesto
Ragionieri of the University of Florence, a member of the
PCI Central Committee.
This meeting was essentially an informal dis-
cussion, the r-sults of v.hich wore published in an ^
fahrungsberi
-ht by the Ml^esinst^ Not only was PCI
policy toward the sot forth in detail, but interesting
insights into Soviet policy, as well as comments on Italian
domestic policy and future PCI-P3I and PCI-DC relations,
also appeare.-l in the "^rr-ihrunhrsbericht
.
Imnact of EP Membership on Partlclpatln£; Parties
During the period under review (I969-I975) a
change has taken place, at least in the case of the political
parties from the larger countries, in the rolec they each
play v/ithin their own national sub-systems. V/hile this de-
velopm^v-^-t was contemporaneoas v/ith E? membership, it is not
possible to demonstrate empirically a causal link between
E? membership and role change, owing to the large number of
variables involved. However, these changes should be noted,
since their coincidence with the period of E? membership calls
13. -arch, 1973.
attention to a consistency of political behavior, the result
of which has been a greater support for Community institution
The PCI, for example, has moved on the domestic
scene from a position of calling for a "unity of the left" to
one which beginning in 1973 has called for a "historic com-
promise" in the form of a coalition with the Church-oriented
Democrazi.-i Crir^tiana. In his maiden EP speech in I969, Amcn-
dola placed "the unity of the forces of the left in every
country of 'arope in the struggle for peace and the affir-
mation of a socialist democracy" as the second most important
objective of the party, just after the overcoming of the mi-
litary blocs. At the Rome session on European policy in
1971. he repeated this demand, saying that the unity of the
left is the first condition of reaching a true unity in all
of Europe. Between 1971 and the enunciation of the com -
promegno stor.i co in 1973. the Italian parties experienced
the presidential election of I97I and the failure of the PCI-
P3I coalition to gain a victory at that time for their candi-
date, Gaetano do Ivlartino, a Socialist. In I973 the Allende
debaclL^ in '^hile showed that evon 51 p&r cent was not a
sufficient majority with which to carry out a revolution.
It was out of this background that the historic comnromise
arose, a- a moans of moving toward rharod responsibility
for thi^ government of an increasingly crisis-ridden Italy.
14. Ancn.^ol:!. Debntr}^ mars, 1939, p. 39.
15. Anifndola, " 1 ntroduziono" , I Coni::nii:.ti Itallrini o
}
*
"laron"!
. p. l6.
Chief among the promoters of the historic compro-
mise has been PCI Politburo member, Giorgio Amendola, Chair-
man of the GAG. who regarded the 1973 initiative as a serious
political offer to the DC leadership and not, as some PCI
leaders held, a long term strategic goal.^" On the other
hand, the less "Europsan" and more conservative wing of the
party, led by Pietro Ingrao, opted for the long term stra-
tegic interpretation of the compromise. Circumstantial
evidence thus tends to link support for an immediate PCI
understanding with the DC to the former's EP experience. ''•'^
In the period before I969 Henry Kerr of the Univer-
sity of Geneva made an interesting study of the changes in
attitudes cf national parliamentarians after service in the
EP. Kerr found that work in the E? affects the cognitive but
not the affective components of members' attitudes toward
European integration. Their fund of knowledge is rendered
more profound, and their existing support for European unity
is thereby enhanced, even though such support does not
appear to be directly increased or decreased in affective
terms by exposure. A similar study of the impact of EP
16, Heinz Timmerman, "Die Diskussion urn den 'historischen
Kompromisi;
' ,
^eobachturi^en and ^c-niurkungcn zum 1^.
Kongress der IKP (^IJlrz 1975)" B(^richtc des Bundcsinsti-
uts ftir ostwissenschaftliche und internationalc Studien,
K»ln, 21/1975.
17, Sergio Pi stone, "La Cri si I tali ana e 1* Integra zionf
Europpa . " (Unpublished 1-13, r'acolta di ocieriza I'olitica,
Turin, 19'^5).
1^5
service on CAG members would be an interesting undertaking,
even though the results might not be so clear, owing to the
small number of people involved and the relative shortness
of the period of their membership to date in the European
Parliament.
During the same period, and particularly since
1973f the PCF has undergone an important change of role in-
ternally, a change v/hich has coincided with the two years
of PCF presence in the 2P. Here again it is impossible to
establish anything more than the link of coincidence, de-
spite the remarkable convergence of the PCF and PCI overall
positions demonstrated in the decisions of the PCF XXIInd
Congress in February, 1976, an event which falls outside the
time frame of this study.
The PCF was admitted to the SP shortly after the
promulgation of the programme commun with the PS and the
left-wing Radicals. As in the case of Italy, this coalition
was foraed with a view toward a presidential election; and
in this election the left-wing candidate was defeated by a
very narrow majority in the spring of 197^. The French co-
alition, however, barely survived the trauma of the Portu-
guese revolution and the subsequent high degree of tension
which arose between the Portuguese Socialist and Communist
Parties. The apparent impact of the Portuguese events on
the PCF has been to place this party in a new role, still
very much in the opposition but committed to working now
\h6
within the system. The joint PCI-PCF statoinent of NovP-mber,
1975. guaranteed freedom of thought and expression, freedom
of the press, religious freedom, a pluralist political sys-
tem and the right of existence and activity of opposition
1
8
political parties. The new phenomenon of "communism under
French colors." introduced to the world by Georges r^archais
at the recent party Congress. would appear to include a
European dL-nension as well, although its content—other than
a search for a rapprochement with other European communist
parties—is not yet fully clear.
Coalition Buildin? and ?:? Participation
The preceding section has show the readiness, at
least of the PCX and the PCF, to seek coalitions with the
socialists and other parties for national ends, from the
proficramme commun to the compromesso storico
. which now may
be regarded as an established trend, despite the warnings of
the State Department to the European socialist parties to be
20
wary of their dealings with the communists.
This same propensity for coalition building has
also been demonstrated at the EP level, where the CAG has
not hesitated to support enthusiastically the initiatives of
18.
19.
20.
New York Times, November 18, 1976.
New York Times, February 4, 1976.
New York Times, February 6, 1976.
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other parties, in particular the socialists; while non-
communist parties have likewise—although somewhat more
rarely— joined forces to support CAG initiatives, in the
interest of common European policy objectives. For example,
a CAG amendment to the Lome Treaty of multilateral associa-
tion with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, which
called for non-interference in the associates' internal
affairs, was supported by the Socialist Group, the rapport-
eur on the Treaty, and the appropriate Commission member.
Nevertheless the amendment failed to pass. On two other re-
cent occasions, the GAG so-sponsored with the Socialist Group
amendments to BP opinions on energy policy and food prices.
(Both amendments failed to pass). On the question of a tri-
partite labor-management-government conference, the CAG's
initiative in pressing for its reconvocation in I975 was
jointly sponsored with the Socialist Group. CAG cooperation
of this type has not been confined to the Socialist Group.
CAG spokesmen have not hesitated to support Gaullist (UDR)
initiatives, such as Alain Terrenoire's ouestion in January,
1975* on price fixing by big petroleum companies.
On a broader level, PCF and PCI spokesmen have
21. Debates . 10 December, 197^, pp. 107-108.
22. Debates . I6 January, 1975. p. 181; 20 February, 1975, p. 221
23. Ernest Glinne (PS) Debates . 9 April, 1975, p. HO.
2k, Lemoine, Debates . 16 January, 1975, PP. 207-208.
made ijse of the 3P as a forum for proposing joint action.
In March, 1974. Ansart said, speaking of building a "Europe
Of peace,"
There does exist a large amount of common
..round
o? Fnrn^^p''' Vl^'^'l ^^^^^^i^t and communist partiesf Europe. .Ve think it possible, we think it necessaryto develop wide cooperation with the Christian forcesof progress because we think, we who are not believersthat the world is not to be divided between believers
and non-believers. In a word we are open to new pro-
^nfio'.rthf^ ^^^^^^ ^ ^-^ill ^nitea d to gatner together. 2^
In many ways Ansart 's remarks prefigured the con-
clusions of the PCF's XXIInd Congress, two years later, in
February, I976.
After the coup d'etat in Chile in October, I973, the
PCI gave another example of readiness for joint action with
bourgeois parties. Amendola withdrew a resolution which he
had proposed in favor of one sponsored by the chairmen of
all political groups. He pointed out that the first signa-
ture on the resolution v;as that of the chairman of the
Christian Democratic group, and said:
I am convinced that not only in Chile, but also in
.Europe, given the historical circumstances of our coun-
tries, it is only from liaison. .. between the major
political elements. Communist, Socialist and Christian
Democratic, that we can derive that political and demo-
cratic progress best suited to the interests of our
peoples.
.
. 26
25. Ansart, Debates . I3 March, 19?^, p. 55.
26. Amendola, Debates
. 1? October 1973, p. 104
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Prospects for a Community-wide CP
Aside from the administrative organization of the
CAG itself (noted above), there has been little indication of
a possibility of organizing any sort of Community-wide commu-
nist party. The objectives of each party, both nationally
and at the European level, are so varied that it is difficult"
even to speak of any coordination of policy, to say nothing
of the possibility of any sort of fusion or federation of
Community parties. There has been no formal meeting of all
West European communist parties since the Brussels session
of January, 197^. Even at the trade union level, cooperation
has been at best hesitant; and save for the joint CGT-CGIL
office in Brussels, no machinery exists for policy coordi-
nation within the pro-communist v/ing of the trade union
movement in V/estern Europe.
Machinery in general is a scarce item today. For
all the reputed "monolithism" of the world communist system,
the individual CPs are notably lacking in formal organizations
for interparty policy coordination. Since the abolition of
the Cominform in 1956, there has been no formal communist in-
ternational coordinating organization, such as the existing
Socialist and Christian Democratic Internationals, and their
several geographic-area sub-groups.
Periodic conferences of most of the communist
parties of the world in Moscow, now more and more infrenuent
compared to the 1950' s and 60's, find their counterpart in the
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less and less frenuent meetings of all-Suropean and West
European meetings. The first meeting of purely European
communist parties since the Karlovy Vary Conference of I967
had been scheduled—after numerous postponements—to be held
in the surr-.-r of 1975, between the wind-up of the Helsinki
Conference on IZuropean Security and Cooperation and the XXVth
Congress of the CPSU; but even this much delayed meeting was
not to mntori-ilize until June, I976. There has been no world
wide meeting of communist parties since the Moscow Conference
of 1969, v/hen Enrico Berlinguer on behalf of the PCI took tJ.e
opportunity to chastir.e the CPCU over the occupation of
2Czechoslovakia. This lack of formal meetings undoubtedly
is a reflection of the divisions which separate the CP's, bot:
at a European and at a world-wide level, as differences over
China, dAent e. north-south dichotomies, and intcrparty re-
lationships all become mere pronounced. Just ac the schedul-
ing and hold in,':; of the ouin^uennial party congress in the
Soviet Union reflects the final achievement of a high degree
of prior '^onr-ensus among the Soviet leadership, so the holdin
of an Int'vrn-^-'-i onal or European conference of CP's reflects
a high de^:^<-'f' of prior consensus among the participating
parti e:-, an;": does not serve as a means of securing such a
consen j,3
.
27. Mr inz I'i'-.Mt-r'm'inn. "?Communi c^tische Cipfeltreffen 197^75"
• II:jJii'Ji!iiJJi-!. IrxM^ VII, No. "4. April, 197'^, p. ^03,
Of: K\-vi;- Povlln, "The Interparty Drama," rroblc:::^; of
C<- - -n'-ni : July-August, 1975* pp. 18-3^, here p. 21.
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The 197^ Brussels Conference of the Communist Part-
ies of the Capitalist Countries of Europe— to give it its
full title—illustrates this point. Called at the initiative
of the PCI, the Brussels meeting was envisaged as one in a
series of steps leading up at least to an all-European if not
a worldwide conference of communist parties. The Brussels
meeting did little to clear the way in the form of an agree-
ment at the V/est European level. The final resolution of the
meeting showed that there was a great variation among the
parties in their attitudes toward the European Community, to-
ward the problem of cooperation with Social Democratic and
Catholic parties, toward China, and tov/ard even the holding
of a world-wide communist conference.
Since the Brussels meeting there has been no in-
dication of change in the line of any of the CAG members (in-
cluding the PCF) which would depart from the two attitudes
expressed in the Brussels resolution, namely: to fight against
the EC's monopolistic orientation and for its democratization
(PCI and PCF), or for a total withdrawal from the EG (CPN and
DKP-SFP). Neither the PCI-PCF declaration of November 17,
1975, nor the documentation of the XXIInd PCF Party Congress
of February, 1976, gives any indication of a departure from
the minimal agreement reached so far between the PCI and PCF
on European Community questions. Fight the monopolies and
democratize the in^'ti tutions would seem still to represent
2S, Devlin, on. oi t
. ,
p-'irr'.im
,
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the extent of policy coordination. The PCF and PCI are still
poles apart on the question of direct election of EP members.
A Europe-wide communist party is still probably a long way '
into the future.
It is interesting to note that in the case of the
Socialist Group a similar situation prevails. The existence
of the Socialist Group in the EP has had little effect on the
role of the Zuropoan socialist parties in the International,
and has not overcome differences among the parties of the
Nine with respect to the future development of Europe.
GAG Contrasts with Other Political Groups
Specific comparisons have already been drawn be-
tween certain aspects of the CAG and other E? groups, e.g.:
age and political rank of the members, group cohesiveness, -^-^
Ik-
and participation m question procedures.-^ However, a brief
description of the other groups is in order, in view of the
considerable magnitude of their overall dissimilarities. It
29. Jean Kanapa, "II faut parler cl,air: I'electicn du
parlement europeen," L'Humanitp . March 2, 1976.
30. Author* s interview with Amendola, June 10, 1975.
31. James May, "Is there a European Socialism?" Journal
of Common i>:arket Studies XIII, k juno, 1975» PP. '^92-502.
32. See pp. 52-53. above.
33. See p. ^» above.
3^. See p. 92, above.
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has been seen that the GAG cannot be held to have a Group
policy toward European problems in general which is more
than a fortuitous (and rare) convergence of the policies of
the four member parties. Also the member parties vary marked-
ly in their allegiance to the concept of an integrated Europe,
and in their concept of the role which the GAG should play in
the daily workings of the European Parliament. Observation
of the other groups in many cases show similar discontinu-
ities and conflicts, or reveals that the raison d'gtre of
some of the groups differs totally from that of the others,
including the GAG.
Parliamentary political groups have been a feature
of European legislatures ever since the French Revolution.
and have played an indispensable role in the parliaments of
Europe at least since the founding of the Ilird French Repub-
35lie. While the Treaties of Paris and Rome, which estab-'
lished the ECSC and the SEC respectively, did not expressly
provide for political groups in the Assembly, they have been
institutionalized therein ever since June l6. I953. Today
they are six in number, not including the non-inscri ts . All
that is necessary to constitute a group today is that it be
a "group of political affinity," that there be either four-
teen members from one country or ten from at least three
35. Lina Vido. Evolution et Perspectives des Groupes
Politiques du Parlem^nt Euroo^en ( Lux em noun":; Gro upe
D^mocrate Chretien du Parlement Europeen. 1975).
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different countries, and that no member be a member of another
group. No 2P member is required to join a parliamentary group,
but may be listed as non-inscri t
Two of the groups which today sit in the EP are
for all practical purposes mono-national. The European Pro-
gressive Democrats (EPD) consist of twelve French JDR
(Gaullist) members and five Irish Fianna Fail members. The
SPD was formed in July. 1973, after the French elections of
that year had led to a reduction in the number of UDR repre-
sentatives in the EP from eighteen to twelve, making it
necessary for them to form a group of mixed nationality to
replace their former exclusively mono-national group. The
Fianna Fail members appear to support the UDR positions on
EG agricultural policy as well as their minimalist position
on European integration.^^ EDP group cohesiveness is thus
probably considerably greater than in the case of the GAG.
The EPD may. like the GAG, be considered a "Major structural
opposition" ^'^ in the EP, in that the EPD consistently repre-
sents the viewpoint of the UDR, which—at least until recently
has often tried to block further European integration in favor
of I'Eurooe des patries
.
On specific issues, however, the
EPD may advocate a more European— interests. -^^ From this
36, Fitzmaurice, op . cit . . p. II7.
37, . See p. 29, above.
38, Fitzmaurice, op. cit
. , p. 126,
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viewpoint the position of the PCI, at least, would seem to
be in the abstract more "European." and therefore less that
of a structural opposition than is the case with the EPD.
The European Conservative Group (ECG), organized
after Britain's accession in 1973. is even more mono-national
than the present EPD, it being composed of eighteen British
Conservatives and two Danes, one from the Conservative People's
Party and one Centre-Democrat. As such, it overwhelmingly
represents the British Conservative point of view with little
or no attention paid to Danish concerns. This view em-
bodies a cautious but consistent pro-Suropeanism, in line with
traditional British Conservative Party policy. In matters of
social policy the ECG may be considered to belong to the po-
litical opposition within the EP, together with the Christian
Democrats, to the extent that such a majority-minority dicho-
tomy on policy issues in fact exists.
The Liberal, Christian Democratic, and Socialist
Groups, on the other hand are all truly multinational, with
representatives of at least seven member nations in each.
These are the original groups of the EP's predecessor, the
Common Assembly, and represent traditional European political
trends. According to Zellentin's I966 survey, the cohesion
index showed the greatest deviation in the case of the Liber-
als and the least in the case of the Socialists, with the
39. Fitzmaurice, op. cit . , p. 152.
^0, See p. 92, above.
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Christian Democrats in the middle, but close to the Liberals.
However, this survey was made before the addition of the Labor
Party representatives to the Socialist Group in July. I975.
The Labor Party delegation is not only composed mostly of
anti-Common Market K?'s. but also includes a Scottish Nation-
alist, whose position on some issues appears to be much closer
to that of the Conservatives. Further disagreements with-
in the Socialist Group would appear inevitable, as the r-^mor
in Strasbourg that the Labor Party is seeking an alliance
with the PCI would seem to foreshadow,
Meanwhile, however, there is a certain general
pattern of group behavior which has conditioned the operation
of the Parliament. To the extent that a majority-minority
dichotomy is applicable, the core of the "governing majority"
at present consists of an informal coalition of the Socialist
and Liberal groups, with the external support of the European
Conservative Group and some of the six non-aligned members.
It is this group which probably determines the Parliament's
total response to Council and Commission initiatives. How-
ever, it has been the practice of the EP to seek for consen-
sus and unanimity both on the floor and in committee meetings
to such an extent that the influence of the Socialist-Liberal
leadership is very difficult to detect. All efforts are
41. Zellentin. "Form and Function," p. U22.'
42. Author's personal observation. Strasbourg, June 15. 197^.
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directed toward presenting a united position to the Council
and Commission, one which will not be repudiated by the
national parliaments. For this reason the resolutions are
generally bland and non-controversial; amandments are usually
withdr.:.n by tho originator in the face of opposition, rather
than allowing them to be voted on; as has been noted, roll-
call votes are rare; and group opposition to any measure in
comrnittee--excep-:; in the case of the CAG--ir> rarely carried
to the fleer.
Seen thus in perspective, the CAG's lack cf co-
hesion and imperfect functioning as an opposition is perhaps
somewhat more understandable, Each political group in the i:)'
has its particularities, and the lack of symmetry among the:ri
may only refleat tho fact that the ^rour concept -vhich orig-
inatcd in the needs of the multiparty national systems is only
partially adaptable to an international enviroramont.
A3, Fitzmaurice, o^. cit.
, p. 197.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion^;
The physical growth and political development of
the CAG during the p^st six years has paralleled important
changes on the overall European political scene. The nu-
merical expansion of the group and the growing sophistication
of its political expression have their counterpart in the in-
creasing flexibility in the approach of these parties to pro-
blems of interparty cooperation at both the national and the
European level.
The decline in direct American political pressure
on Europe which has resulted from the United States' turn
toward isolationism in the 1970 's has led to a recrudescence
of nationalism throughout Europe in v.'hich the communist part-
ies have also ahared. Polycentrism in the world communist
movement, the intellectual child of Palmiro Togliatti, has
grown steadily since he first spoke of it in 195^,^ and even
more rapidly since his demise in 196^, as West European and
Asian communist parties and party-states have become less
and less supportive of the Soviet Union and in particular its
foreign policy. Separate national paths to communism are now
2
accepted, albeit grudgingly, even by the Soviet Union.
1, Nuovi Ar^omenti No. 20(ivlay-June , 1956). republished in
P. To g 1 i a 1 1 1 . Pro hi om i del movimonto ooeraio internazionale ,
I956-I96I (Rome: Kiuniti, 19^.
2. cf. Suslov speech to Soviet Academy of Sciences, Pravda,
y.arch 18, 1976.
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The PCF. traditionally among the more loyal followers of the
CP3U. now advocates a "socialism in French color-s" as the
party's goal. 3 At the same time that the individual national
parties are asserting their independence, they are reenforc
ing each other through cooperation at the European level, as
for example in the CAG. Even though this cooperation may be
halting and full of sharp differences in practice, the grow-
ing similarity in overall approach on the part of the West
European CPs, following the lead of the PCI, particularly in
the Latin countries, is becoming more noticeable each day.
The Italian. French and Spanish CPs are now committed to the
non-violent pursuit of political goals and to the maintenance
of pluralistic politics, including the multiparty state, free,
dom of religious and cultural expression, and the abandonment
of the dogma of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The
future role of the Portuguese CP remains to he determined.
Is there anything in particular about the CPs of
Latin Europe that gives them simultaneously a strength and
flexibility not shared by the parties of the more northern,
Protestant countries? Neil Mclnnes, echoing Franz Borkenau,
has an interesting theory in this connection. He points out
that in the European Catholic countries the Church and the
political parties of Catholic inspiration have never devoted
themselves to the pursuit of the ideal of a rational economy.
3. Parti Communiste Fran(jais, Le Social i 5--! rT".? pour Li France
(Paris: Editions Sociales, 1976), p. 198
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while the Protestant societies of northern Europe have equat-
ed the perfection of the free market system of distribution
with pure rationality. The appeal of communism as a ration-
alizing force has thus become irrelevant in Protestant so-
cieties today, including the United States, but it is still
highly attractive in the Catholic countries, particularly in
a period of modernization when material goods are becoming in-
creasingly available.^
In the construction of Europe the European Parlia-
ment has a unique role to play, even though this role until
now has been overlooked in the general atmosphere of neglect
with which the EP has been treated since its first emanation
nearly a quarter of a century ago. EC Commissioner Altiero
Spinelli speaks of a "pro-European creative tenrdon" v;hlch
is kept alive and vigorotjs by the EP during the time when the
governmental representatives on the Council of ivlinisters are
distracted by selfish national objectives.^ It is indeed the
Parliament which has taken the initiative in such fundamental
questions as the direct election for EP members or the issu-
ance of a European passport, which have both functional and
great symbolic significance for the building of a united
Europe. The CAG indubitably contributes to this "creative
Neil Mclnnes, The Western !*larxists (New York: The Library
Press, 1972, p. 19^^
5. Alti ero Spinelll, The European Adventure (Londont
Macmillan, 1972) p. 27.
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tension" not despite but because of the differences which
prevail among its members, who nonetheless are united among
themselves in their decision to use a European institution
as a means of articulating their disparate views. This
intra-CAG dialectical process synthesizes into a far broader
recognition of the possibility of West European CPs becoming
more and more acceptable partners or even leaders in West
European governments of the future.
In order for the Cag, functioning as an opposition,,
to enhance the legitimatizing function of the European Parlia-
ment in the European Community, the role the EP now plays
in the Community's decision-making process must be altered.
Today, the European Parliament does not reflect in represent-
ative fashion the political and national forces y>ich are en-
compassed by the EC, either in its compostion or in its mode
of selection. Nor does the EP have an effective voice in EC
decision-making. Under these circumstances, the parties
composing the CAG have not developed into a legitimatizing
opposition within the EP, and will not be able to do so until
the Parliament is converted into a true, rule-making body for
Europe,
In the present political context, the CAG, unlike
the Socialist, Liberal, or Christian Democratic groups, cannot
perform one of the important functions of an opposition, that
of offering an alternative leadership, capable of mustering
the support of a majority of the E? members. Such a coalition
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could be formed among the traditional parties in various
combinations, but the CAG is still not "clubbable" in that
sense. Thus, despite superficial similarities to an opposi-
tion-lik« behavior, it cannot as yet be said that the CAG acts
as a legitimatizer for the EP. The situation, however, is
by no means static. If the communist-socialist alliances in
France and Italy survive and grow stronger (or if-as far as
Italy is concerned-the historic compromise materializes) an
if the PCI and PCF in due course have their forces augmented
by the addition of Greek, Portuguese, and even Spanish mem-
bers to the CAG, then the role of the Group will also change.
It may very well grow in cohesion, develop a truly European
policy not based on domestic expediencies, and in time blossom
into a genuine functioning opposition. When this will happen
is a question to which only time can give the answeri that
it will happen there would seem to be no question.
Meanwhile, the Berlin meeting of the European
communist parties which closed on June 30, 19 76, has given
eloquent testimony to the existence of a new phenomenon in
Marxism-Leninism, namely "Eurocommunism," or the determina-
tion of the communist parties of France, Italy and Spain to
develop a type of socialism which proposes to be very much at
variance with the order prevailing today in Eastern Europe,
tho Soviet Union, or the Chinese People's Republic. Euro-
communism has come to the fore simultaneously with the de-
velopment of the CAG and the evolution of a West European
communist policy toward the European Community which is very
163
different fro™ that espoused by the Soviet Union. One day
we may indeed looK back upon March 12. 1969. the day the PCI
made its debut in the HP, as one of those historic turning
points in the political develonmpnt n-r p,u. i p e of Europe which may de-
light the specialist for years to come.
16k
APPENDIX I
SELECTED DATA FROM THE I973 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES STUDY
The attached tables give data, broken down by
political party, on interest in and knowledge about the
European Community, concern for the future of the Common
Market, direct elections for the European Parliament, and
other issues of interest to the EC, The survey was con-
ducted by Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-Rene Rabier, prin-
cipal investigators, and the raw data is available from
the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research,
Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.
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Question! Are you personally very interested, a little in-terested, or not at all interested in the problems of theEuropean Community—that is, the Common Market? (Responsestabulated in percentages by "political party you feel closest
NETHERLANDS
.
Total
0.85% of total sample
Don't know, no reply 0.0 3.35
Very interested 23.08 22.68
A little interested 30.77 47,20
Not at all interested 46.15* 26.78
DENMARK
SFP»* Total
8. 51^ of total sample
Don't know, no reply 0.0 1.17
Very interested 35.29 28.69
A little interested 45.10 50.88
Not at all interested 19.61 19.27
highest percentage of not at all interested of any Dutch
political party.
* DKP responses were not recorded separately. Presumably
they are included under "Other" (3.84^ of the total
sample).
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Question: Do you think that vou are <^nff i t. •
NETHERLANDS
CPN
0.85f^ of the total samr^lp
Don't know, no reply 0 0
Sufficiently well informed 23.08
Insufficiently informed 76.92
Total
17.83
28.55
53.62
DENIvURK
„ ^
^
SFP Total
8.51% of total sample
Don't know, no reply 3.92 8 17
Sufficiently well informed 24.51 36.53
Insufficiently informed 71.57 55.30
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Sprv!t°h:lH
^^""^ tomorrow that the Common'Ma ket had been scrapped would you be very sorry about it,indifferent, or relieved? '
NETHERLANDS
CPN Total
0.85/^ of the total samp ip
13.25Don't know, no reply 7,69
Very sorry 30.77 45^31
Indifferent 53.85 36.54
Relieved 7.69 3^89
DENIVIARK
SFP Total
8. 51^ of total sample
Don't know, no reply 4.90 12.09
Very sorry 4.90 30.28
Indifferent 1^.71 29.02
Relieved 75.^9 28.31
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t''^
^""^ against the election of a European
E^J^H?^?^^ ""^"^^ citizens in the mem-ber states of the European Community?
NETHERLANDS
CPN Total
0.85% of total c^^mplp
Don't know, no reply 15.38 21 58
Completely favor 30.77 32 72
Favor on the whole 30.77 29. 71
Disagree in general 15.38 11.00
Disagree completely
. 7.69 i^.99
DENiMRK
SFP Total
8. 5lfo of total sample
Don't know, no reply 8.82 20.02
Completely favor 20.59 20.18
Favor on the whole 13.73 16.35
Disagree in general 15.69 18.^3
Disagree completely J^l.18* 25.02
highest percentage of any Danish political party.
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^ ^ political European union'' If foror against, how strongly do you feel about it?
NETHERLANDS
CPN
0,8'^% of total Rample
Total
Don't knov/, no reply 15.38 22.40
Completely favor 15.38 20.83
Favor on the whole 61.5'^ 33.^7
Disagree in general 7.69 14.14
Disagree completely 0.0 9.15
DENIVIARK
SFP
8. 51% of total samDle
Total
Don't know, no reply 3.92 1^.35
Completely favor 3.92 11.26
Favor on the whole 7.84 16.76
Disagree in general 23.53 25.69
Disagree completely 60.78 31.9^
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Question: Would you. or would you not. be willing to makesome personal sacrifice—for examt^lP Aav «
taxes to help bring about the SlcAtion of e''''urope
NETHERLANDS
CPN
O.Q'^fo of total samole
Total
Don't know, no reply 0.0 7.65
Very willing 15.38 12.91
Fairly willing 15.38 28.48
Not very willing 23.08 23.09
Not at all willing ^6.15* 27.8?
DENMARK
SFP
8. Slfo of total samnle
Total
Don't know, no reply 2.94 6.67
Very willing 4.90 6.51
Fairly willing 11.76 29.52
Not very willing 30.39 27.69
Not at all willing 50.00* 29.61
most not at all willing of any Dutch or l^anish political
par,ty.
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Question: Achieving a common foreign policy is a problem
the European Community is concerned with at present. Canyou say whether in your view this problem is very important,
fairly important, not very important, or not at all im-
portant?
NETHERLANDS
CPN
0.85^ of total sample
Total
Don't know, no reply 7.69 12.
Very important 30.77 27.66
Fairly important 23.08 35.11
Not very important 30.77 17.69
Not at all important 7.69 6.90
DENMARK
SFP
8.61!^ of total sample
Total
Don't know, no reply 1.96 4.92
Very important 15.69 21,37
Fairly important 13.73 25.13
Not very important 26.47 23.21
Not at all important 25.29
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Questiont As for the future, do you think the movement to-
ward the unification of Europe should be speeded up, slowed
down or continued as it is at present?
NETHER LAiNDS
CPN Total
0.85^/^ of tota] samT3le
Don't know, no reply 7,69 l^-.^S
Speeded up 46.15 3?-. ^5
Continued as at present 46.15 46.65
Slowed down 0.0 5.94
DENMARK
SFP Total
8.51^ of total sample
Don't know, no reply 5.88 8.34
Speeded up 10.78 12.09
Continued as at present I6.67 43,79
Slowed down 66.67* 35.78
highest percentage for slowing down of any Danish political
party.
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Question! In the future, for the unification of Europe,
which of the following formulas are you more in favor of?
1. Create some sort of European Government to which
each national government delegates a large part of
its powers.
2. Establish closer ties between the member state of
the European Union but without a European Government,
3. Maintain the degree of national independence (existin
today)
.
NETHERLANDS
^
CPN Total
0.85% of total sample
Don't know, no reply 7.69 11,95
Create a European Govt. 38.^6 30.53
Closer ties, no govt. 15.38 30,8?
Maintain status quo 38.^6 26,64
DENMARK
SFP Total
8. 51^ of total sample
Don't know, no reply 5.88 7,76
Create a European govt, ^f.90 8.09
Closer ties, no govt. 23.53 27.36
Maintain status quo 65, 69* 56. 80
highest percentage for this formula of any Danish political
party.
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